Marines currently suited to conventional warfare and are looking to transform operations to provide commanders with mobile units with “low signatures, bad attitudes and toolkits full of disruptive capabilities.”
And that means divesting of some capabilities while investing in others.
“We may need to get smaller, trade some parts we’ve had for a long time but are not a good fit for the future.“
Marines ‘not optimized’ for the next great power fight, commandant says. This is how the Corps will need to change
That’s because what the Marine Corps has to offer to the joint fight must be unique and include those disruptive capabilities.
“Our ability to conduct sea control and sea denial operations both from the sea and from key maritime terrain is an essential naval capability in modern armed conflict.”
“It’s not a nice to have,” the Commadant said. “It is essential.”
Those mobile, toolkit-packing Marines are focused on a small set of tasks to achieve sea control and denial: “sinking ships, shooting down planes, killing enemy forces inside the area and stopping all forces from coming in.”
That means reducing or eliminating money going toward manned antiarmor ground and aviation platforms, manned, traditional towed artillery that can’t be modified to fire hypervelocity projectiles, short-range mortar systems that lack precision, lethality and range, nonlethal short range drones and excess equipment being kept in administrative storage.
Areas where the Corps needs to spend? Low cost, lethal air and ground unmanned platforms, unmanned long range surface and subsurface vehicles, mobile, rapidly deployable rocket systems, long range precision fires, loitering munitions across the echelons, mobile air defense and counter-precision guided munitions capabilities, signature management, electronic warfare and expeditionary airfield.
Some of that has come from planning, a lot from wargames against various iterations of what Marines might face in the near future from peer competitors.
A recent, massive exercise involving more than 10,000 Marines from 2nd Marine Division conducting a force on force exercise at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California, helped expose some of the needed changes,.
The exercise showed atrophied skills and areas where training and equipment is needed to meet the existing capabilities of adversaries.
Those include signature management, basic fieldcraft, command and control in degraded environments, deception and decoy, electronic warfare, information operations and sustainment.
And all of those need to be done inside of the “Weapons Engagement Zone” for the Marines to be the “stand in” force taking on the role of both blunt and contact layer in any potential future fight.
“We are the frontline.”
““We are going to need to divest of certain critical capabilities that we have come to enjoy within the Marine Corps. We built a Marine Corps to fight and win a long, sustained ground campaign.”
The Corps’ heaviest land equipment is likely one area where the future cuts would take place.
“However, we’re also very heavy at this point and so that force and its ability to embark aboard some form of sea-base lift, there’s a fundamental mismatch. “What we’re going to need to do is get lighter, we’re going to need to become more distributed and more mobile.”
Exercises are shock testing "what we will expect to see in a realistic fight where large forces are spread out over great distances.”
Some 10,000 Marines just hammered away at new fighting concepts in the Corps’ largest exercise since the Cold War, testing bold new guidance to the force.
The 2nd Marine Division took on a peer enemy with similar capabilities, marking a key test of the Pentagon’s push to stay ahead of the threat.
“What we see in this exercise is what we will expect to see in a realistic fight where large forces are spread out over great distances.”
The Marines contended with degraded communications and other complicating factors, but “the imperative is to train in all warfighting domains, understanding what we look like in the electromagnetic spectrum, and evolve our noise, light and warfighting disciplines that will make us successful in battle.”
The action — dubbed the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Exercise 1-20 — played out at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms in California’s Mojave Desert, with the 2nd Marine Division squaring off against troops from the locally-based 7th and 4th Marine Regiments, along with British Royal Marines’ 40 Commando Battle Group.
“Twentynine Palms is home to 7th Marines. It’s their stomping ground, they will know every nook and cranny of this place.”
The test was about much more than overcoming geography, however. “It’s really largely about the military application of emergent technologies, the testing of developing theories, the art and science of operational design.
The “enemy” force was smaller than the attacking element, but were beefed up with emerging technologies allowing them to punch above their weight. Portable GPS jamming, small drone swarms, and radio frequency disruption are all meant to mimic an advanced force and make life difficult as possible for the 2nd Marine Division.
It is crucial to see how Marines confront those obstacles, ready to see everyone from lance corporals to his commanders fail, since that will be part of the process of getting better. “We must allow them to fail and learn from those mistakes. “Realistic training should force squad and platoon leaders to adapt to a changing environment and make decisions based upon commander’s intent,” while lessons learned “must feed back into improved realism and combat effectiveness going forward.”
Commadant questioned everything from the service’s long reliance on amphibious ships to move his troops across long distances to demanding that the Corps become more integrated with the Navy, an idea the Navy has embraced.
Building this new Marine Corps will require “very honest assessments of our strengths and our weaknesses while “unshackling ourselves from previous notions of what war looks like and reimagining how Marines will train, how we will operate, and how we will fight.”
