Navy faces significant challenges in maintaining its current fleet and realising full benefit of the ships it has in its inventory today due to persistent and substantial maintenance delays. The Navy has made progress identifying the causes of their maintenance challenges and has begun efforts to address them. However, delays continue to persist and these challenges will require years of continued executive attention and substantial investment to be resolved.

The FY20 Maintenance and Modernization Plan begins to capture the requirements necessary to maintain the Navy’s fleet mission-ready. This plan forms the basis for future industrial base capacity requirements with the following key themes:

Shows that maintaining and modernizing the fleet requires a sustained and sufficient investment, and a close partnership with the public and private ship repair industrial base.

Demonstrates that as the Navy grows to 355 battle force ships, the demand on the industrial base must change to effectively maintain and modernize a growing and changing fleet. This will require changes to industrial base infrastructure, workforce, and business processes to prepare for the future workload.

Reaffirms that maintenance and modernizations rely on a robust and highly efficient supply chain to deliver material to the fleet. As the fleet grows in size, complexity and age, the supply chain vendor base must deliver the material support necessary to achieve the required level of readiness.

Demonstrates that continued maintenance of ships in accordance with the applicable class maintenance plans is necessary to allow the Navy to achieve the maximum service life of ships and submarines as well as extend the service lives of select classes of ships to achieve a battle force of 355 ships.

This plan describes the Navy’s continued challenges with high-tempo operations that has resulted in a maintenance backlog and reduced readiness rates for Navy ships. It is baselined on the current 2019 inventory and PB-2020 data with updates from the FY 2020 Shipbuilding Plan, planned selected service life extensions and projected decommissionings during the next 30 years.

Navy status updates related to the delivery and subsequent post-delivery period for selected ship platforms have been assessed to determine to what extent Navy provides quality, complete ships to the fleet and sustains the fleet over the service life.

We assessed what work was incomplete or deficient when each case study ship was delivered to the Navy from the shipbuilder, providing updates about the availabilities, tests, and trials each ship completed during the post-delivery period; and the condition of each ship when it was provided to the fleet following the post-delivery period as well as current maintenance actions required for sustainment.

In particular, for the selected ships that have already completed the post-delivery period, we assessed the number and type of deficiencies at the time of ship delivery and tracked these through the post-delivery period into sustainment phase maintenance activities to determine whether they were passed to the fleet core requirements.

For each case study, we reviewed such status updates for delivery, readiness briefings for Board of Inspection/Survey trials, trial cards and reports, Material Inspection and Receiving Report for operational assessments and maintenance availability stats throughout each sustainment phase.

For example, flexible coupling on the starboard main propulsion diesel failed in transit resulting in loss of propulsion to one of the four engine shafts. Couplings were intended to last the life of the ship and no spare parts were available.

Maintenance optimisation models maximise balance between cost/benefit of maintenance. For given system with failure rate profiles of its components and the available maintenance resources, maintenance optimisation model provides the answer to questions like:

“What is the optimal number of maintenance tasks required on this piece of equipment for a given time horizon?”

“When is the appropriate time to execute maintenance action?”

In more complex cases, optimisation model also includes decisions about the spare parts policy for components & estimating number of maintenance crews required in given shift.

Capacity for applications described in this report currently consider only subset of missions and focuses on equipment-specific planning factors.

Future work will expand application to include other missions and will include additions or process advance of existing features—for example, the addition of a consistency test for relative task importance selection.

The first challenge is how to deal with common tasks when considering multiple missions. It may be the case that a single command centre is all that is required to accommodate multiple missions, but the equipment needed to support each mission may differ in some way. In other words, although the task is “common,” there may be unique, mission-specific requirements for accomplishing it.

Second challenge concerns sequencing tasks and assigning relative importance at the task level versus the mission level. A typical example might be transport of equipment to new staging area. If mission A is designated more important than mission B, does that mean that all tasks associated with mission A have absolute priority? If not, how do we provide the user with the ability to designate exceptions at the task level?

Congress provides guidance on accounting for depot maintenance by listing exceptions to the definition. The existing exclusions are confusing. For example, any modification designed to “improve performance” is not considered depot maintenance. The installation of parts for modifications is depot maintenance, but not the acquisition of those parts. 

Current acquisition guidance does not provide any emphasis/direction for core assessments. Acquisition policy addressing core maintenance capabilities is largely absent. 

Almost all of major programmes failed to identify core requirements within the required timeframe, and many didn’t identify core requirements until either the production/deployment phase or the sustainment phase of the acquisition process.

Delay results in core requirements not being identified early enough in the acquisition process to allow for the establishment of organic core capabilities mandated by DoD policy.

Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination Process, addresses only tasked or fielded systems. It does not cover those systems still in the acquisition process. There also is little, if any, core workload focus on jointly developed systems, resulting in capabilities determinations not up to par.

The Navy reported workload shortfalls in aircraft component, aircraft engines, ships, and communications and electronics. The Navy cited confusion between systems commands and an inability to obtain funds to establish organic capability. 

The Navy responds to demands for forces by resourcing a strategy that balances current and long-term readiness requirements by considering: 1) cost to own—maintaining ships and aircraft to ensure expected service life is met; 2) cost to train—producing the proficiency to operate ships and aircraft; 3) cost to operate—based on a fleet response plan FRP that provides deployed and surge-ready units and battle groups to support combatant commander demands. 

Alignment of the readiness requirements strategy allows for the balancing of the costs to train and operate flying hour and ship operations accounts with the cost to own, i.e., aviation and ship depot accounts. This balance facilitates the optimisation of achieving the FRP operational availability schedule in framework phases: 1) maintenance; 2) basic; 3) integrated; 4) sustainment. 

The number of required serviceable ships and airframes is based on meeting the readiness entitlement during each FRP phase. Readiness models estimate the cost of each FRP phase using pricing factors that are specific to field and depot maintenance actions flying hours, ship operations, and ship and aviation depot repairs. 

Combining the readiness output provided by each phase of the FRP with the cost of that phase creates the link between desired readiness output and budget levels. For example, Navy ships and aircraft are capital-intensive forces that, when properly maintained, last for decades and meet their associated expected service life.

The Navy recognises that scheduled maintenance of these ships and aircraft and the associated training and certification of their crews between deployments are key elements of the costs to own and operate the fleet. Readiness models can accurately reflect the cost to own, train, and operate Navy forces and fleets and to reach expected service life of its ships and aircraft.

 1. Decreased crew levels. 

Navy’s effort to reduce crew sizes corresponded with increases in maintenance costs that outweighed the savings achieved through reduced personnel costs. Shifts in maintenance workload from the organizational- and intermediate levels to depot-level maintenance increased overall maintenance costs. This change occurred in part because reduced crew sizes resulted in minor maintenance being deferred, which developed into more costly issues that had to be addressed later at the depot level.
  
2. Extended deployments. 

Navy decisions to extend deployments can lead to maintenance challenges, since these decisions have resulted in declining ship conditions across the fleet, and have increased the amount of time that ships require to complete maintenance in the shipyards.

3. Deferred maintenance. 

Maintenance deferred while a ship is deployed can develop into more costly issues that must be addressed later, often during depot-level maintenance. Deferred maintenance can lead to new work at the shipyards, as the degraded ship conditions result in the need for additional maintenance. Systems with the potential to reduce ship service life can be subject to maintenance deferrals in order to allow the ship to sustain a high operational tempo. 

4.  Difficulties in adhering to the maintenance planning process. 

Navy must accurately define the work for each ship’s maintenance period. To do this, the Navy’s maintenance planning process specifies planning milestones intended to ascertain the ship’s condition, identify the work needed, and plan for its execution. Missing or meeting planning milestones late can contribute to maintenance delays. 

5. Late discovery of additional workload

Navy does not always adhere to its own maintenance planning process due to high operational tempo, scheduling difficulties, or personnel shortages, among other factors. As a result, shipyards discover the need for additional repairs after maintenance has begun and adding time to the schedule for planning, contracting, or waiting for parts.  

6. Navy shipyards have shortages of skilled personnel. 

The Navy has reported a variety of workforce challenges at such as hiring personnel in a timely manner and providing personnel with the training necessary to gain proficiency in critical skills. Some occupations require years of training before workers become proficient. But neither  depots, their higher-level service component commands, nor the services have conducted an assessment to determine the effectiveness of these actions.                                                                                                                        
7. Infrastructure condition affect timeliness 

Poor condition of facilities and equipment at the shipyards contributed to maintenance delays for aircraft carriers and submarines. Navy shipyards do not track when facility problems leads to maintenance delays. Age of equipment at the shipyards is beyond its average expected service life posing an increased risk for maintenance delays or higher maintenance costs, affecting the depots’ ability to conduct work. 

8. The Navy shipyards lack the capacity to conduct required maintenance in the future. 

Navy shipyards cannot support many of the maintenance periods that aircraft carriers and submarines will require through 2040, due to a lack of dry dock capacity. Shipyards could have some additional capacity to conduct maintenance, but are hesitant to invest in creating this capacity without more certainty from the Navy. Optimal placement of facilities and major equipment can increase its maintenance efficiency by reducing the distance that workers and material will have to travel around the shipyards during the maintenance period. 

9. Hiring additional workers at shipyards. 

Shipyards have increased hiring, but it takes several years for workers to reach full productivity. In the past, new hires would take about 5 years to become fully productive, although Navy plans to reduce that time through new training techniques.  

10. Performance to Plan. 
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The Navy has begun an analytical effort to better understand maintenance challenges and its capacity needs for the future, called “Performance to Plan.” Project is intended to help the Navy improve full and timely completion of maintenance, including for aviation, surface ships, and submarines. The effort for surface ship maintenance currently involves a pilot program looking at how to better plan and execute maintenance periods including examining how to improve the accuracy of forecasted maintenance requirements/duration and better adhere to planning milestones, among other 

​Navy must find ways to get ships and capabilities out to the fleet faster. There are issues, such as the Ford-class aircraft carrier that continues to climb in cost, and fixing a servicewide maintenance mess caused by years of cuts and overtasking of a shrinking fleet.

Navy is focused on. first and foremost, delivery. We have got to get capability into the fleet, whether that’s new capability, new construction or sustaining the capability we have. So the big measure of success is through the fleet size. Reorganising our value proposition along that line is an important piece.

Second piece is focusing on agility. The world is changing faster and faster, threats are changing, we’re in a world competition. And so if we can’t change faster, we are not going to be relevant.

Third piece has been focusing on getting some fundamental costs out. And as we try and grow the fleet, they won’t do as much good if we can’t afford to build and operate that fleet. We want to take fundamental costs out of the system.

Congress has been vocal about the need to control the costs of the first-in-class ships. We’ve got Columbia coming up, as well as FFG(X), large surface combatant and a fleet of unmanned ships. How will Navy get their arms around that?

That’s certainly a fundamental thing to watch. First-in-class ships are tough. It comes down to a couple of different things. One is having a robust dialogue as we are building requirements with both industry and our technical experts, and moving away from transactional requirements.

The frigate is an example where we’ve had a much more interactive dialogue. We've actually changed requirements based on cost and time, and so, that’s an important element. We’re doing a lot more of that.
Industry seems excited about predictive analytics in the maintenance world: knowing what’s going to break before it breaks. Is there potential for significant cost savings?

That’s where the commercial world’s gone. We have the data. We haven’t integrated the data and the analytics into our processes the way we need to.

In the future we will essentially have a Digital Twin of the ship in terms of how all the systems are working, what needs maintenance, what doesn’t and how are they operating, to better condition our maintenance planning. 

The biggest thing we need to improve in our maintenance work is planning, and so that when we open up a ship, we have a better idea of what needs to be done. And then a little less focus on cost and more focus on schedule, because what the fleet really is sensitive to is ships coming in on time and ships coming out on time.

Sometimes we get a little too fixated on cost, and we incur a lot of cost because we control cost by having schedule move-out, and that just ripples its way all the way through the system.

We need to set the standards for shipbuilders in the ship repair world, and then let them go so that we are not unnecessarily holding up maintenance activities as they’re ongoing. That’s what we need to deliver for the fleet.
The private shipyards that do maintenance often complain the Navy is too unpredictable. How can the Navy regain the trust of industry?

Lack of either planning or adhering to plan has been one of the core issues. This is the first year we’ve ever produced a 30-year ship maintenance plan. Now, it’s not specific for every ship at every time, but it shows the amount of work we’ve got to do and how we’ve got to build so that industry can make smart investments seeing that.

Then what we’re trying to do for the ships returning from deployment is we’re moving away from executing a contract 30 days before we needed to start the maintenance. So now we’re back to a six-month goal, so we have a plan.

We’re never going to be able to control every variable. It’s not a commercial effort where you own every route and you can control every variable to hyper-optimize. We don’t want to hyper-optimize because then you lose some resiliency. But we’re trying to find that sweet space of enough predictability so that we can be efficient.

The other thing we’re doing is setting some controls. In new construction, we have a very disciplined way to add work in. We didn’t have quite that level of discipline in repair, and so we tended to add work in late in the game.

We’re adding some discipline into that, so if we advance plan a little bit sooner and add some more discipline, then we can make a better decision on the exact impact. Because while it may not seem that large for that individual ship, it could have a huge ripple effect, and we need to be cognizant of that when we make those decisions.

Navy has been especially challenged on the submarine maintenance front, particularly with the attack boats. Is there some light at the end of the tunnel?

We have accelerated by about a year hiring all the DoD folks in the shipyard to get to full strength. So the good news is we’ve got the workforce. The challenges are that they’re inexperienced.

There has been some great work, at some locations but all the shipyards are getting that experience to level up. That will give us the depth going forward in a couple of years to take care of our fleet as we build back up to a 66-submarine fleet.

To help some of the surge, we’ve been sending some to the private yard. And that’s another area we’ve got to get a skilled base of repair specialists. We’re challenged a little bit on the front end, We will work our way through that.

Then there is rebuilding the shipyards for the future. Navy has about a $21 billion investment over the next 20 years. That will allow us, as the workforce matures, to then gain efficiency, about 20 to 30 percent, which will then allow us to take that increased load once we come out of the dip in submarine numbers.

Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program is on deck as the Navy‘s #1 prioroty. There supplier issues. Does the Navy have a plan to stabilize the supplier base?

We have a submarine industrial base — both DoD, supplier, and at 2 private shipyards— that has done tremendous things rebuilding itself from a decade of hiatus in the ’90s. We’ve gotten up to two Virginias per year and done a very good job with that.

Submarines are very sensitive to cadence and sequence, and so the arc will be, as we add in Columbia and some of the other mods we want to do to Virginia, not to mess up that cadence and sequencing. That would cause massive disruptions.

So we put the biggest focus on Columbia, making sure that design is solid. The biggest threat to Columbia is Virginia, and so if we don’t keep Virginia on track, then that can cause disruption to Columbia.

The biggest threat to Virginia is the supplier base not being able to keep up. We have an integrated enterprise that looks at all the suppliers for all of our nuclear construction — in total it is over 300 suppliers — and making sure they are up to the task. And then, where we see challenges either getting it right or having kind of single source, proactively addressing those challenges.

Congress has been a great help with us. They provided funding to go after those, and so we will continue to manage that, but it’s a big enterprise, and we have got to keep focused on it.

Depot Metrics to Measure and Improve On

When it comes to metrics, it’s often said that what gets measured gets done. Part of this is because you are so busy with your other tasks. Everyone has more piled on their plate than ever, and many workers find themselves constantly re-prioritizing their work activities.

So metrics that have the attention of business and manufacturing leaders tend to be those that get measured and improved upon by their employee teams.

Effectively measuring/improving manufacturing metrics is not as simple as it may appear. While there are certain metrics that work well for specific job roles, it’s often the case that there are multiple combinations of metric indicators needed to ensure that a larger business objective is being met.

For this reason, metrics need to be aligned to larger goals and objectives. Think “SMART” goals—Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Realistic, Time-Based. This construct contains some key concepts.

It’s important to understand the interrelationships between high-level goals and objectives as well as what actions or methods are required for an organization to achieve them—this falls under Specific. Measurable and Actionable are when metrics come into play—any desired result must have a set of defined measurements, targets, and actions that can be taken in order to “move the needle” on the metrics that are leading or lagging indicators of results.

In manufacturing, each major goal typically requires multiple metrics. Metrics can often be  grouped together relating to specific higher-level goals and objectives e.g. increasing quality, improving customer experience, achieving efficiencies, flexibility promoting innovation, etc.

The Realistic component of SMART can present a significant area of challenge. Leaders want teams to stretch and achieve more than what is individually perceived as possible. However, if goals are set too high, and workers don’t believe they can be achieved, they may give up.

Since every goal needs to be driven by some type of deadline or period to achieve the target, a Time-Based aspect is important to keeping everyone focused.

Sustainable metrics improvements require a continuous improvement methodology—a cycle that is never fully complete. As can be seen, measurement and metrics is a central pillar of this continuous improvement cycle.

What Metrics Matter Most?

1. On-Time Delivery to Commit 

This metric is the percentage of time that manufacturing delivers a completed product on the schedule that was committed to customers.

2. Manufacturing Cycle Time 

Measures the speed or time it takes for manufacturing to produce a given product from the time the order is released to production, to finished goods.

3. Time to Make Changeovers 

Measures the speed or time it takes to switch a manufacturing line or plant from making one product over to making a different product.

4. Supplier’s Quality Incoming 

A measure of the percentage of good quality materials coming into the manufacturing process from a given supplier.

5. Capacity Utilization 

Indicates how much of the total manufacturing output capacity is being utilized at a given point in time.

6. Overall Equipment Effectiveness 

This multi-dimensional metric is a multiplier of Availability x Performance x Quality, and it can be used to indicate the overall effectiveness of a piece of production equipment, or an entire production line.

7. Schedule or Production Attainment 

A measure of what percentage of time a target level of production is attained within a specified schedule of time.

8. Rate of New Product Introduction 

Indicates how rapidly new products can be introduced to the marketplace and typically includes a combination of design, development and manufacturing ramp up times.

9. Engineering Change Order Cycle Time 

A measure of how rapidly design changes or modifications to existing products can be implemented all the way through documentation processes and volume production.

10. Customer Order Fill Rate/On-Time delivery

This metric is the percentage of times that customers receive the entirety of their ordered manufactured goods, to the correct specifications, and delivered at the expected time.

Navy has conducted a market survey of available/potential dry docks and is developing a long-range plan to increase the number of certified dry docks to reduce this shortfall.

Navy continually optimizes regional port loading by adjusting ship schedules in order to develop executable availabilities and best use available capacity. The Regional Maintenance Centers develop plans that address ship and submarine maintenance programming, budgeting, and execution.

These plans forecast private sector workload and show projected capacity of the industrial base, based on input provided by each of the industry participants. 

The Navy is continuously reviewing ship maintenance and modernization requirements and private sector port loading, and works to provide a predictable and stable workload to industry.

We’re also looking hard at the contract vehicles. The contract strategy of the future is probably not one contract of one type to one supplier, but a number of contracts. A prime contractor build, a price challenge to look at new technology, a Digital Twin to evaluate it — all of those things will play into allowing us to get more credibility in our delivery programs out of the gate.

The Navy had previously awarded ship maintenance availabilities under a Multi-Ship Multi-Option MSMO construct that prioritized a predictable workload for industry, and then began moving towards a Multiple Award Contract/Multi-Order MAC-MO firm fixed price setup that prioritized cost control.

“We’ve moved out of the MSMO construct over the last couple years into more of this firm fixed price environment, and so as we have watched this, we were in kind of an era with MSMO where schedule was the number-one driver and we didn’t pay a whole lot of attention to cost, and we go into this new firm fixed price environment today where we’ve really put a premium on cost control and the industry out there has really responded.”

“The pendulum has probably swung too far the other direction, there’s probably a happy medium in between. So we’ve had the chance to try this MAC-MO out and some of the new things in the past couple years, and when we look at, now that we’ve learned how this works and we know the lessons learned from MSMO, is there a hybrid model out there that may provide the same level of cost control that we’re seeing today in the firm fixed price environment but that would also provide a little more predictability and stability for the private sector industry so they can go out and plan better?”

The move to MAC-MO’s firm fixed price contracts “is causing us to increase our planning, and most of those ships are delivering to schedule.” In fact 90 percent of the ships currently undergoing maintenance and modernization are on track for on-time delivery.

Navy is expecting a 135 percent at the time of this report of its recent surface ship maintenance workload in Fiscal Years 2018 through 2020, and that extra workload will force the Navy and industry to get creative.

“When you look at what that number was you look at the amount of upcoming docking availabilities, we need to do something differently, such as provide the opportunity to award multiple ships and multiple- or dual-docking wherever possible,” 

There are some efficiencies associated with the same contractor working on two destroyers side-by-side, for example. Finding efficiencies – which will both keep maintenance work on schedule and keep cost down – will be important with the greater workload and could inform the new hybrid contracting model NAVSEA is looking at now.

We’re pushing to get “open and inspect” work done much earlier in the process, so solicitations can include a more precise work package instead of assuming a certain percentage of work growth. Today, the open and inspect process is only required to happen before 20 percent of the maintenance availability is executed.

“That’s not good enough.”

We need to get all the open and inspects done before the avail and put the results in the solicitation for you to do the work,” so the work package is accurate and the tank work doesn’t show up as “new work” later on, which impacts cost and schedule.

“By not getting it in the solicitation, it guarantees that you’re going to have growth and new work in the availability. You’ve got it scoped in to the solicitation to do the open and inspect, but not the results of it. What we do there is we have industry provide us hours on what they think may be needed. So it’s one of the additional parts or final parts of the avail that’s not defined.

“We can go do the open and inspect work. We do multiple assist visits to the ships for areas that doesn’t include things like hot work, cutting something open to look, or something that would cause a system to come down, because the ship’s not in the avail. 

So in some of those cases we can do the majority of that and document the findings and put it in the request for proposals. And then other work a bit more complex that we truly need to get into the RFP, we may need some additional contracting with industry to go ahead and do those large open and inspects.”

Overall, the Navy already has teams that travel around the globe to support ships, so they could schedule the open and inspect earlier and work with fleet maintenance officers to ensure this early work would not affect the crew or operations.

The ability to define work packages earlier and reduce the potential for new work later on is inextricably linked to on-time delivery and the success of the current contracting model.

“As we pour through the data … to hit the schedule, to hit the budget, the data says regardless of who does the work, regardless of what the ship type, regardless of what the port is where it gets done, if you have changes after 60 percent of the scheduled duration, guaranteed loss of operational days.”

The  current MAC-MO relies on well-defined work packages, and as the Navy develops a new “hybrid” contracting model, that model’s implementation could be aided by improvements in accurate work packages.

With firm fixed price we’ve shifted a lot of the execution risk to the primes and that they must now submit bids to enable them to somehow both win the contract and still make money. We get that.”

If we can get the yards a solid, timely package in accordance with the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual  milestones, they’ll deliver a good product in the end no matter what the contracting strategy. 

The requirement to have a well-written package in advance of the availability start is even greater in the firm fixed price environment, and we’re working hard to ensure there’s discipline in the process on our end so that you can be confident the work package industry agrees to execute are in fact what they execute.”

Navy had previously planned for 20 percent – or sometimes as much as 40 percent – new work growth in the availabilities, so standardizing how to do the open and inspect work and ensuring it occurs before the RFPs go out would create more confidence going into the availability.

DoD report partially addressed the element to include a description of product support capacity required to support the force structure. Specifically, DoD report did not provide a complete picture for product support requirement levels. For example, product support at large aircraft installations was described by square yards of apron space, but did not include other requirements such as aircraft hangars and maintenance facilities. 

According to DoD officials, specific department-wide guidance concerning DoD methods for selecting installations in its assessments does not exist. Moreover, without developing guidance, product support assessments may not be based on consistent methods across the department, resulting in inaccurate estimates. DoD/Congress does not currently have necessary information to make decisions concerning product support capacity across the Services.

DoD method for estimating excess capacity is not sufficient because its reported estimates cannot be generalised to describe excess capacity across the department. Furthermore, DoD sampling method is not always implemented effectively because some of the military departments adjusted the sampling approach. 

According to generally accepted survey standards, methods/assessment are sufficient for accomplishing the objectives of the study. In addition, the assessment was executed consistently with the study plan or the described techniques. We found the basis for establishing product support availabilites performed by DoD in the assessment require additional work.