Marines are ready to toss aside legacy equipment to so the service can develop and buy new unmanned systems, long-range fires, and other gear to allow small units to operate out of ad hoc camps in support of larger, joint campaigns.
The logistics required planners to push most of a division’s worth of troops and materiel across the country to California using contracted tractor trailer services and rail lift, something that has proven a challenge in managing hundreds of rail cars, tractor trailer loads, and aircraft across thousands of miles.
Those shipments have nothing on any potential push to get troops and their gear across thousands of miles of open ocean prowled by adversary submarines and ranged by long-range fires, but it might be something that would inform efforts to resupply troops by land in other theatres
.“Any Naval action involving Marines will inevitably involve into-, intra- and even inter-theater transport and ship-to-shore delivery.”
By land or sea, however, “training with these capabilities at scale allows you to see those hidden friction points that might otherwise be missed. “In other words, you don’t know what you are capable of until you practice with all of your capabilities at scale and at speed.”
The MWX comes as the Corps has pushed to do more training missions with partners.
One exercise focused on “enhancing Marines’ proficiency with cold-weather equipment so they can travel, survive, and enhance basic winter-warfare skills in harsh, cold-weather environments and communicate information and coordinate movements.
Today’s Marine has weapons that can shoot farther, faster, more accurately and sling many more types of projectiles downrange.
Over the past few years, Marine Corps weapons from pistols to shoulder-fired rockets have seen more advances, upgrades and changes than the service likely saw in the previous three decades.
Those changes, Marine Corps Times has found, have come from a combination of scientific studies, a recognition by top leadership that close combat has to change and battle-hardened marines telling small arms developers the weapons flaws they were finding when in the fight.
And many of the findings of those involved started with adjusting to ever-improving adversaries in current wars with an eye on what the next potential peer combat could bring.
Marines could see another major change in the coming years if the Next Generation Squad Weapon program is successful. These are three variants of a 6.8mm rifle/automatic rifle suite competing to replace both the Squad Automatic Weapon and M4/M16.
The infantry Marine of today will carry a rifle that can perform the work both of a rifle and automatic rifle in the same package, a pistol that’s built for better optics, a new grenade launcher that can fire a wider range of munitions. That same infantryman will have a more modern sniper rifle supporting his formation and likely hear a different battle as everyone around will likely have suppressed weapons.
Much of those changes, and the work that went into them, emerged from a series of experiments during Sea Dragon 2025 that focused on infantry squad lethality.“
“Across the board for all weapons modernization, pick a weapons system, the intent for everything we’re doing is to increase the lethality of the Marine rifle squad.”
And the results of those changes will likely mean changes to Marine Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the infantry squad, platoon and company as deployments and experimentation continue to push the capabilities of those formations with the new equipment they’re now fielding.
The most notable change, and nearest to the heart of every rifleman, has been the rifle.
The M16 is still the standard rifle being toted by nearly every Marine .
From its inception, it courted controversy.
Called the “plastic rifle” for jamming in firefights and continued debate over the effectiveness of its lighter, high velocity round, the first versions of the M16 cast a long shadow over government decisions in small arms and downstream effects on Marines and soldiers in combat.
But, over time, the rifle saw a host of modifications that improved its durability, range, rate of fire and the round it fired. The M4 carbine emerged and was used decades ago for special operations. While suitable for certain situations, it still lacked the range and lethality that Marines needed.
Some have criticized the basic design, calling the direct gas impingement operation that the M16 used its fatal flaw the limited its rate of fire and necessitated extensive maintenance and cleaning to avoid feeding issues and jamming.
Marine infantrymen have seen a new primary weapon enter their ranks in recent years. The M27 has or will replace all M4s for grunts.
Enter the M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle. The weapon uses a gas piston operating system. It shoots the same round but faster and with less maintenance.
But, that’s a little tricky. Mostly because, while the order came for the M27 IAR begin fielding to replace the M16 in all infantry units in 2017, the weapon actually emerged from work nearly two decades before to replace the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon.
Back in 2000, the Marines were looking for a lighter, more accurate replacement for the SAW. A request to industry in 2005 led to the Corps selecting the Heckler & Koch 416 as the M27 in 2010.
It proved lighter than the SAW and had a 36 rounds per minute rate of fire, or three times that of the M16.
The SAW has had its own checkered history with troops since it is notorious in training circles for its jamming. Nearly one third of troops who carried the SAW had it jam while in contact with the enemy. Of thousands of marines surveyed for the report, the SAW came in second only to the M9 pistol for the lack of confidence in its reliability and durability.