Here we present plans for meetings with maintenance contractors to identify actions aimed at improving performance measure results:

1. Send out a pre qualification questionnaire to likely suppliers in order to 

2. Select a short list of appropriate potential suppliers

3. Receive tenders are sent in from the qualified suppliers

4. Schedule meetings to clarify supplier questions that suppliers may have

5. Evaluate tenders and award requirement  to winning bidder

6. Negotiate terms and conditions with chosen supplier. 

7. Update purchasing ledger and stock records

8. Approve budget identify stakeholders and form project team

9. Keep up-to-date with future procurement activities 

10. Consult stakeholders to get a complete picture of the business need

11. Conduct market research to help clarify and inform requirements 

12. Give stakeholders a clear picture of the market

13. Develop detailed scope of requirements from the business need

14. Ensure outcome fully satisfies the need

15. Clarify 'needs' vs. 'wants’

16. Identify timeline and key dates

17. Specify key quality or performance standards

18. Develop evaluation methodology to score the response to request 

19. Ask questions to test the supplier, interviews, demos, site visits

20. Decide approach route to market

21. Develop evaluation methodology panel members

22. Assess and score responses against the evaluation criteria 

23. Ensure suppliers are given a fair amount of time to respond

24. Check that you have the capacity and capability to deliver the contract.

25. Check that you meet all the pre-conditions

26. Show how your organisation can add value

27. Make available debriefs to both successful and unsuccessful respondents

28. Monitor work against the agreed deliverables, timescales and cost.
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29. Manage the delivery of goods/services as per the contract

30. Ensure you have a purchase order, where appropriate

31. Submit complete and accurate invoices on time

32. Share feedback about the contract

33. Consult central procurement area for advice were appropriate

34. Research the market to understand capabilities and restraints

35. Determine whether the goods or services to be purchased are subject to coordinated procurement arrangements 

36. Determine if the relevant entity already has a panel or multi-use list could be used

37. Consider whether there are opportunities for cooperative procurement

38. Treat procurements as if they are over the relevant threshold if unable to be valued

39. Seek procurement based on quotes directly from one or more suppliers

40. Include what was previously referred to as ‘sole source’ and ‘select’ or ‘restricted’ source procurements

41. Include essential information eg. closing time, evaluation criteria and methodology, process rules

42. Contact officer and the possibility of an industry briefing, site visit, and/or mid-term review

43. Enable suppliers to develop and lodge competitive and compliant submissions

44. Include a draft contract and statement of compliance in the request documentation

45. Use appropriate limitation of liability and standard contract clauses where available

46. Ensure clarifications or additional materials are made available to all potential suppliers in a timely and equitable manner

47. Do not materially change the evaluation plan after the opening of submissions.

48. Develop a contract management plan to assist the entity to understand and implement obligations under the contract

49. Assess contract extension options on a value for money basis in accordance with the terms of the contract 

50. Consider any obligations that survive the contract end-date or termination of the contract 

The contractor is pitching the Pentagon on a five-year deal — with promises to keep 80 percent of the fleet mission-ready and reducing the cost of the F-35 combat jet: sign a five-year maintenance deal instead of negotiating a new contract every year. There’s also a performance-based twist: the company would provide enough spare parts to keep 80 percent of the world’s F-35s battle-ready — or face penalties.

Currently, Contractor and the Pentagon’s F-35 program office negotiate new deals every year to maintain the hundreds of F-35s flown by U.S. and partners. The negotiations often take most of the year and by the time a contract is signed, it’s time to begin negotiating the next one.

“It’s a commitment on the company’s part to a five-year deal and it would bring along the partners as well as the supply chain and allow us all to establish long-term arrangements with our vendor base.

The contractor says “If we had a five-year deal where folks could bank on having a certain level of money coming into their activities and be able to work long-term arrangements with the vendor base, everybody benefits from that.” 

The Pentagon currently pays contractor more than $2 billion per year to sustain about 400 jets, or roughly $5 million per jet per year. But within four years, the global fleet is expected to reach nearly 1,200 aircraft as production ramps up. 

Contractor estimates that the tab for the five-year arrangement could come to $15 billion, and that it would save the Pentagon a total of $1 billion.

Company officials figure that both sides will do better with the half-decade-long deal, which will allow the aircraft maker to lock in longer-lead parts contracts and assure its suppliers of steady work at known prices. 

Contractor also says that if the Pentagon signs the deal, the company will immediately invest $1.5 billion to buy parts, sign long-lead contracts, and improve the F-35’s ALIS logistics/maintenance software.

And contractor says the arrangement would require the company to make sure 80 percent of the fleet is always mission-ready. 

Finally, contractors proposal includes commitment to reduce the cost per flying hour from the current $44,000 — for an Air Force F-35A in 2018 — to about $25,000. Company officials say they would absorb the risk.

“We are accepting a lot of the risk in the deal,” says the contractor.

The number of F-35 flown by the U.S. and partners is projected to triple in the next four years, from roughly 400 to nearly 1,200 jets. “That growth is going to lead to a step function in flying hours and we’ve got to be prepared for that.”

Sustainment costs consume about 70 percent of Pentagon weapons spending. “This is our opportunity to stand behind our product from the sustainment perspective.”

Fewer than half of the Air Force F-35s were deemed mission-ready in 2018. Those numbers have improved this year, particularly for jets deployed overseas. Last year, SECDEF ordered the military services to boost fighter readiness to 80 percent.

Contractor has proposed to assume most of the risk for keeping the plane in a high state of readiness. The company would guarantee a fixed price to reach and exceed 80% fleet readiness by 2025, higher than most U.S. combat aircraft achieve today.

The cost of building each aircraft has been declining steadily, with the latest agreement aiming to produce the most common variant for less than it costs to manufacture last-generation fighters that the F-35 will replace.

However, most of the life-cycle cost for modern weapons is incurred after production, in the form of what is called “sustainment”—maintenance, spare parts and other items necessary to keep weapons in a high state of readiness. It is the cumulative cost of sustainment during a service life stretching to 2070 that has earned F-35 the reputation for being the military’s first trillion-dollar program.

What contractor is proposing is that DoD transition F-35 to a performance-based logistics approach in which contractors are incentivized to reduce costs. Traditional sustainment concepts measure inputs, whereas performance-based logistics measures success in terms of outputs—in this case, readiness and affordability.

Under the terms of the contractor offer, DoD would be guaranteed that the F-35 fleet is over 80% mission-capable by 2025, meeting a goal set by SECDEF. Less than 10% of the fleet could be non-mission-capable due to supply shortages, and less than 10% could be non-mission-capable due to maintenance issues. That is significantly better readiness than is currently achieved by most military aircraft.

The most unusual feature of contractors offer, though, is the proposal to deliver high readiness levels at a fixed price below what current sustainment practices would permit. The company estimates that $18 billion would be saved over a 15-year period, with savings averaging about $1 billion per year after initial startup of the performance-based approach.

What makes the offer of a fixed price unusual is that contractor doesn’t actually control most of the costs driving F-35 sustainment outlays. The company says it accounts for roughly 40% of sustainment costs, with the engine maker accounting for 10% and DoD generating the remainder.

Contractor needs to negotiate ground rules governing how performance-based logistics would be implemented for F-35. Following the pattern used in other performance-based arrangements, including those contractor has with its own suppliers, the company wants sustainment to be negotiated in five-year increments, giving it sufficient time to earn back its up-front investment. 

Transitioning to five-year increments would eliminate the current practice of annual negotiations for sustainment, a process that results in considerable price variability from year to year. By migrating to a system of only one negotiation every five years, DoD would get a more predictable outcome in terms of cost and performance. It would also shift most of the execution risk to industry, which is a common feature of all performance-based logistics contracts.

Capability and affordability are usually traded off against each other in Pentagon arrangements for supporting combat systems, so it is not  a sure thing the contractor can simultaneously increase readiness and decrease costs. The short answer is that it has analyzed processes surrounding the sustainment function and has identified numerous ways in which money can be saved without sacrificing readiness. These include reducing manpower and material costs, improving inventory control, automating tasks and predicting with greater accuracy when maintenance actions will be required.

Many of these enhancements can be implemented whether they are carried out by DoD or industry. The fact that contractor is willing to risk its own funds up front signals that the F-35 has reached a level of maturity where sustainment processes are well understood and thus ready for refinement. This approach would implement recognized best practices across the F-35 support enterprise, but would require significant adjustments on the part of all parties involved.

Fashioning an optimized sustainment process for the world’s biggest weapons program “is a strategic inflection point—maybe the last.” In other words, with the battle over reducing production costs now largely won, DoD and industry need to agree on how best to support the F-35 fighter through the coming half-century of operations. If they get it right, F-35 will be the dominant tactical aircraft in the world for two generations. If they get it wrong, the aircraft won’t live up to its full potential.

Congress Cooling on F-35 Multi-Year Production Contracts

Some lawmakers have signalled they’re unlikely to authorize the Pentagon to award a  multi-year contract to build F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters unless the program solves such problems as chronic shortages of spare parts that often wear out quicker than anticipated.

The F-35 program is still plagued by high operating costs, inadequate repair capacity, spare part shortages and poor replacement part reliabilities. Ongoing challenges running the Autonomic Logistics Information System ALIS, which was created to deliver parts to aircraft maintainers, are compounding the spare parts problems.

Timely delivery of spare F-35 parts to maintainers is at the heart of high maintenance costs. ALIS was described by Pentagon officials as hard to use, especially at remote locations and by Navy personnel on large deck amphibious warships.

The Pentagon is in the process of revamping the system’s underlying architecture, which is now pushing 20 years old.

“ALIS is a key enabler for tactical and operational availability and  as presently constituted, ALIS is not delivering the capabilities the warfighter needs,” DoD is progressing towards a future ALIS developed and sustained utilizing agile software development techniques designed to rapidly deliver flexible applications on a modern secure architecture.”
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Congress has said they don’t see a multi-year contract going forward until the fundamental questions that have been asked thus far, and several that have not yet been put on the table have been resolved.” 

1. What are the basics of performance-based logistics? 

Performance-based logistics is an outcome based support strategy that delivers an integrated, affordable product support solution that satisfies Warfighter requirements while reducing Operating and Support O&S costs. When dealing with industry, product support outcomes are acquired through performance based arrangements that deliver Warfighter requirements and incentivize product support providers to reduce costs through innovation.

2. At what point is it appropriate to engage the original equipment manufacturer in the performance-based logistics initiative? 

The appropriate time to engage the original equipment manufacturer within a performance-based logistics initiative varies. When trying to evaluate the correct time to involve an original equipment manufacturer, it is important to consider the various inputs that may be required from the provider and at what stage such inputs will need to be available for review. Additionally, depending on the acquisition environment-- competitive vs. sole source there will be certain limitations to the scope/context of allowable discussions in which the parties are expected to operate. For example, when trying to use will be necessary to solicit feedback from the original equipment manufacturer  as early as possible to determine if this data is available or needs to be licensed. Regardless, establishing a collaborative communication flow with all involved parties is important to the successful implementation of any strategy. 

3. What constitutes a properly structured and executed performance-based logistics arrangement? 

Successful performance-based logistics arrangements have the following attributes: Objective, measurable work description that achieves a product support outcome Appropriate contract length, terms, and funding strategies that encourage delivery of the required outcome. A manageable number of metrics linked to desired Warfighter outcomes and cost reduction goals/Incentives to achieve required outcomes and cost reduction initiatives Risks and rewards shared between DoD and commercial product support integrators and providers. Active management by the Product Support Manager, Integrator and provider with frequent, transparent interaction between the performance-based logistics

4.  What are best practices for managing performance-based logistics arrangements?
 
Tracking performance is a critical part of performance-based logistics arrangement management so performance-based logistics arrangements cannot be a “fire and forget” endeavor. Routine reviews and performance monitoring, and close collaboration between stakeholders will help drive successful performance-based logistics arrangement outcomes. The Support Manager, must have a relationship built on trust with their industry counterparts and maintain open and honest lines of communication. Fixed-price contract variants are the preferred type because they provide the greatest incentive to the product support Integrator and provider to improve their products and processes and reduce their cost to perform. When the providers cost to deliver or the risk is difficult to determine, then a Fixed Price Incentive Firm target contract with a ceiling price and a profit-sharing formula is appropriate. 

5. What is the difference between multiyear and multiple-year contracts? 

The primary characteristics of each contract type are included below. Multi year Buys more than one year’s requirement without having to exercise options Beyond one-year investments can be recovered if contract is terminated Multiple Years: Contract written for multiple years Only first year is ‘guaranteed’ No recovery of investments if contract is terminated 

6. How are organic performance-based logistics Product Support provider incentivized to perform and improve its productivity to satisfy program metrics and receive more work? 

The product Support provider organization is motivated by improving its capability and capacity and ensuring a stable or increasing workload. Establishing public-private partnerships with  industry and aligning the organic product Support provider  metrics with those of the program has resulted in improved processes and additional capabilities in organic facilities. There are different challenges and constraints when incentivizing DoD product Support provider , compared to their commercial counterparts. Regulations preclude commercial product support integrator from giving bonuses for exceptional performance to the DoD product Support provider  they may have under contract. Any bonuses or awards given to the members of the organic product Support provider  must come from the Command’s authorized and often limited funds. 

7. What should be considered when selecting performance incentives? 

Considerations for selecting performance incentives include: Ensuring incentives are built upon performance objectives/standards and are realistic, measurable, and attainable. Aligning incentives with the effort and contract value is key. Structuring incentives for largest overall impact and avoiding any unintended consequences, while providing value for achieving mission Being careful what you ask for, as you will likely get it and may not be able to afford it – or may not have really needed or wanted it.

8. What about “funding appropriating types.” What does this term mean? 

There are different types of funding appropriations. A summary of the primary categories with their overall scope/statutory time limits is included below. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation RDT&E – Covers RDT&E activities and expenses. Policy allows incremental funding, and the funds are available for two years. Procurement – For procurement of end items all centrally managed items, initial spares and labor for certain production-related functions e.g., item assembly, quality assurance. Operations and Maintenance O&M – For replenishment spares, fuel, construction projects. Another type of fund is the Working Capital Fund, which is a non-expiring, revolving fund that allows for contracts with multiple-year performance periods. Congressional multiyear contract authority is not required for these contracts, greatly simplifying contract execution. Funding is applied to long-term contracts in annual increments, reducing the amount of funding that must be obligated at any given time. 

9. How does using appropriated versus revolving funds affect performance-based logistics contracts? 

Services fund performance-based logistics contracts with either Working Capital Funds or direct appropriations. Working capital funds are appropriate funding sources for performance-based logistics-related supply, depot maintenance, and transportation activities. Working Capital-funded performance-based logistics arrangements may also enable the award of long-term contracts and leverage existing supply chain procedures. As such, Working Capital-funded performance-based logistics are transparent to customers interacting through supply and financial systems. Direct appropriations may be the most appropriate funding source for performance-based logistics arrangements that operate outside the existing Service supply chain and the normal requirements generation process or cover a full system beyond supply, maintenance, and transportation activities. The type of appropriation depends upon the phase of the life cycle typically procurement and RDT&E during development and O&M during sustainment. 

10. What are good examples of potential measurement units for performance metrics? 

Each program must decide the appropriate metric for their specific system requirements. However, generally programs will include one or more of the following: Time: Delivery time, schedule adherence, Cost Per Flight Hour Accuracy Rates: Most often stated in percentages Error Rates: Number of mistakes/errors allowed in meeting performance standard Milestones: Percentage complete by target date.

​The Pentagon and Contractor are at odds over how much data the military can have access to for its own jet, the F-35, and that’s creating renewed friction in the fight to fix longstanding issues with the automated logistics system vital to keeping it flying.

ALIS is an off-board system that runs the maintenance and logistics system for the F-35. The Pentagon and Contractor say a relaunched version of the Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, should be ready to start sending to squadrons in 2020. Both the military’s top acquisition official and the F-35 program manager expressed frustration to lawmakers with how much control contractor asserts over crucial data for the system.

“One of the key elements of coming up with a new ALIS architecture, data standards, and all the other parts that would make a very good system is understanding the data set as it exists today — what all the algorithms are — and we are still in the process of going through that with contractor. But understanding where all the intellectual property is and making sure the government has access to what it has paid for is a key part of rearchitecting ALIS.”

The fight over intellectual property stems from the original concept for the program, which gave contractor sweeping control over virtually every major aspect of the F-35, from design and fabrication to maintenance, parts and logistics. But in recent years, dissatisfied by rising costs and delays, the Pentagon has sought to wrest more control back from contractor. Intellectual property rights and disputes over proprietary data, however, have often tripped up such efforts.

“We still have concerns, there still are roadblocks as we go to execute. Everything from something as simple as DoD documents that get uploaded into a system and come back with contractor proprietary markings on it. That is a frustrating occurrence, but not one that prevents us from doing work.

“What we’re working to do is to figure out where are the places at which intellectual property assertions actually prevent us from doing the kind of work that we intend to do. … We’re getting to a place where we don’t need all the data, but the data that we need — it’s important that we pursue it.”

DoD says the key to getting a successful system was breaking contractors grip on the logistics data infrastructure and housing more of it in a DoD network bank.

“One of the challenges we have is that fact that a lot of the ALIS data and functionality works back through contractor computers. So, what we need to have in a newly rearchitected ALIS to is have that accessible within DoD.  So, this deconflicting of contractor data and DoD data will become much more clear.”

The Pentagon would like to leverage more of its internal network development capabilities to get after a newly reconstructed ALIS system, resolving the intellectual property disputes is the key.

Contractor for its part, says it is investing significant company resources in developing solutions to both improve the current ALIS system, known as ALIS classic, but also in the redesigned “ALIS Next.”

Contractor spending about $50 million of internal funds to improve classic ALIS, and also implementing additional company funds in the order of $120 million to support new architecture investments.”

Though the ALIS release in 2018 met the required-capabilities threshold for its design and development phase, the system needs “significant additional improvements” and noted that combat coded squadrons require more than one dozen system administrators to maintain deployed operations and that training squadrons would probably require similar numbers.

Lawmakers said “As we look ahead to the next few decades of F-35 service, failing to create an effective and cost-efficient sustainment system would diminish readiness, squander  resources, and discourage the services and our partners from continuing to purchase the F-35. This would create unacceptable risk for the program and would be an abdication of the trust and investment of partners.

Manufacturers can prevent DoD from repairing certain equipment, which puts members of the military at risk. Marines have told us they had roadblocks in the logistics process that left them unable to fix a broken generator because of the warranty.

The idea behind right-to-repair is that you or a third-party you choose, should be able to repair something you own, instead of being forced to rely on the company that originally sold it. 

This could involve not repairing something like a generator because doing so would void a warranty; repairs which require specialized tools, diagnostic equipment, data or schematics not reasonably available to consumers; or products that are deliberately designed to prevent an end user from fixing them.

Conversations about right-to-repair issues are increasing, because of the big issues that arise when a manufacturer restricts or makes it impossible for a consumer or an independent repair shop to make product repairs.”

We first heard about the term from a Marine interested in problems with industry power and technology. A few past experiences then snapped into focus. Besides the broken generator the Marine was working at a maintenance unit overseas watching as engines were packed up and shipped back to contractors in the United States for repairs because “that’s what the contract says.” The process took months.

With every engine sent back, Marines lost the opportunity to practice the skills they might need one day on the battlefield, where contractor support is inordinately expensive, unreliable or nonexistent.

Marines have the ability to manufacture parts using water-jets, lathes and milling machines, as well as newer 3D printers, but these tools often sit idle in maintenance bays alongside broken-down military equipment. Although parts from the manufacturer aren’t available to repair the equipment, we aren’t allowed to make the parts ourselves “due to specifications.”

How pervasive is this issue for the most powerful military in the world? And what does it mean for a military that is expected to operate in the most austere and hostile environments to not possess the experience, training or tools to fix its own very technical equipment?

DoD spent 30 years last century significantly invested in research and development and unquestionably owned the right to repair the equipment it developed. In the years since, much of the research and development has shifted to the commercial sector; increasingly, the commercial sector develops cutting-edge technology that also has military uses, such as communication technologies, satellite launches and drones.

To compound the impact of increasingly technical military systems, a new set of political  views favorable to industry consolidation emerged resulted in merger waves across the industry landscape.

Strategists in the national security world responded by arguing that DoD needed to become a better customer in order to have access to this commercially developed technology. Consequently, DoD decided that it needed to be more cooperative, and less aggressive, when negotiating terms with commercial companies that produce military equipment or perform services in support of the military.

At the end of the century policymakers simplified the Federal Acquisition Regulation, exempting “commercial items” from a large portion of the rules as well as expanding the definition of what is a commercial item to include goods that could be seen as specialized military goods. 

Congress also encouraged DoD to purchase commercial items “to the maximum extent practicable.” These changes fueled high rates of commercial purchases, which, coupled with consolidation in the defense industry, contributed to increased use of commercial technology by DoD and the negotiation of single-source contracts.

Ultimately, the power dynamics shifted between DoD and commercial industry, forcing the department to accept warranties, contracts or prices that it could previously avoid — all thanks to changes in research and development funding, regulations and a lack of competition.

The effects of the right-to-repair paradigm will become only more significant and restrictive as older military vehicles and systems are replaced with equipment that is more complex and involving more electronics. Already complicated equipment designs lead to situations where the manufacturer is the only source for repairs.
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Fundamentally, service members just want to ensure that their gear is ready to meet mission requirements. While a broken generator or tactical vehicle may seem like small issues, the implications are much larger when a combat ship or a fighter jet needs to be fixed. What happens when those systems break somewhere with limited communications or transportation? Will DoD get stuck in the mud because of a warranty?

1. Acquire clearly defined Warfighter relevant outcomes - not just sustainment services or replacement equipment

The performance-based logistics strategy should be focused on Warfighter product support requirements and structure the associated performance-based logistics arrangements to deliver outcomes that are tied to the Warfighter requirements. Workloads should be distributed to the most effective providers consistent with guidelines, and with an effort to focus on best competencies, best value, and effective use of public-private partnership solutions. The activities of the product Support integrator and provider are aligned with the Warfighter requirements and monitored with metrics that are consistent with the responsibility and risk delegated to them. This is counter to traditional transactional approaches where DoD procures products and services without linking the consumption of the resources with the desired Warfighter outcomes.

2. Use measurable and practical metrics that accurately assess the product support provider’s performance against delivery of targeted Warfighter outcomes

Performance metrics are vital to the success of a performance-based logistics arrangement. DoD needs insight into program performance to determine compliance with performance requirements and level of mission success. For example, one important area to gather measurement data is related supply chain performance, as these are associated with key performance indicators such as materiel availability and operations and support costs. The product support manager  is responsible for the performance of the product support solution and will use Warfighter relevant metrics to monitor its performance.

Metrics assigned to the product support integrator or provider reflect the responsibilities assigned to them. They should not reflect outcomes that are beyond the product support integrator/provider ability to influence and are not part of the arrangement. The selected metrics should be measurable and manageable and map back to the higher-level program metrics. For example, a product support provider may be responsible for the availability of their product and the associated metric may be supply material availability or logistics response time. Too many metrics make it difficult to manage and may also work at cross purposes to each other. Also, data must be available for the metric. There have been occasions where metrics were required as part of an arrangement without the ability to collect the data to determine performance against the metric.

3. Provide significant incentives to the support provider that are tied to the achievement of outcomes for aspects of performance that are within their control

An incentive is anything that encourages or motivates somebody to do something. With respect to performance-based logistics arrangements, it is any term or condition that encourages the desired product support integrator and/or provider behavior to deliver the relevant Warfighter outcome for aspects of performance that are within their control. The incentive may be related to contract type, contract length, or incentive/penalties.  A Long term Firm Fixed Price contract provides the strongest incentive for the provider to control costs. However, Long term Firm Fixed Price contracts do not share these savings with DoD, and without additional mechanisms e.g., Contract Data Requirements Lists, they do not provide the information needed by the DoD to understand actual costs for negotiations on future performance-based logistics contracts. 

4. Long term Firm Fixed Price contract is generally the preferred contract type but Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target and Cost-plus-incentive-fee Contracts may be effective

When coupled with a requirement to deliver a Warfighter relevant outcome versus delivery of a part or service, a Long term Firm Fixed Price contract converts a traditional revenue center in a transactional business model to a cost center under performance-based logistics. The provider is required to deliver a specific Warfighter relevant outcome for a set price. It transfers the financial risk from DoD to the provider. In this fashion, it acts as a powerful incentive for product support integrator/provider to improve the reliability of their product and the efficiency of their processes in order to reduce their cost to deliver the desired outcome. The lower their cost to perform, the greater the provider profit associated with the fixed price. In order to transfer risk in this fashion to the provider, the failure modes and rates need to be stable enough to reasonably forecast demand. Otherwise, the provider will price in the difficulty with assessing the risk ultimately becoming an unaffordable option.

As the uncertainty and associated risk increases, a more appropriate contract type would be a Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target  or a Cost-plus-incentive-fee Contracts arrangement. Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target contracts provide a mechanism for the provider to reduce costs while sharing those cost savings with DoD. Without sharing, there can be instances when DoD does not fully understand the actual costs or the cost-saving opportunities available to the provider. The further the contract type moves from Long term Firm Fixed Price and Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target toward cost plus, the less incentive there is for the provider to improve the product and lean out their processes without reasonable assurance of a follow-on arrangement. Conversely, a cost-plus fixed-fee contract is generally not appropriate for performance-based logistics arrangements.

5. Provide sufficient contract length for the product support provider to recoup investments on improved product e.g. time between failure, sustainment processes and manufacturing capabilities

Performance-based logistics contribute to minimizing operational risk by incentivizing the product support integrator and provider to invest in improving their product and processes in support of Warfighter relevant outcomes. However, this requires an appropriate contract length aligned with the desired investment to provide the product support integrator or provider an opportunity to realize a return on their investment. A provider would want the improved component to go through at least one repair cycle so they have an opportunity to recoup their investment. The length of the contract will depend on the complexity of the product and the size of the investment. The product support manager and Contracting Officer will need to work with their product support integrator and provider counterparts to determine the contract length that is appropriate for their specific arrangement.

6. Performance-based logistics knowledge and resources are maintained for DoD team and product support providers

The most successful performance-based logistics programs are those where both DoD organization and the product support integrator and provider have a comprehensive knowledge of and experience in performance-based concepts, tenets, business models, and implementation strategies at the beginning of their program efforts. The very best programs assemble a performance-based logistics team comprising DoD and the support provider representatives, and tend to include teams with prior performance-based logistics management experience.