The SAW is also considerably less accurate than the M27. The older machine gun fires a 12 Minute of Angle as compared to the 2 MOA of the M27. That means that at 100 yards the SAW’s rounds can strike within about a foot of the target while the M27 is no more than 2 inches from where it is aimed. Initial findings also showed the M27 didn’t jam and wasn’t as dirty as the M16 or SAW systems. Those performances led to the adoption to replace the SAW in the squad, then to replace both the M16 and M4 in the squad and later, a more accurized with better optic version, the M38, to become the Squad Designated Marksman Rifle.
An M4 barrel and bolt can last up to about 10,000 rounds before needed replacement. But the M27 has routinely lasted more than 35,000 rounds before requiring the same.
Marines with 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, were equipped with M27s and suppressors for large-scale tests in 2017. The results of better signature control, accuracy and reliance cemented the decision.
The M27 essentially became a one-stop replacement for rifle, carbine, light machine gun and marksman rifle.
To help that M38 and the M27s in the squad shoot at distance more accurately, the Marines have the squad rangefinder to increase the first shot probability of hit. The Squad Common Optic, to better leverage the M27’s accuracy, had a request put out earlier in 2019 that seeks a scope to engage targets at the 600 to 900m range, which is slightly more powerful than the four times magnification and 800m range of the current Rifle Combat Optic.
They have set late 2020 to begin procuring so that fielding may commence in early 2021.
Before then, Marines will also get their hands on a new squad binocular night vision goggle by 2020 that will dramatically improve night vision, depth perception and targeting.
But, if a program to develop an entirely new rifle and automatic rifle around a round never before part of the inventory is successful, the M27 could also be replaced.
The Next Generation Squad Weapon program is currently seeing three companies compete to build the rifle and automatic rifle both chambered in 6.8mm.
To meet lighter but more lethal demands, one contractor has put forth a bullpup design, putting the magazine behind the trigger to maintain barrel length without lengthening the weapon. Another has built the weapon around the round in a “cased telescope” ammo package that eliminates the heavy brass and gives designers ways to put different types of round size, weight and propellant to squeeze performance out of the form.
Another product has a more traditional rifle design, similar to a beefed up version of the current AR platform that most Marines are familiar with but with more robust and durable components.
Though all hold promise, the next two years will determine which is has the best shot at becoming the future rifle of the Marine infantry.
The intermediate caliber round selection was to maximize lethality, accuracy and velocity in a weapon that was light enough to carry on long missions but accurate enough at farther ranges and against tougher targets, including body armor.
The pistol
At the same time as the Marines were adopting the M27, developments by another service were quickly finding a way to solve a decades-old problem — replacing the M9 Beretta pistol.
Years-long requirements that had stymied replacing the pistol were tossed out and ran through a competition, testing and fielding in less than two years to adopt the 9mm M17 handgun, part of the Modular Handgun System, which includes day/night optic and suppressor options.
Marines took on the compact version, the M18, to replace the M9s
All service branches recently adopted the Modular Handgun System as their issued sidearm, replacing the M9 pistol that's been standard carry for decades.
While each of the updates so far has replaced one for one or found more jobs for individual weapons, such as the M27, another weapon change did add some kit to the Marine gear but also more than tripled their firepower options.
That’s because the long-serving M203, 40mm grenade launcher, which came on the scene decades ago to replace the M79, a shoulder-fired, single shot grenade launcher, had just a handful of munitions that it can employ.
Developments that could include many more different 40mm variants need a different type of launcher. That’s one reason the Marines have taken on the M320, which can accommodate longer rounds with its side-loading mechanism, as compared to the breech-loading M203.
With the change from the M203 to the M320, Marines now have more ammunition options for their 40mm grenade launcher.
And each squad is going to see a new addition to its weaponry ranks. That’s because the Marine Corps is pushing down the shoulder-fired rocket, anti-barricade, anti-armor capability to the squad with the Carl Gustaf Recoilless Rifle.
The weapon fires an 84mm round that can be used for bunker busting or to take on certain light-armored vehicles and some tanks.
That capability has traditionally been held at the company level with the Mk 153 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon, or SMAW, and that previous setup included was six SMAWs for the company to employ as needed.
The current SMAW gives Marines three round options and even with the recently fielded mod 2 version, it can only effectively fire to the 500m range
.
“We took a hard look at increasing the lethality of the squad and giving them a better capability.”
The result was the Gustaf has a family of 11 rounds, nine of which are kinetic. Those options also provide nearly double the distance range as the SMAW. And one Gustaf will go to each squad, to be used much like a multi-shot grenade launcher, but with more presence.
The 2020 infantryman
And though its not technically in the squad-level arsenal, the immediate long-range rifle support to the squad got a recent boost as well.
When the Mk13 Mod 7 sniper rifle was chosen to replace the venerable M40 sniper rifle Marine shooters got not just a new rifle with modern accessories and options, they also got a more powerful, farther shooting round.
The M40 fires the same caliber as the M240 machine gun, 7.62mm, which has an effective range to 800m. Though many shoot at or beyond the 1,000m range, depending on conditions and target.