7. Leadership champions the effort throughout their organization

A successful performance-based logistics strategy and subsequent arrangements require the support of leadership and all stakeholders throughout DoD and product support integrator/provider organizations. It is particularly important for DoD leadership to create an environment that facilitates broadly implementing performance-based logistics solutions across DoD. This focus must flow down through the organization such that the product support manager is enabled to develop and execute performance-based solutions without undue oversight or review when compared with other approaches.

8. Everyone with a vested interest in the outcome is involved

Organizational alignment is a strategically focused approach that integrates efforts throughout all levels of the organization, starting with leadership down to the shop floor of both customer and supplier organizations. Leadership may champion performance-based logistics, while the lower levels of the workforce may be less than enthusiastic or vice versa. Situations like this can become charged, and a concerted effort to align all parties involved in the execution of the strategy pays big dividends upon execution with a win-win proposition for the entire team. This includes internal and external stakeholders that they should be involved as early in the process as possible. The goal is to drive strong consensus and participation toward common support strategy objectives. An agreement across all stakeholders that establishes performance-based logistics metrics that align with the required operational outcomes is essential.

9.  Supply chain activities are aligned to the desired performance-based logistics outcome, vice disparate internal goals

Performance-based logistics focuses on optimizing the effectiveness of the end-to-end process, while traditional sustainment contracts manage the supply chain by commodities or services. The product support manager must develop a management strategy as part of the Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan, which integrates and aligns functions of the various product support integrators and providers to optimize the complete supply chain process. Internally stove-piped processes must be reduced or eliminated. Portions of the supply chain’s effectiveness should not be measured with metrics that are not aligned with the desired performance outcome for the Warfighter. For some programs, co-location of the support provider and DoD team in a public-private partnership arrangement has proven to facilitate cohesive, comprehensive and coordinated customer and supplier supply chain efficiency.

10. Assumption of Risk is shared between DoD customer and support provider

Robust performance-based logistics solutions include a focus on total program risk reduction along with appropriate off-ramp exit criteria that are captured at the onset of the contract execution. These programs balance risk with mitigation strategies that account for all parties involved, while paying specific attention to integrate supplier accountability and authority. By moving some risk to the support provider, and aligning incentives to stimulate program effectiveness, the product support business model can remove risk from the total system. Performance-based logistics is about realigning the incentives to reduce total program risk. Cost: Hourly, annual, life 

​While sustainment strategies do not guarantee successful outcomes, they serve as a tool to guide operations as well as support planning and implementation of activities through the life-cycle of the aircraft. Specifically, at a high-level the strategy is aimed at integrating requirements, product support elements, funding, and risk management to provide oversight of the aircraft. 

For example, these sustainment strategies can be documented in a life-cycle sustainment plan, postproduction support plan, or an in-service support plan, among other types of documented strategies. 

Additionally, program officials stated aircraft sustainment strategies are an important management tool for the sustainment of the aircraft by documenting requirements that are known by all stakeholders, including good practices identified in sustaining each aircraft.

Agents are integrating time-saving applications into their own workflow with proven concepts across commands and services. These time-saving tools enable simultaneous access to data such as requirements, program notes and contractor documents. 

You can move from a system where you’re waiting for an email with comments to come back from an engineer or contractor to logging into a system where you can see what they’re working on, in real time, so team can work on a project without any lag time. 
 
Acquisition rules require contractors, program managers, engineers and other stakeholders  to work together but it usually involves dozens of technical documents to move from contractor to DoD on any given day, creating a nightmare for acquisition officials charged with ensuring each document is reviewed and meets expectations.
 
Programs find themselves overwhelmed by the sheer volume of data, putting the program at risk, if data spends too long in the review state, missing the contractual response deadline. 

Without a vector check from DoD, the contractor assumes a conditional acceptance and moves forward, assuming they are on the right track. This could lead to a host of problems, including a possible schedule slip.”

The team is now spreading the proven results of tools and showing individual offices can use the tools to suit various purposes. Versatility is inherent in the review and content-sharing applications, so new users usually recognize ways to streamline the bulk of documents that shuttle through an acquisition enterprise.

The objective is simple: information dominance through the creation, review, approval and dissemination of data.  If you have unrefined, makeshift processes, this won’t work for you, at least not yet. Business processes work more efficient with automation so there are now options if your workflow is functional, but uses outdated tools or requires intense use of human capital.
 
“The advantage of the utilities lies in the ability to collaborate on existing work, review past work and evolve the system architecture to meet changing needs. These tools provide value now, and value in the future by giving agents access to program work performed. Every agent in the chain can see, through comment tracking, how data changed to capture the correct info and meet requirements.

This fidelity, coupled with the capacity to short-circuit future process complications, makes content-sharing applications ideal for long-running, complex weapons systems program offices looking to limit volume of work spent on acquisition schedule. 

F-35 Still Falling Short on Combat Readiness

Even though the F-35 program is making strides, each of the Joint Strike Fighter variants is still coming up short on combat readiness goals.

Based on collected data, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy variants all remain "below service expectations" for aircraft availability.

"Operational suitability of the F-35 fleet remains below service expectations. In particular, no F-35 variant meets the specified reliability or maintainability metrics."

One reason for falling short of the 65% availability rate goal is that "the aircraft are breaking more often and taking longer to fix.’

Results improved marginally from 2018 to 2019 but were still below the benchmark, and well below the 80% mission-capable rate goal set by SECDEF ordering the services to raise mission-capable rates for four key tactical aircraft: the F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet, the F-22 Raptor and the F-35. The objective was to achieve an 80% or higher mission-capable rate for each fleet by the end of fiscal 2019.

Units that deployed for overseas missions had “better luck.”. "Individual units were able to achieve the 80% target for short periods during deployed operations.”

A substantial contributor to the degraded mission capability rate -- the ability to perform a core mission function --is a deteriorated stealth coating on F-35 canopies. The F-35 falls short of the 80% mission-capable rate target over parts supply shortages to fix the crumbling coating that allows the plane to evade radar.

"Canopy supply shortages continue to be the main obstacle to achieving this. "We are seeking additional sources to fix unserviceable canopies."

"DoD's costs to purchase the F-35 are expected to exceed $406 billion, and the department expects to spend more than $1 trillion to sustain its F-35 fleet.” 

So DoD must continue to grapple with affordability as it takes actions to increase the readiness of the F-35 fleet and improve its sustainment efforts to deliver an aircraft that the military services and partners can successfully operate and maintain over the long term within their budgetary realities."

Lapses in supply chain management is one reason the F-35 stealth jet fleet, operated across three services, is falling short of its performance and operational requirements.

It's something the Pentagon and contractor need to work through as they gear up for another large endeavor. DoD last month finalized a $34 billion agreement with the company for the next three batches of Joint Strike Fighters, firming up its largest stealth fighter jet deal to date.

Despite improvements in availability and mission capable rates, copies of F-35are “breaking more often than planned and taking longer to fix." The operational suitability of the F-35 fleet remains at a level below service expectations. But after several years of remaining relatively stable, several key suitability metrics are showing signs of slow improvement in 2019.

The F-35 fleet missed the monthly availability target of 65 percent, missed an 80 percent mission-capable target and missed reliability and maintainability metrics. DoD linked recent improvements in availability and mission capable rates to a greater availability of spare parts ― through the programs efforts to improve maintenance process and depot support.

Parts shortages was the chief contributor to low mission capable rates. Parts were breaking more often than expected, it’s taken twice as long to fix them, and the depots for the repairs won’t be ready until 2024.

F-35 Production Delayed Deficits Due to Operational Performance of Joint Simulation System Impact Delivery Status 

It's official: top Pentagon officials will not clear the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter for full-rate production this year, after setbacks during a crucial testing phase.

The Pentagon’s decision to start full-rate production of the F-35 fighter may be delayed until 2021, due to difficulties with integrating the jet into the DoD virtual wargaming system.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is performing well in the real world, but challenges incorporating it into a simulation system will delay DoD from being able to move into full-rate production.

The JSE simulation projects characteristics such as weather, geography and range, allowing test pilots to prove the aircraft's "full capabilities against the full range of required threats and scenarios.

The delay is due to, in part, a slow progress adding the F-35 into the Joint Simulation Environment, a critical part of the fighter’s fielding process.  JSE must be absolutely correct before we proceed” with Milestone C full-rate production decision. 

But because the Joint Simulation Environment continues to face delays in its own development, DoD will have to defer Milestone C by more than one year.

The Joint Simulation Environment, or JSE, is needed to conduct simulated evaluations of the F-35 in a range of high-threat scenarios.

“We are not making enough progress on the Joint Simulation Environment, integrating the F-35 into it. It is a critical portion of IOT&E. Progress is being made out on the range with the F-35, but we need to do the work in the Joint Simulation Environment.

“We have collectively decided that we need the JSE to be absolutely correct before we proceed, so some decisions about when that full-rate production decision will be made.

Joint Program Office signed out program deviation report” of a “schedule threshold breach in the Milestone C full-rate production decision of up to a year.

Although the Pentagon and F-35 builder have had a “handshake deal” on the next 478 F-35s for months, they are still negotiating a final agreement on an upcoming contract. 

“We’re moving forward with the program and the aircraft are performing exceptionally well. There has been significant progress, so it does not change what we’re doing on the production line, what we’re doing in development, or sustainment.”

Although DoD already buys the F-35 in large numbers, the full-rate production decision is viewed as a major show of confidence in the program’s maturity.

 During this time, the yearly production rate is set to skyrocket from the 91 jets manufactured in 2018 upward of 160 by 2023. But before officials sign off on the  production decision, the F-35 must complete operational testing.

There is progress being made out on the range with the F-35, but we need to do the work in the Joint Simulation Environment out of its low-rate initial production stage.

Heading into F-35 operational tests, threat of delays loom. The F-35 operational test plan doesn't leave much margin for re-testing or flight cancellations.

The F-35 won’t finish its operational test and evaluation by the end of 2019, which is the final step needed to clear the way for greater production numbers.
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Even though F-35’s testing community had intended to complete initial operational test and evaluation in 2019, work on the JSE is not yet complete.

1. Aren’t there required DoD product support metrics? 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council requires the mandatory Key Performance Parameter of Sustainment be addressed for all Acquisition Category I and II programs. The Sustainment Key Performance Parameter  has three elements that provide an integrated structure that balances sustainment with capability and affordability across a system’s life cycle. The first element is an Availability Key Performance Parameter, consisting of two components: Material Availability and Operational Availability The other two elements are Key System Attributes of Reliability and O&S Cost. 

2. How is the right number of key performance metrics tied to incentives/disincentives? What if any are the detrimental effects of having too many Key Performance Indicator? Typically, just a few metrics is the effective number of metrics. The inclusion of “too many metrics” typically indicates that the arrangement is focusing on activities and not outcomes, thus limiting the flexibility of the product support integrator or provider to apply resources where needed to be successful. Additionally, a large number of metrics can potentially dilute the impact of incentives, since metrics may offset each other.
 
3. What is a product support arrangement? 

Product support” and “product support arrangement” defined as: Product support — the package of support functions required to field and maintain the readiness and operational capability of major weapon systems, subsystems, and components, including all functions related to weapon system readiness. Product support arrangement — a contract, order, or any type of other contractual arrangement, or any type of agreement or non-contractual arrangement within DoD, for the performance of sustainment or logistics support required for major weapon systems, subsystems, or components. The term includes arrangements for any of the following: Performance-based logistics, Sustainment support, Contractor logistics support, Life cycle product support and Weapon systems product support. Product support arrangement enable a product support strategy. They must document the following: An acceptable range of weapon system performance objectives Corresponding support necessary to meet that level of performance Terms and conditions for payment, remediation, and other contract conditions 
 
4. Can there be more than one product support integrator? 

There is no limit to the number of product support integrators that can be designated by the product support manager, but product support integrators  are generally assigned a specific scope of responsibility that aligns either with subsystems or components on the weapon system or for specific integrated product support elements. There can be a single product support integrator for the entire weapon system, or two,  for example, an aircraft airframe and propulsion system or multiple product support integrator for various subsystems or components of the weapon system. Each product support integrator has responsibility for accomplishing designated performance outcomes for their assigned scope of sustainment responsibility. 

5. What exactly does the term “Integration” mean in the product support integrator role? 

“Integration” refers to coordinating typically one dozen product support element activities to deliver an effective and cost-efficient product support solution to the Warfighter. The product support elements are: Product Support Management Design Interface Sustaining Engineering Supply Support Maintenance Planning and Management Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation, Technical Data Support Equipment Training and Training Support Manpower and Personnel Facilities and Infrastructure Computer Resources. Effective support and sustainment of any weapon system, subsystem, or component over its life cycle always involves several, and often all, of these support elements. Each of these can be performed by separate organizations or by either/both the public and private sector, and in geographically disparate locations. Each of these functions is dependent, to some degree, on the other functions. 

6. Does it make any difference whether the product support integrator is a DoD entity or an industry entity? 

Although statute allows for the product support integrator to be “an entity within/outside the DoD” there may be times when it is advantageous to use a DoD or commercial product support integrator. For example, the product support manager may want to use the original equipment manufacturer as the product support integrator if original equipment manufacturer engineering expertise and experience with the system is important. Conversely, the product support manager may use a DoD product support integrator if the arrangement includes responsibilities inherently conducted by DoD. 

7. How can an industry product support integrator manage the performance of the work being performed by DoD workers, or vice versa, in accomplishing the “integration” of product support? 

Many product support functions are accomplished by a combination of public and private sector workers, not only working separate functions, but also working together on common functions. The collaboration of public and private sector workers is usually done under a public/private partnership. For example, if an industry original equipment manufacturer is designated as a product support integrator with responsibility for delivering outcomes dependent on organic performance of depot maintenance, then the industry provider has the ability to enter into a public-private partnership with the depots in which the details of the roles and responsibilities to facilitate achievement of the necessary outcomes through their mutual efforts is documented. This collaboration can apply under an Organic product support integrator as well. 

8. It seems that most product support integrators are from industry and most of them seem to be the original equipment manufacturer . Does assignment of a product support integrator signify outsourcing of sustainment to industry?
 
Programs choose to allocate work among DoD and commercial providers, the product support manager is ultimately accountable for the performance of the product support providers. A powerful incentive is the ability to receive extensions to the duration of the contract/award term with good performance. This provides stability to the provider’s order book and adds shareholder value. Incentives that focus on profit may not be applicable for DoD facilities, but increased percentage of available workload, promotions, bonuses, and spot awards are all possible incentives along with the desire to positively impact Warfighter outcomes. Whatever form the incentive takes, it should be sufficient to ensure the desired behavior and outcome over a range of conditions.

9. What are the product support integrator and provider responsible for?

The product support integrator and provider are responsible for successfully executing all delegated activities associated with delivering the outcome specified in the performance-based logistics arrangement. Similar to product support integrator, organic activities, such as an Depot, a Logistics Complex or an Inventory Control Point can also serve as a product support provider.  Much in the same way as incentivizing a product support integrator, it depends on whether or not the product support provider is an organic or commercial activity. If the product support provider is an organic activity, the primary incentive is to increase the volume and predictability of the performance-based logistics workload. For the commercial product support provider, there are a variety of effective incentives that can be used to manage repair behavior. 

10. If operational requirements change, can required pay level of performance from the product support provider be reduced e.g., a “readiness metrics.”

This is always a requirement that needs to be considered when constructing a performance-based logistics arrangement. A properly structured performance-based logistics arrangement should have provisions that cover such circumstances by allowing the program manager to adjust the performance or terminate a contract under certain conditions. For example, if payment is tied to unit of use, such as operating hour or miles driven, then a change in the level of operations will automatically result in a change in payment.

​Experiment by experiment, the company is weaving aircraft, ground vehicles, satellites, and the rest into a network that will someday give commanders unprecedented decision-support options.

The Pentagon’s efforts to digitally connect everything on the battlefield has a big challenge to overcome: getting disparate vehicles and weapons to share data. 

“The interoperability of various, different systems, that’s really where we are struggling. We don’t have that machine to machine connection to begin with.”

Over the past several years, we’ve been working to build those connections, piece by piece and plane by plane. We started by asking, “How would we go fight in 2030, 2045?” and then working backwards.

There are efforts underway to link the stealthy F-22 and F-35 combat jets. The Air Force has announced that they are to test a similar link next month, but the Air Force is establishing more complete linkages, including new forms of secure radio linkages using software defined radio, and also including other assets such as drones. 

Experiment by experiment, we tried to “systematically work” to build the components of a  larger network of networks.

Ultimately, we want all this to add up to a “virtualized cloud-based architecture like the branches of a tree. A handful of ships and planes might form one network. That will, in turn, connect to a larger network that would, in turn, would be connected to the larger network

 “You end up with virtual networks on the edge with a computing architecture you could have on an aircraft, on a ship, or any of the deployed nodes..  

Bringing all these pieces together will enable a new sort of operating system for warfare, a new experimental battle management display to illustrate the concept.

The system presents the operator with a list of effects, from devastating explosions to a quiet disabling of some enemy system; a list of available assets, including planes or drones; a map of targets; and recommendations for the best way to deliver effects to targets. 

As circumstances change — fuel gets low, ammunition is depleted, targets are destroyed, new enemy forces arrive, etc. — the system can send out alerts that a new plan is needed — or automatically update the plan with new instructions for pilots and drone operators. It all depends on how high the operator wants to set the autonomy.

That vision is very different from the way mission tasking works today. “Right now, our commanders are very limited in who they can assign to do certain” things. “More often than not, you have to assign someone because they happen to be in front of a specific place in front of a specific computer. 

Of course, realtime data sharing across platforms isn’t a simple or clear-cut affair, even after successful experimentation. It’s hard to simply to share data between operators and just one platform. The challenges of sharing data between multiple platforms, in the middle of battle in a highly contested airspace, are far larger.

Navy is making integration of ships, planes, sensors and weapons a priority going forward and is in the requirements-writing stage of development an integrated combat system. Today’s ability to pass information from sensors to operators at sea to fleet commanders ashore is not happening “at the speed of warfare.”

“It’s every ship, it’s every radar, it’s every airplane, it’s every weapon. And if we don’t optimize every one of them, the margin of victory is so slim right now we risk defeat. That’s how we approached strike group command, and that’s how we are approaching the push to develop the requirements for an integrated combat system.”

“We have to have the ability for that operator, when he looks at that track, to have confidence – whether it’s coming from an unmanned vehicle 200 miles away – that it’s the same thing they’re seeing on a cruiser, the same thing they’re seeing on Control Channels, the same thing that’s displayed in the Maritime Ops Center.”

All those leaders, from the cruiser to the strike group to the fleet commander, should also have a level of awareness that extends to what sensor is doing the tracking and therefore what its limitations might be; and what weapon is most appropriate to go after the threat, so it’s effective but not wasting a costly high-end weapon to defeat a less-capable target.

While leaders at sea might have access to this information, those at the Maritime Operations Center ashore see a lag in getting those details. We want everyone at all levels to have access to the same information in real time “so we can make good, sensible decisions and employ our weapons wisely against the threat. Or not react at all, if that’s the most prudent case, depending on the mission.”

“We should be able to, with this level of technology, to take what we are seeing on the carrier should be available in the operations center in real time so that when a fleet commander is told, ‘these are my intentions and I’m engaging here,, they can look at it and go, absolutely, and I’m moving this or that or whatever the case may be to support you.

“We deserve better information to the decision-maker. The information is there, somewhere; we’re just not getting it in the right hands at the right speed.”

A run-through of “what we need to win” includes the amphibious force, the submarine force, mine warfare and mine countermeasures communities, combat logistics and more. While much effort has been put into creating and strengthening the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air structure for the carrier strike group force, other communities in the Navy have been left out of previous efforts.

“We are going to do things differently, we are going to do things in a completely netted environment. … We have the weaponry to go a lot farther than we’re able to do because of the sensors.

Priorities include long-range targeting, which will require these netted sensors; a universal common operating picture and combat logistics.

Air Force is preparing an experiment it hopes will link the F-22 and F-35 fighter jets, the first in a series of experiments dubbed “connect-a-thons.”

The goal is to identify a fleet of aircraft with a communications issue, invite voices from inside and outside the Pentagon to offer solutions, and then test those offerings in a live experiment.

The F-22 was built with an older data link that can’t match up with the Multifunction Advanced Data Link system used on the newer F-35; while the F-35 can receive data , it can’t share the data back — a key capability given the envisioned role of the F-35 as a major sensor for the future Air Force.

For the test, the service will use a “universal translator” for the two jets. The first test, will feature the equipment on a pole on a test range, with the jets pinging their information back and forth from that fixed location.

It’s not the first time a drone has been used as a link between the two fighters. Global Hawk unmanned system, equipped with a new radio has been designed to act as a translator between the aircraft.

A cloud-based common operational picture that tracks where friendly forces are and displays a map of their constantly updated positions.

Why is this so difficult? As stealth aircraft whose whole raison d’être is to evade detection, the F-22 and F-35 would rather not use conventional radios to communicate in combat because the transmissions are too easy for an enemy to pick up. 

So both jets use so-called Low Probability of Detection/Low Probability of Interception communications – but they each use different ones that operate on different frequencies with incompatible software. F-22s use a unique Intra-Flight Data Link that works only with other F-22s, while the newer F-35s use the Multifunction Advanced Data Link , which can only talk to other F-35s.

The goal is to get something that works well enough to test in real-world conditions and get feedback from real pilots. Then you take that data and improve your solution and run the improved version through another test- then rinse and repeat until you get something good enough to field to actual combat forces.

We have product categories that we care a lot about. We want to be able to integrate sensors. We want to get data off of them. We want to secure the process. We want to be able to put applications on the system and connect capability and people together. And we want to output an effect, like  jamming a radar, to hacking a network, to blowing everything up.

The system features new methods of data sharing between air and ground forces, a common operational view that can track updated positions, and most prominently, a data connection to allow F-22s and F-35s to share data without exposing their positions.

The F-35 was designed to take in large amounts of data regarding battlefield positions and situations. The F-22 has a more limited mission and capability -- and the F-22's Intra-Flight Data Link and the F-35's Multifunction Advanced Data Link are currently incompatible.

The fighter planes, and other platforms, have different communications protocols and radio frequencies, and were not designed with a digital gateway to integrate their communications capabilities.

"The main point is that we want both the F-22 and the F-35 to be able to share communication over a link that allows them to do so in a way that protects their survivability."

Imagine a network of manned and unmanned systems, with relatively expendable drones actively emitting signals while the rest of the force stays silent, stealthy, and survivable. Imagine a multi-domain command and control network that can pull together forces from air, land, sea, networks reorganizing as needed on the fly. The goal: create a dispersed, flexible force our adversaries’ centralized systems can’t keep up with.

How would that work? A commander inputs the task the force needs to do, identifies the units to be made available for tasking, enters some constraints like geographic bounds, timing, etc., and the system comes back with some proposed courses of action. To develop the courses of action, the system runs an auction across all the units available to determine which can best accomplish the tasking like match passenger’s desired pickup points and destinations with available drivers, in seconds, millions of times a day.

Of course, the artificial intelligence driving this kind of Joint All-Domain Command & Control system would be complex, distinguishing between ride type and it would need to know the capabilities of different types of drones, planes, ships, ground vehicles, satellites, and more.

Then it needs to calculate which was best able to do a mission based on both its inherent capabilities and its current location. Instead of just knowing where to drop off a passenger, it would need to figure out the best kind of bomb to drop, or jamming to conduct, or network toodto deploy, against a wide variety of targets.

Traditional  military organization is like a jigsaw puzzle, where every piece can fit in one and only one place in the larger picture; the future organization needs to be like a mosaic, where a set of tiny building blocks can be combined in all sorts of ways to make an infinite variety of images.

This kind of networked force could survive enemy attack – physical destruction, hacking, or jamming – by reorganizing itself to pass data around the damaged nodes, making  it difficult for adversaries to knock out by jamming a few key links or physically destroying major headquarters, bases, ships, and satellites.

“The tools available to field commanders are insufficient to enable them to develop and plan creative operations. As a result, commanders, particularly junior ones who lack large planning staffs, will tend to fall back on doctrine, habits, and traditions that the enemy can predict.” We heed to enable leaders up and down the chain of command to creatively plan, adapt, and recompose their forces and operations.”

These new tools would help commanders rapidly retask and reorganize a new kind of force. Instead of relying on large, powerful aircraft that can do all aspects of an electronic warfare mission alone by themselves – which simplifies both US planning and the enemy’s countermeasures – the future force would disaggregate capabilities across multiple manned and unmanned platforms. 

Expendable drones might emit radar signals, while other drones and manned systems would passively receive the radar returns, then compare notes over hard-to-detect datalinks to figure out where the enemy forces were. Other expendable drones – possibly launched from a manned mothership — could transmit the powerful signals required for jamming, but every unit in the network would have the capacity to passively listen for enemy transmissions.

1. Saved Money

Automation cuts down on the amount of labor your business needs and the number of mistakes you make, which themselves turn into more labor. For example, if you have a customer service policy that allows customers to keep an incorrect product that you sent by mistake, a growing error rate can be very costly.

2. Saved Time

It takes far less time for computers to do data entry. While your human employees are sleeping, you can run jobs in the middle of the night so that they're ready when people arrive in the morning. By handling a larger workload, you can do things in advance instead of just in time. If an order comes in on a Monday and needs to be out on Wednesday, automation can often help you get it sent by Tuesday, helping your business to perform beyond its previous limits.