The Mk13 Mod 7, firing the .300 Winchester Magnum, gives Marine snipers at least 1,000m range with lethal power at the end of that distance.
Though an improvement, the Mk13 Mod 7 is still an interim replacement.
Marine snipers finally saw a substantial upgrade to their firepower when the Corps adopted the Mk13 Mod 7 rifle over the M40.
Marines are closely following the Special Operations Command development of the Advanced Sniper Rifle, which will likely replace the Mk13 Mod 7 when it fields in early 2021 to 2022, as officials acknowledged.
And that near-term sniper rifle replacement isn’t all that’s in store for Marine shooters.
Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s weapons experts have said at industry forums that they are assessing the work being done by SOCOM to use the .338 Norma Magnum round to replace the M240 machine gun, which fires the 7.62mm.
Marines are seeing if that would fit to replace the M240 in the rifle companies for dismounted ops.
That round can also be used in place of the .50 caliber round for some missions.
And those machine guns could be suppressed.
Plans now call for a suppressed squad using the M27 and the M18 pistol. But testing being conducted is looking more closely at also suppressing medium machine guns. Developments by SOCOM put a timeline of fiscal year 2021 for testing an M240 suppressor.
Not just riflemen anymore: Marines must self sustain in the high end fight
Military operations have always relied on logistics: The supply of fuel, food, bullets and medicine keep the fight going from the front lines back to the homeland.
But the way the Marine Corps intends to fight the next war will require a major shift from mountains of steel piled in deserts or long convoys trucking boxes of MREs and towing water on dusty mountain paths.
Marines will not only be riflemen when forward-deployed, but also water purifiers, fuel cleaners and power scavengers.
The Corps is entering an era of “hybrid logistics.” And that era will see Marines continuing to use the systems and concepts that have kept them fueled for a couple of generations while simultaneously adapting to be more self-sustaining in hotly contested environments.
The focus, as was stated in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance issued this summer is for the Corps to aid the Navy through sea denial. That means pockets of small groups of Marines strung out within weapons range of adversaries far from the robust supply chain that they’ve enjoyed for the past decades.
“We have to be lighter, more economical. “Fuel is the pacing commodity.”
That means ways to identify better fuel economy, finding fuel sources and cleaning fuel that the do find in substandard supplies.
For the logistics community that will mean using automation to deliver exactly what’s needed when it is needed, or “precise sustainment.”
But logistics goes beyond beans and bullets . It means maintaining the systems that drive modern warfighting.
To tackle that problem, Marines are looking to industry methods to have better awareness and monitoring of the conditions of all of their systems at all times.
“The ability to look at a platform and understand its health; to make decisions far removed from the battlefield and deliver for sustainment is critical for us.”
If achieved, that would give commanders sensors that they could respond to and conduct “condition-based maintenance,” keeping platforms in the fight and pulling them when necessary to maintain their capabilities.
What the future of feeding the operational forces looks like is likely not what it is now. The Maritime Prepositioning Force, a fleet of commercial ships in floating rotation around the world ready to pull into a port and offload for Marines to meet just isn’t likely to work in a near-peer conflict.
While MPF had served the Corps well, the future will likely include more smaller, distributed force packages. A lot of which they’ve been observing industries well versed in delivery to learn best practices.
Some of that future includes robots.
A Forward Aerial Refueling Point, or FARP, of the future might contain a handful of Marines assisted by automated machines so that five humans can do the work of a platoon’s worth of Marines for a short period.
One problem they’ve still not figured out is how to get fuel to contested areas, and current ship to shore petroleum offload capacity is not prepared for those scenarios.
“We must move towards a new concept that really supports the joint enterprise.”
To address that, a series of war games that has put logistics as a crucial piece that are looking at scenarios beyond regional conflicts Marines have tackled and looks at what war looks like across multiple combatant commands.
Meaning, logistics will have to conduct intra- and inter-theater delivery. Getting supplies to the combat theater then moving them around the contested environment.
Logistics are always part of the discussion and wargame but there are bigger questions being pursued now.
“What is occurring now, is while we have operational plans against individual adversaries, now we’re looking at simultaneous. “What do you do? That’s the globally integrated piece. How do you sustain security throughout the globe with multiple adversaries?”
New devices allows a Marine to 3D map an area, whether a barracks parking lot, soccer field or beach, and place virtual tanks and other targets on the real background.
The Marine Corps Modeling and Simulation Management Office was tasked with identifying and maintaining a list of approved video games.
Marines were also authorized to write to Marine Corps Combat Development Command to seek approval for new games to be added to the list, according to the Marine order.
“Decisions made in war must frequently be made under physical and emotional duress. Our brain exercises in peacetime should replicate some of the same conditions.