3. Customer Satisfaction with Product

By reducing the number of errors you commit, automation helps your final output be better. In addition, providing automation-enabled features, such as self-service and faster turnaround time, makes your customers want to come back to do business with you.

Automation doesn't just bring benefits on your side of the equation; it can also make your customers happier too. For example, if you run an e-commerce site, your customers can log into a self-service portal containing their order histories. Once you've entered the tracking number into your system, your customers can view exactly where their orders are in the process, without having to email or call customer service.

4. Happier Staff

Tedious and repetitive tasks are the bane of every worker's existence. By automating these activities, you can free up your employees from spending too much time on lower-level functions and let them better apply their knowledge. In doing so, they can learn new facets of the business and you'll develop more well-rounded employees. Automation make your staff smarter and help you find and retain the right people in the first place by improving your hiring processes and internal workflows.

5. Improved Control and Visibility

Having visibility into and oversight of manual processes is difficult because you can't always see how far your employees have progressed with a certain task. As such, one of the major benefits of automation is predictability and control: you know exactly how your processes are being executed every time. In addition, automation is often able to consolidate processes by reducing the number of steps involved, decreasing the complexity.

6. Improved Quality and Reduced Errors

If you're using manual processes, errors are nearly inevitable. What's more, the greater number of humans involved in the process, the greater the chances that mistakes will be introduced, especially with tedious tasks like data entry. Automating your processes gives you consistency: the knowledge that as long as you've set up the system correctly, you'll always get back the right results.

7. Improved Measurement Ability

Automation gives you more data, which means it's easier to measure all sorts of metrics and key performance indicators about your processes. For example, if you know you can ship a certain number of orders during a single day or hour, you can use that as a baseline for your future forecasts. You can also more easily find problems and shortcomings. If you know there's a bottleneck in a given process and you've already automated two steps, it's easier to find the bottleneck in the remaining manual parts.

8. Improved Communication

There are two ways automation can improve communication: between technologies and between people. First, an expert automation partner can help you connect two completely independent systems and have them start talking to each other and working together relatively seamlessly. Second, automation can connect you better with your clients by providing information, such as order and shipping status, so they're kept up-to-date at all times.

9. Improved Ability to Scale and Grow

Too many businesses struggle to scale their manual processes under the weight of increased growth. By helping to shoulder a good deal of the workload, automation can help you become more productive and efficient without having to hire additional workers. The more quickly and correctly you can complete business-critical processes, such as ordering and customer service, the better prepared you'll be to scale your business.

10. Improved Compliance and Security

As mentioned above, automation gives you more predictability and visibility into the results of a process, which are extremely important for compliance reasons. Automating your processes helps you be certain you're following a given compliance framework. In addition, by automating a given process, you're exposing any sensitive information to fewer human eyes, helping you keep this data more secure.

​The purpose of a wingman was established to provide mutual support within a formation, protect the flight lead and provide pilot with the additional capacity to manage the formation, operate the aircraft, and make decisions.
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The most important tasks for the wingman were to help avoid an attack by an unseen enemy, contribute to the formation’s situational awareness, and watch out for obvious signs the leader had either missed something or made an error. At the very heart of the idea was an acceptance that the pilot is fallible and, in the heat of battle, task saturation was likely to result in mistakes and errors in tactical decision-making.

In the early years of aviation, a wingman would be positioned slightly behind the lead aircraft in close visual proximity to the wings of the leader. But as advances in technology introduced new inter and intra-flight data links and increased levels of integration with airborne early warning/control systems, formations became invariably separated beyond visual range of each other and able to benefit from shared situational awareness.

There are, of course, still times when a wingman is required to be in close visual range, but these are becoming more suited to non-tactical reasons such as transits through controlled airspace or through poor weather conditions.

So what started out as a role providing visual lookout support has now been transformed by the introduction of multi-sensor fusion displays and data links, with mutual support by proximity now measured in miles rather than metres. The fundamental purpose of a wingman has changed over the years from supporting and protecting the leader, to one which is focused on the greater concentration of firepower and more effective application and multiplication of force.

Yet perhaps the most transformational aspect of the evolving wingman role is that of the unmanned ‘Loyal Wingman’, a wingman that does as it is told and does not get distracted by the fear and chaos of battle.

The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards “and” rather than “or”.  Manned and unmanned teaming is a powerful concept which leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles and the challenges of integration.

It should come as no surprise, then, to see the expansion of the loyal wingman concept in recent times into the other warfighting domains.

Recent developments in unmanned surface and sub-surface combatants are opening new ways of warfighting and creating opportunities to reconceptualise joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace.

The new unmanned platforms are expected to carry a range of sensors and weapon systems almost certainly configured for anti-surface warfare and maritime strike. Yet the potential for broader counter-air missions set within the cooperative engagement framework opens up new possibilities and significantly leverages existing manned surface fleet capability as well as providing a means of enabling integrated fire control, with the air layer containing E-2D Hawkeye, F-35C, F/A-18F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers.

The distributed architecture will require a complex web of advanced datalinks and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building this ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics.

And then the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. And that is exactly why we should do it.

Now robots understand verbal instructions, carry out a task, and report back. The potential rewards are tremendous. A robot that can understand commands and has a degree of machine intelligence would one day be able to go ahead of troops and check for ambushes. It could also reduce the number of human soldiers needed on the ground.

Soldiers will soon use VR technology widely to train for such experiences as jumping from an airplane. You can create a virtual reality of the exact environment you would be in and it’s extremely realistic. so you don’t have to go through the stress and expense of getting on the plane and learning exactly where to put your hands on the door. 

Virtual reality enables you to practice time after time and get better at it. Soldiers in a recent VR session found digital jump training so realistic they automatically assumed the jump position and “reached out where they needed to put their hands.”

The new techniques won’t stop with training. Troops in the field already “receive information on enemy location, friendly location, targeting – all things to absorb and react to.
 
We are putting real-time input from different sources into one package. “What we’ve done is basically put a digital wrapper around the soldier that allows them to take different inputs.  "We can interchange sensors, algorithms and it becomes plug and play.”

Every time a parachute unit hits the ground, it shatters. A well-ordered formation breaks apart into individuals, strewn across the landscape and unsure of where their comrades and commanders have landed. Leaders race to reform a fighting force before the enemy can pick the scattered paratroopers off.

Now we are testing to see how much faster could that force form up and move out if paratroopers could see each others’ locations in real time on a digital map. What new tactics would become possible?

Yes, drones, satellites, and datalinks have dramatically improved the amount of information available today to static command posts and troops in vehicles. But more advanced communications systems have been too bulky and too hungry for electricity for paratroopers, still relying on backpack push-to-talk radios. “It hasn’t changed much for the dismounted infantryman. It was more like wrestling in the dark when you don’t really know where your hands and your feet are all the time.”

With the new network available  to leaders at every level down to the four-man fire team, “that commander at all times knows exactly where his hands and his feet are. We’ll eventually get to the point with the smart goggles now in testing that will go to every infantry soldier – “where we know all the fingers and toes are too.”

Do commanders really need to know the location of every private? “In the chaos of an airborne assault, commanders actually do care about where individuals are.. Today, for instance, we can’t call in artillery or airstrikes too close to the landing zone for fear they’ll hit stray paratroopers he hasn’t accounted for yet. With goggles on every soldier, calls could be put in in heavy firepower in even in the first critical, vulnerable minutes after hitting the ground and not have to worry about friendly fire.

“Right now, we try to jump consolidated-  put as many members of this brigade on a single piece of terrain as possible.” In other words, you drop the entire brigade in the same location to make it easier to link up. But if you’re already linked virtually as soon as you hit the ground, you can be spread out.”

Instead of one big drop from lots of vulnerable transport aircraft, which require blasting a wide path through enemy air defenses, you could do several small drops from a few planes and exploit smaller holes in the enemy defensive system. Instead of a brigade or battalion hitting the ground in one place, getting organized, and moving out against multiple objectives, you can hit each objective at once, giving the enemy less time to respond.

Even after the initial landing, the new network lets the troops spread out more without losing the ability to support each other, because it has longer range than the current FM radios. “Right now, the problem is, not how fast I can move, its can communications reach far enough?’”

Currently, the brigade has to send out specialist FM transmission teams to relay messages to keep units in contact when they’re separated by distance or radio-wave-blocking terrain like hills or buildings. Those teams have to set up on high ground to ensure unobstructed transmissions, where they then start pumping out lots of radio signals. That makes them easy for an enemy to find. And the brigade doesn’t have many retrans teams. Only battalion commanders and above have any.

By contrast, every company in the new network will get its own relay drone. Because long-range radios are bulky and power-hungry, these drones aren’t portable systems. They have to be carried on the company commander’s vehicle air-dropped in with the first wave to carry special equipment – which is also the only vehicle in a standard rifle company. 

Even in flight, the drones need an electrical cord back down to that vehicle to draw power, so they can only fly in circles, tethered to a specific location. But they don’t have to set up on high ground, since they’re effectively instant radio towers. A bulkier version of the drone, it “greatly enhanced our ability to extend our mesh network,” That meant forward units could push forward aggressively and remain in touch.

Longer range communications are even more important on the brigade level. We have a cavalry squadron, but today the commander can’t send them out very far before they are no longer able to report back, which defeats the point of doing reconnaissance. With the new network, there is the ability to push the scouts out farther, allowing them to find the enemy faster. That, in turn, gives the rest of the brigade more warning time to attack, dig in or evade.

Longer range also helps link the brigade to supporting units, like AH-64 helicopter gunships. Today, “unless they’re within FM range of one command post, they’re going to be hard for us to talk to. But with the new system a frontline platoon leader, for instance, talk to the gunship pilot “the entire time that Apache is moving through my battlespace… from the minute the wheels are up.”

Keeping the tech light is critical to a unit that moves mostly on foot. So is making it easy to use and to maintain. While the brigade has its own Forward Support Battalion, it has nowhere near the deep bench of mechanics and technicians that an armored or helicopter unit has. Adding that many personnel and all their gear would make the brigade much bulkier and slower to deploy, defeating the point of a light infantry unit.

“Is the equipment going to the right echelon? Do we have the technological capability to maintain it?” For brigade commanders, this is one of the biggest concerns, it’s one of the things they asked us to pay the most attention to. We don’t want to … have to give the rifle platoon a vehicle and a trailer and a generator.”

We don’t want paratroopers to become dependent on technology, not when hacking, jamming and ordinary breakdowns can take it away.

“In everything we do, we have to take into consideration what happens when that technological advantage is denied to us, for whatever reason. That means training in “basic skills” like using map, compass, and human contact.

“But even with these big advances, the infantry’s a hands-on business. “Sometimes you just need to put your hand on somebody’s shoulder and have a conversation eye to eye.

With the next generation of network technology expected to become more widespread, we are exploring how the new hardware could improve global asset management, “smart depots" and augmented or virtual reality. The technology will help with training, network security and artificial intelligence capabilities.

Advanced network technology will also allow troops to process information faster, key to developing better artificial intelligence. “In order to really use artificial intelligence you’re going to require a lot more bandwidth than we currently have.

1. Saves Time

The first and most valuable benefit Digital Process Automation provides is time-savings. Providing your employees with the right information at the right time and in the specific context will help them do their tasks more quickly and easily while reducing manual tasks. Automating many of these repetitive tasks can save hundreds, even thousands of working hours for organizations.

2. Cost Reduction

Every business faces global pressure to increase their profitability. One approach is to reduce costs. But, reducing the capabilities of the computer center negatively impacts the entire company.

Automation software is a better and more intelligent approach to cost containment and reduction. The greatest opportunity is to increase service to the customer while systematically reducing costs. Management often overlooks this potential for savings. 

3. Operational Stability

Another significant advantage of Digital Process Automation is operational stability. By following fixed guidelines, Digital Process Automation eliminates situations in which documents may be displaced, or where processing steps might be missed. This allows your employees to effortlessly provide value to clients while handling all the needed steps to ensure accuracy and security of the process.

4. Prevents Errors

Process changes  can lead to work-errors. Digital Process Automation  systems can easily adapt to these changes and eliminate risks. With updated-to-date workflows around new document templates, employees can easily follow the predetermined workflow. Such automation helps organizations avoid document processing errors because most of these errors are human errors.

5. Responds to Customer Demand

The ability of Digital Process Automation provides ability organize and digitize processes allows for easy adaptations and improvements. This enables organizations to quickly launch new solutions to scale and to adjust to the needs of the market. This ability of rapid experimentation is crucial for the success of organizations.

6. Productivity

As an organization’s technology demands grow, productivity becomes a bigger concern. Typically, as other business areas were given tools to increase their productivity and effectiveness, but network operations took a back seat. 