The Corps is pushing heavy on virtual simulators. One such device is a simple pair of virtual reality googles that serves as a mobile fires support trainer to help keep air tactical controllers and Joint Fires Observers fresh on their skills.
Marines and units don’t always have the time to reserve ranges, virtual reality simulators can help reduce the work burden while also being cost effective.
Another system being looked at by the Corps is the gunfighter gym. These systems are ultra realistic marksmanship simulators that can change scenarios, terrain, environment, or day and night.
Marine squads can be pitted against low tech enemies or thrown though the gauntlet against a technological superior enemy with night vision and thermal capabilities.
The system has a recording function so a squad can playback their performance and help them adjust or work through tactical solutions.
“Since success in combat depends in large part on our collective capability to make and execute effective military decisions under physical and emotional stress, it is imperative that all Marines make every effort to exercise and develop their decision making abilities.”
It was high noon in a mock city located in the California desert. Automatic rifle fire could be heard in the distance and the sound of a drone — heard but not seen — buzzed in the blue skies above.
A Marine Corps lieutenant stuck his rifle out a window and used its scope to reconnoiter a block of nearby buildings. Six of his men had just been lost and there was a sniper nearby. It was only a mock battle, but adrenaline levels were running high.
“Hey Animal. On that uniform 10 alpha and charlie. The round went through the roof and exploded on the second floor. That’s all I know…”
“No KIA?
“Don’t know. We can’t observe from inside the building.”
Several minutes later, a report came back negative. The sniper had escaped.
Range 220 at Twentynine Palms, California, consists of some 1,200 buildings and resembles the urban battle zones.. But the seven-day Marine Air-Ground Task Force Warfighting Exercise, also known as MWX, was not intended to replicate counterinsurgency battles. That will always be an element of the Marine Corps mission, but this service-level training exercise has been retooled to teach Marines to fight peer or near-peer competitors.
“We want to get good at that again. “It’s not just about training the tactics. It’s about systems. It’s about thought processes. It’s about — when you’re facing somebody that has equal or better equipment than you, that is as dedicated to the fight as you — can you make rapid decisions by taking in information and then implement those decisions across a domain challenged environment to take action?”
Both sides in MWX had armored vehicles, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, the ability to call in close-air support and electronic and cyber warfare tools at their disposal, just as a near-peer military would.
“What’s exciting about this force on force is that these Marines want to win. They are keyed up. You can feel the tension between them. … Some of these guys know each other so they can talk smack afterwards.”
The exercise was spread out over 200 square miles of the base, but the focus that day was on Range 220, a warren of buildings, streets, alleyways and tunnels. The mock city was originally built for counterinsurgency conflict and can absorb 10,000 troops. While there might be a shift to fighting “great powers,” the Marine Corps believes urban warfare is here to stay. Clearing the city was one of the organizers’ objectives.
“Whatever the nature of war is going forward, people live in buildings and cities and towns. We’re going to have to figure out the urban fight. … This is a sustainable technique, tactic and procedure that we have to constantly improve upon.
“We have to keep that in our training. That part of warfare is never going to change.
“We’re trying to teach this generation of Marines that people live where you’re going to fight. And they may not be able to evacuate. There may be populations problems. … How are you going to deal with that?”
Because this is not a live-fire exercise, the battle unfolds over the course of the week unscripted. A live-fire exercise, for safety purposes, is highly controlled. In this case, Marines wear harnesses with electronics that indicate when they have been hit. The referees — called “coyotes” — wear orange backpacks to distinguish them from the participants. They can declare a Marine knocked out, necessitating the need to execute a evacuation. The one action that could not be simulated was artillery fire.
The coyotes told the Marines when they were under indirect fire.
The mock casualties presented real problems. “It’s warfare. It’s going to happen. You’re going to face attrition. You have to adjust.”
All elements are being trained. Explosive ordnance disposal teams were on hand because the Marine Corps expects roadside bombs to be employed by near-peer competitors or their proxies. EW teams were trying to jam their opponents’ communications. Someone was operating the UAV that buzzed overhead throughout the day to provide surveillance but it wasn’t clear which side was using it.
Marines used colored smoke grenades to send signals to each other, indicating that they were operating in a degraded communications environment.
“Each unit will assign a variable meaning to the colors. It could mean move forward, clear a building, clear a floor. Bring up the armor. Bring up the squad. … In an urban environment, communicating between buildings is really hard.”
MWX coordinators made sureIn the context of fighting a peer competitor on the battlefield, we are employing EW on both sides. The Marines are experiencing the challenge of that.”
And like any force, the troops had to be resupplied.
“This is really challenging for us because we have a living, thinking enemy trying to win the fight.”
Meanwhile, depending on weather and availability, nearby air wings could participate as well, providing close-air support, resupply or troop transport. Harriers, F/A-18s, Ospreys, Super Cobras and Super Hueys took part during the course of the week-long exercise.
Because much of the Twentynine Palms base was being used in the exercise and was fair game, spotters have been sent to landing zones to provide reconnaissance. If six V-22 Ospreys are seen taking off, they can radio ahead the possibility that an air-assault is coming.
“We can’t control that. We set this scenario. And yeah, that’s what happened. One side would eventually gain air superiority over the other.
The exercise was also an opportunity to test new equipment. Some of the technology is new to the force and will be incorporated into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Others are still under development and being evaluated.
“It’s different equipment across different capabilities. Since most of it was geared toward the “near-peer” fight, leaders declined to provide any details and tip the Marines’ hand.
“We are absolutely evaluating ways to be more effective in the conventional fight across all domains,” including electronic warfare.
Marines at MWX are training for the “gray zone,” and hybrid warfare where there is a lot of ambiguity. The adversary is leveraging unconventional capabilities with both uniformed and non-uniformed special operators.
And there are civilians who might have other motivations that lead them to participate with the adversary.
Marines “have to fight at the high-end conventional, but also at the low end in that sort of dynamic environment.”
At the MWX’s conclusion, there will be an after-action report to provide feedback for the participants.
“The overall end state is to present both the adversary force that we use and the exercise force with that situation, see their ability to compete and operate in that environment, learn lessons from that, develop leaders, and develop new tactics, techniques and procedures.
Raiding Beaches.
It is time for the Corps to fully integrate into the Navy to maximize warfighting.
Leaders are concerned that we’re going too slow and that we’re afraid of change. Nearly two decades of sustained operations ashore have negatively affected the Corps’ institutional sense of self. Operating from static command posts and executing overt patrols with the certainty of air and naval preeminence will not define operations in a peer conflict.
The development of antiship ballistic missiles able to sink an aircraft carrier, ground- and space-based anti-satellite systems, advanced network capabilities, an expanding overseas basing infrastructure, and the use of land reclamation activities to expand its regional maritime claims have created a powerful antiaccess/area denial A2/AD buffer.
To be the nation’s “naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations,” the Marine Corps must become lighter, more versatile, and more survivable, and leadership is considering fully integrating into the Navy’s fleet structure, deagating its air wings, and overhauling its ground combat forces.
The first step in this reinvention could be complete naval integration. Marines have discussed returning to their “amphibious roots” for years. As some Marine leaders have recently asked, are we naval in purpose or just in character? “Such other duties as the leaders may direct” have led to a jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none mentality, seeking to be the force of choice for every mission across the range of military operations.
The Commadants Planing Guidance ends the debate:
The Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. The Fleet Marine Force acts as an extension of the Fleet.”
This is the Corps’ new statement for maritime conflict. The service’s raison d’être is “the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. The issue becomes whether the Corps should remain a coequal service or be absorbed by the Navy altogether.
It is time for the Marine Corps to fully integrate into the Navy under the composite warfare command CWC architecture. Only as a fully integrated element of the CWC will Marines identify themselves—and will the Navy understand them—as amphibious in both character and purpose.
Integration into the CWC structure will ensure the Corps’ enduring utility and increase the lethality and survivability of the Navy-Marine Corps team. Placing Marine complements on board all classes of naval vessels affords commanders increased flexibility across multiple domains, while increasing adversary commanders’ uncertainty.
Marine detachments on board surface combatants could conduct visit, board, search, and seizure missions, eliminating the need for collaterally trained sailors to conduct high-risk missions. Amphibious reconnaissance forces could find their home in submarines. High-mobility artillery rocket systems HiMARS already are proving their utility on small-deck amphibious ships. Distributed employment would bring greater flexibility, lethality, and survivability while fostering interdependence and integration.
Full integration into the CWC construct is the primary step toward realizing the CPG’s vision. If Marines are the ground combat component of the CWC, however, where does that leave Marine aviation? To analyze the requirements of the Marine Corps in relation to the current threat environment, all assumptions must be challenged.
Any air operations necessary for a larger naval campaign could in principle be conducted by Navy aviators, to include close-air support and assault support of the Marine Corps and this is being considered In a service-level context, this would gain efficiencies and reduce duplicative efforts. A large portion of existing Marine aviation structure may be transferred to the Navy it such proposals find a foothold.
Current law mandates that the Marine Corps include three air wings but this was written when the aircraft carrier was the preeminent power in naval warfare. The same capabilities that threaten L-class shipping threaten carriers. “Visions of a massed naval armada ten nautical miles off-shore preparing to launch the landing force . . . are impractical and unreasonable.”
Like Marine aviation, many current operating force and supporting establishment organizations should be examined for future utility and considered for alteration or abolition, such as the Marine logistics groups and network commands. After it is fully integrated into the Navy’s CWC structure and inefficiencies are eliminated, the Corps needs to overhaul and reorient its ground combat forces—the Marine divisions.