As people use computers more, they place greater demands on the system. More users are generating more jobs, and printed output has increased despite efforts to reduce printed reports. In spite of the trend to online transaction-oriented and client/server systems, batch workloads continue to grow. Production batch jobs still consume the majority of time, and in large shops, jobs are constantly being added.

7. Job Scheduling

Job scheduling  increases batch throughput by automating the production batch schedule. In the early days, computer throughput was limited by how fast operators could reset switches on the console not allowing idle time while waiting for the operator to release the next job. You save time and money by eliminating the lag time between jobs and minimizing operator intervention to process more work and significantly improve system use.

Once the job schedule is established, automation executes the commands precisely and in the correct sequence, eliminating operator errors. Forecasting job completion and being able to perform “what if” analyses of schedule changes benefits operations by removing much of the guesswork from daily tasks.

8. Availability

Companies are continually more reliant on networks to conduct day-to-day business like: order entry, reservations, assembly instructions, shipping orders—the list goes on. If the computer is not available, the business suffers.

High availability is clearly one network primary goals. Here too, automated operations can help. A driver may crash, but the situation becomes serious when there is not an adequate backup— or worse, the tape cannot be found. A key advantage to automation is the ability to automate your save and recovery systems to ensure protection from the potential disaster of disk loss, or inadvertent damage to system objects from human error.

9. Reliability

Productivity is an obvious benefit of automation. However, reliability is the real gem that sparkles with automation. It is the cornerstone of any good network operations. Without it you have confusion, chaos, and unhappy users. Network operations requires two opposed skill sets.

On one hand, an operations person needs highly technical skills, such as the ability to understand the complexities of an operating system and to analyze and solve problems as they arise. On the other hand, this same person has to be content pushing buttons and loading paper.

Automated operations ensure that jobs are not forgotten or run out of sequence, that prerequisite jobs are completed successfully, that the input data is correct, and that any special processing is performed.

10. Performance

Every company would like to have their enterprise perform like a thoroughbred. In reality, it is more likely to be overburdened with work. Even though advancements in computers make them faster and less expensive every year, the demands on them always catch up and eventually exceed the level of capability that a company’s computer infrastructure possesses. That leaves a lot of companies wanting to improve their system performance.

Two options to improve performance are to upgrade/purchase a newer system—both expensive choices. It’s also possible to tune a system for better performance, but this takes a highly skilled person who is not normally available 24 hours a day. And, once a system is tuned for a specific workload, if the workload changes, the settings are no longer optimum.

​As the Services push its top priorities for modernization through a collection of cross functional teams, a lot of the headline-grabbing items include longer range fires, missile defense, new helicopters, new vehicles and new rifles.

But for soldiers to use that gear best and practice round after round, they’ve got to be able to train.

Training now means more than mock squad grass drills behind the barracks. Technology is finally getting to a point where soldiers can enter a simulated world and run through combat-like scenarios on the actual terrain where they will fight, whether that’s boots on dirt, flying in the skies or firing from remote platforms.

Soldiers, Marines try out new device that puts ‘mixed reality,’ multiple functions into warfighter’s hands. The system melds navigation, targeting, situational awareness and communications into a single device with advanced thermal and night vision.

Advanced trainers have already pushed out with more on the way, including the backbone of how a multitude of soldiers, commanders and units will conduct realistic training at home station to help them prepare in ways they never before could.

Another key piece of gear with the Soldier Lethality is Integrated Visual Augmentation System, a kind of headset that ties in navigation, weapon and troop location information into one device.

Some of that will combine old items, such as the engagement skills trainer, for items such as call for fire, use of force and others, into one system with the Soldier-Squad Virtual Trainer to help a squad operate in the simulated environment together in real time.

The advantage that gives is to allow for “reps and sets” of training to be done at home station regardless of range availability.

“Train wherever you are. Set up a barracks as an entire shoot house, use a series of buildings. They’re not tied to some facility scheduled way in advance. That lets soldiers be intuitive and execute parts of their training when they need to, practicing in the terrain they’ll actually fight on.

The most pressing and promising work, though has been in developing “One World Terrain models from real world data. Processing times for the data needed to create a usable environment shrank from months or weeks down to days or hours since the team started work.

The next steps for One World Terrain include expanding the system’s database. Some of the challenges include improving latency and bandwidth so that the fidelity or realistic qualify of the terrain remains high. However, even lower fidelity versions can help with training and mission planning. 

As they continue building the individual, squad and collective trainers, training is pushing into the combined simulation to improve the decades-old gear with force-on-force laser-based shooting simulators. Also alternatives both for the engagement system that runs the shooting devices and the devices themselves.

Roll out the talking robots – or at least the artificial intelligence technologies that can manage human communication networks on the future battlefield. The unprecedented complexity of communications management in a future with exponential increases of ubiquitous information technology devices in Multi-Domain Operations needs AI solutions. 

Military must develop AI-supported assured communications management capabilities to understand and monitor network structures and their availability throughout the environment. to seamlessly integrate commercial and military communication networks to the warfighter’s devices. 

Like any adversary, the complexity of Future Operational Environments will challenge future warriors’ abilities to command and control their warfighting systems. For example, Multi Domain Operations are expected to be composed of vast formations of unmanned, robotic, and autonomous systems that depend on massive amounts of data and rapid, assured communications across the spectrum, from tactical to strategic battle areas.

Engagements in the future environment will “far exceed the reaction time of humans. Decision-making processes require much greater speed; information and intelligence…so that commanders can make decisions at increasingly rapid rates.” 

Future forces may have to operate in a communications denied environment, potentially requiring the employment of robotic and autonomous systems highlighting the importance of maintaining “assured communications and sufficient network bandwidth” as operational tempo increases with the integration of greater numbers of manned and unmanned systems. 

Despite the compelling need for AI-based capabilities, their development has been slow, potentially leading to degraded battlefield communication management, and ultimately communication gaps. AI-based innovations may reduce the warfighter’s need to pause operations for lack of communications must develop capability can monitor network status and seamlessly integrate warfighters’ communications networks and devices. 

Consider scenarios where such capabilities can enhance command and control during MDO:

A battlefield truck driver needs to give a status report to operations centers, from the strategic to the tactical support areas. What communications are available along the route? What onboard technology will feed into the report? Must the driver find a friendly command post or a commercial node to transmit his report? Is there a single channel, line-of-sight, or beyond line-of-sight option mounted to the truck? AI assured capabilities knows instantly and will automatically establish network connections, provide assured communications, and send the status report to the proper recipients.

Special operations forces and local militias engaged in a fight against a common enemy must maintain command and control in an austere environment. The signal officer must develop primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications options. New tools understand the interoperability and interface requirements of the available communications equipment and autonomously establishes assured communications connectivity.

Such capabilities can simultaneously support a truck driver, a signal officer, a special forces operator, and virtually every other soldier, command post, or robotic and autonomous capability on the battlefield, establishing communications with the management of two key dependencies. 

First, they seamlessly employ available commercial, private, or military communication networks for the warfighter. Second, they understand the type, capability, location, and availability of all warfighters’ organic communications assets, assigned by echelons.

A robust capability should autonomously answer three questions for communications managers: Who talks to whom and when? What talks to what and when? And what means best serve these communications requirements? 

To answer these questions, an AI-empowered system requires three intrinsic, trusted data feeds that include 1) the status of all available communications systems across the battlefield in real time; 2) an inventory of units, locations, and communications assets of all friendly forces; and 3) the permissions needed to autonomously establish services between communications systems and warfighting communications assets. With these comprehensive, ubiquitous trusts, AI assured capabilities  and its data resources provides all warfighters at echelon with communications at any time, by any available means. 

These may include the following:

Managing Access Points. AI assured capabilities  must know all potential access points for wired and wireless communications capabilities across the battlefield. Access points provide warfighters, command posts, robotic and autonomous systems with the locations and types of available communications.

Reporting Operational Status. AI assured capabilities  must know the operational status of all wired and wireless communications capabilities at each potential access point. This status identifies the quality and capacity of communications at each access point.

Mapping Routes of March and Command Post Locations. AI assured capabilities requires terrain mapping of all potential routes of march traversing a battlespace. AI assured capabilities  overlays routes of march upon access points so warfighters can readily connect to the nearest communications capability. 

The result is war fighters and command posts receive ‘on the move’ and ‘at the halt’ communications. AI assured capabilities  also requires terrain mapping of potential command post locations, to include improved buildings and unimproved field locations that can support ‘at the halt’ and fixed communications requirements. AI assured capabilities  overlays command post locations upon access points so warfighters can establish command posts at a location with the best network connectivity.

Managing All Available Communications Devices. AI assured capabilities requires a trusted awareness of all available communications capabilities by unit, with the ability to geolocate each device. This awareness of friendly force information must include all echelons of capability. From a truck with an FM radio to the four-star command post, to any number of future warfighting devices, and capability operating on the battlefield. The alignment of network connectivity with warfighter capability produces assured communications.

Providing Trusted Network Provider Access and Contracts. AI assured capabilities  requires trusted relationships communications providers to seamlessly enable leased or military services for authorized users. AI assured capabilities must automatically establish  contracts processes to rapidly establish communications connectivity for the warfighter and for other systems on the battlefield.

Providing Information Fusion. AI assured capabilities capability fuses information feeds and provides a real-time alignment of: 1) access point communications capabilities; 2) routes of march; 3) command post locations; 4) available devices by location; and, 5) automatic contracts and service provision. An AI assured capabilities system-of-systems becomes a ‘matrix’ of all available users, their organic communications capabilities, and the networks to connect them.

Who talks to whom and when? What talks to what and when? And what means best serve these communications requirements?

The result of such capability is comprehensive. From the platoon to the theater army level, and at all points in time and space on the battlefield, AI-assured communications capabilities can minimize the “the fog and friction of war” and their effects on operations..

1.  Increased Productivity

Workflow and business process automation reduces the amount of time needed to complete a task. This can result in higher productivity rates for routine tasks, with the side benefit of freeing up employees’ time to concentrate on more complex and revenue-generating activities and better customer service.

2.  Streamlined Communication

Conversations, emails, and phone calls between employees who are trying to pass on information can result in many details getting lost in translation. An automated system provides a visual and organized platform where all employees have a centralized view. Updates and documentation is recorded and managed so that all information is current. Controls are in place to prevent overlaying information and for access permissions.

3.  Reduced Time and Costs

Performing tasks manually requires a lot more time than if they were automated. This frees up your time to work on items that add genuine value to the business, allowing you to be more innovative and increasing your employees’ levels of motivation.

Expensive manual errors and inefficiencies occur where humans are involved. Automation can greatly reduce the costs associated with errors such as delayed approvals and the like. It can also save administrative labor costs.

Business process automation means that more man-hours are available to you. This means your company can have the same level of output even after reducing the human workforce. Thus, you have the chance to focus more on the quality of your employees instead of quantity. And eventually, reduce the overall cost of business operation.

4.  Improved Quality

An automated process ensures that all actions are performed identically with no room for error. Each product is produced and each service is performed consistently, without deviations. This results in higher quality products and customer service that is more reliable. The improved consistency also encourages the development of more feature-filled products with little or no increase in production time and costs.

5.  Greater Visibility

Business process automation systems include dashboards where you can view and monitor the process and see where things are at any given time. This is useful in managing deadlines and for capacity planning purposes.

6.  More Efficient Task Management

The various departments involved in any process can have access and visibility into the automated workflow with just a few clicks. No more emails or phone calls to other departments requesting status. You can set up regular monitoring and reminders within the automated system so that nothing in the process slips through the cracks.

7.  Improved Operational Stability

Business process automation systems have rigid guidelines regarding the control document and process actions. This eliminates situations where processing steps might be missed or documents misplaced. Employees need not worry about verifying accuracy of information and tasks; it’s all built in to the system. This greatly increases the dependability and reliability of the process.

8.  Greater Customer Satisfaction

Because they will receive more accurate and consistent products and services, your customers will be more satisfied. They’ll know that they can depend on you to get the job done right. Also, your customer service will be easier and more efficient. If a customer calls, you can quickly pull up all their related information without shuffling through a bunch of papers. Customers will appreciate the speed and quality of service, which will increase their trust and loyalty.

9. Better allocation of the workforce

Automating tasks allows your business to free up your workforce from many repeated actions that actually do not need that much human intervention. This enables you to reorganize your company’s structure and focus more on creative tasks and innovation.

At complex projects, monitoring every team member and ensuring proper flow of information often turns out to be a difficult task. Keeping track of project process, updating the different teams, setting goals and deadlines become a lot easier if these processes can be automated.

10. Deeper insights into the business process
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By computationally managing your business information, you can analyse and dig deeper into the data. Automating the business process thus gives you a way to gain deeper into different aspects of your business.
For example, you may want to see the number of leads that you are generating and compare that with the number of sales you have. Of course, this analysis can be done manually. But for large organisations, such manual analysis can be complex. Better insights also mean you can easily identify problems in any part of the business process, which may otherwise be invisible.