Marine divisions are neither the elite light infantry force , nor the heavy mechanized maneuver forces required of a large land army. Nearly two decades of counterinsurgency campaigns have atrophied many competencies required of an amphibious light infantry force, especially one that is fully integrated into the Navy’s CWC architecture.
Among the most glaring examples are scouting and patrolling, camouflage and concealment, proficiency in small boat operations, and an ability to self-sustain. In addition, lack of multispectral signature management especially of command-and-control nodes and overreliance on large vehicle footprints are unsustainable given both the nature of the pacing threat and the requirements of distributed maritime operations.
Many Marines are aware of such issues, but placing the burden on operating forces to address them is inadequate. An institutional approach is necessary, including the reorientation of unit training priorities.
To persist inside an adversary A2/AD engagement zone, Marines need to be lighter, more agile, and more survivable. The middleweight force currently fielded by Marine divisions has a signature that is too large and too tied to vehicular support to evade adversary targeting.
The Corps can consider divesting itself of all heavy armor and most light-armored platforms. The main effort would be light infantry forces operating in small units that can maneuver and communicate clandestinely for extended periods inside an adversary engagement zone. Forces that can effectively infiltrate will be more successful at evading adversaries and more successful at persisting inside enemy engagement zones.
Furthermore, static, large-footprint command posts at the battalion level and above must be eliminated, as enemy use of unmanned aerial systems and long-range precision fires have made them dangerous and outdated. Fighting this way against a peer adversary with robust overhead collection and special operations forces would be costly.
An infantry battalion command post will need to be capable of operating with a small enough footprint to remain clandestine and still effectively command and control. Army Special Forces Operational Detachments–Charlie could be a model for a Marine infantry battalion field headquarters.
However, persisting inside an adversary’s A2/AD network is only half the job. To facilitate sea control/sea denial, seize and hold key maritime terrain, reconnoiter and defend advanced naval bases, and conduct other operations that will facilitate the naval campaign, the future force must be armed with more than the current inventory of infantry weapon systems.
Antiship and surface-to-air missile systems that can create mutually contested maritime spaces must be part of every infantry formation. Although larger signature, extended-range artillery systems such as HiMARS will play a major role in this mission, they cannot be the sole solution.
A broader range of low-signature systems, such as man-portable and unmanned systems, distributed across a larger geographic space, should be the primary objective for initial stay-behind or stand-in forces. Without the ability to accomplish these essential tasks, an infantry formation—even one that can successfully persist inside an A2/AD network—is little more than an easily bypassed nominal force.
To facilitate this operating concept, infantry forces also must broaden their means of insertion and infiltration. Lighter, cheaper, and more expendable vehicles would increase mobility in complex littoral terrain, improve flexibility in insertion and extraction, and lighten the logistics footprint to sustain the force. In addition, proficiency in small boat operations should be required for an amphibious light infantry force. Even the signature of foot-mobile forces can be further reduced by advances in multispectral camouflage.
Marines also must surpass current concepts of expeditionary logistics. They must reduce the demand signal for an already substantial logistics tail. What currently are treated as survival techniques e.g., personal water purification)must be daily skills if Marines are to accomplish the CPG objectives.
The Marine Corps of the Future
Many stakeholders may be unwilling to accept these recommendations. The Commandant made clear, however, “There is no piece of equipment or major defense acquisition program that defines us. . . . Instead, we are defined by our collective character as Marines.” Every Marine is a Marine first, then an aviator, tanker, logistician, or rifleman. Gatekeeping should not dissuade Marines from fielding the right force for maritime conflict.
An individual Marine or unit challenged on a technique or procedure, replying “That’s the way we’ve always done it,” is the a concern.
By fully integrating into the Navy’s CWC, gaining efficiencies in aviation and the supporting establishment structure, and overhauling its ground forces, the Marine Corps can reinvent itself as a more lethal and survivable naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. This new-look Corps would be capable of persisting inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone, creating mutually contested space and facilitating larger naval campaigns. Marines must challenge existing assumptions if they want to realize this future.
“We may need to get smaller, trade some parts we’ve had for a long time but are not a good fit for the future.”
“Our ability to conduct sea control and sea denial operations both from the sea and from key maritime terrain is an essential naval capability in modern armed conflict.” “That’s my premise.” said the Commadant.
“It’s not a nice to have. It is essential. We are the frontline.” The Commadant said.
With the transformation of Marine Corps Aviation, the older notion of the ARG-MEU is being replaced by a much more flexible concept of the amphibious task force.
And with the central importance of dealing with full spectrum crisis management, the capabilities resident in the task force as well as its enhanced capabilities to reachback to capabilities not organic to the task force is changing the concept of operations as well.
With the coming of the Osprey, the tyranny of helicopter range was broken, which allowed for the expansion of the core ARG-MEU to be able to cover a much wider range of operations.
With the addition of the F-35B to the force, and the building of a new class of large amphibious ships, the combing of Ospreys with F-35Bs has allowed the emergence of a new ampbhious based assault carrier concept.
By committing Marine Corps Aviation to shaping a digital interoperability capability, and with the coming of the CNI enabled F-35, the amphibious task force can add other new capabilities to extend its operational approach and envelope.
And enhanced capabilities to move data throughout the force to enable its capabilities to operate as an integrated distributed force means that the amphibious task force can be tailored to the threat and leverage reachback assets to the wider Navy fleet or Air Force assets as well.
The Navy and Marine Corps recently tested out the “Lightning Carrier” concept of packing an amphibious assault ship with F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter jets, and they will likely continue to expand and exercise this capability.
Knowing that ships would have the capability to support so many F-35Bs, the services have long talked about the Lightning Carrier concept as a capability that would be useful in a high-end fight.
The jets’ stealth, ability to collect and distribute vast data and strike targets would make them ideal for the opening of a fight: they could come off a ship at sea and take out enemy defenses with jamming and missiles, collect information and share it with the rest of the fleet at sea and Marines on the ground or heading ashore.
Still, though the jets routinely operate on the forward-deployed big-deck and have conducted a deployment from the Amphibious Ready Group, operating so many at once is much different than previous operations with about six jets onboard and supplemented by tiltrotors and helicopters.
With the ampphibious task force concept, the Marines and the Navy can reevaluate what constitute the platforms which can become part of the task force going forward as well.
“Why not have integrated command and control? Why not figure out how to have the ships integrated, so that when the smaller ships need some gas they don’t have to go to the big-deck amphib, which currently is the only ship that can give fuel?”
It is clear that the digital interoperability piece is crucial to any such operational remaking of the amphibious fleet to become an effective full spectrum crisis management task force.
And at the heart of this capability is the transformation of the Naval aviation, from the Osprey, to the F-35B, to the modernization of the attack helicopters, the Venom and the Zulu, to the coming of the CH-53K, to the preparation to integrate a new air remote system to the force MUX, to operating an ashore radar system which can call in fires from a variety of combat sources G/ATOR, and doing so with a core focus on integratability and ability to operate in a full spectrum combat environment.
It is not just that there are new air platforms added to the force which open up new combat capabilities, but it is the ongoing modernization opportunities for the force to leverage those new capabilities through interactive modernization cycles.
A good case in point is the next phase of Osprey modernization, which is clearly driven by the coming of the F-35B to the force and anticipating the coming of the CH-53K and the MUX.
That shift requires the aircraft not simply to be a robust distance runner but to become smart in the digital battlespace.
This requires major modifications to the aircraft in terms of its ability to work with data, generate data and to work in the evolving C2 and ISR infrastructure which the Marine Corps is building for its approach to building an integrated distributed force.
The F-35 can contribute to the Osprey and the V-22 aircraft needs to be modified to a more useful member of the integrated distributed force.
“With the Marine in the back of the Osprey working with his MAG-Tab tablet, they have the ability able to gain access to information flowing in from other platforms in the battlespace.
“And that is one key aspect of what we are focused on as we rework the program.
“We have already done exercises at MAWTS-1 and VMX-1 where the Marine in the back of a V-22 can be looking on his MAG-TAB at a video generated from an H-1 or an F-35 operating in the same battlespace.”
And the V-22 working with the F-35 is a key element of being able for the Marine Corps/Navy team to work a Lightening carrier approach whereby an LHD can operate a significant number of F-35s with accompanying Ospreys.
And this approach clearly is about changing dramatically the nature of what a Marine Corps assault force looks like as well as the combat effect it can achieve.
With the transformation of Marine Corps Aviation, the older notion of the ARG-MEU is being replaced by a much more flexible concept of the amphibious task force.
And with the central importance of dealing with full spectrum crisis management, the capabilities resident in the task force as well as its enhanced capabilities to reachback to capabilities not organic to the task force is changing the concept of operations as well.
With the coming of the Osprey, the tyranny of helicopter range was broken, which allowed for the expansion of the core ARG-MEU to be able to cover a much wider range of operations.
With the addition of the F-35B to the force, and the building of a new class of large amphibious ships Ospreys with F-35Bs has allowed the emergence of a new ampbhious based assault carrier concept.
By committing Marine Corps Aviation to shaping a digital interoperability capability, and with the coming of the network enabled F-35, the amphibious task force can add other new capabilities to extend its operational approach and envelope.
Clearly, enhanced capabilities to move data throughout the force to enable its capabilities to operate as an integrated distributed force means that the amphibious task force can be tailored to the threat and leverage reachback assets to service-wide forces.