Logistics is probably the most complex and interrelated capability provided by today’s military. But to those unfamiliar with its conceptual and technological reach of difficulty, it can be considered an assumed capability—something that simply happens—or, worse yet, a “back office” function that is not connected to warfighting capability.

The success of military logistics during the past decade of combat operations is partly to blame for anyone’s assumption that continued logistical success in the ever-changing national security environment is a given across the entirety of the military logistics enterprise. This dangerous assumption tends to exclude logistics from the conversation regarding the nation’s current and future warfighting needs.

As a result, the logistics enterprise is rarely debated outside the logistics profession with the same intensity as other more publicized warfighting needs, especially the need to regain our military technological advantage over major competitors. Failure to understand the implications of not modernizing logistics in a time of great technological change compromises success of the modernized force.

In addition to ensuring modernized logistics capabilities are appreciated as central to regaining our military advantage, logistics capabilities must be considered in the ongoing discussion of solutions to overcome the current readiness shortfalls of today’s military. Logistics is nearly absent from the recent testimonies by military leaders, members of congress, and industry. While all of the testimonies highlight the need to modernize the U.S. military in order to regain our technological advantage, few specifically highlight the need for modernized logistics capabilities.
 
 “Logistics isn’t rocket science…it’s much harder!” Logistics is—those at home, deployed in operational settings, and permanently stationed abroad—given that it must operate around the world and across every domain of activity in spite of enemy efforts to frustrate its operations. Consequently, it is far more complex than even the most operationally global business enterprises.
 
Logistics planning and modernization define the distinctive characteristics or qualities of the military force and ultimately provide the military commander the freedom of action, endurance, and ability to extend operational reach that are necessary to achieve success.

Logistics operations are far more than “back office” functions and are truly what sustain the force and support its warfighting readiness. The criticality of logistics is not a newcomer, however; logistics has a significantly more complex nature today because of its integration across air, land, sea, space, and the information and cyber domains.

For the U.S. to be able to sustain effective combat operations in the modern era, it must “prioritize prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, partner and allied support, as well as non-commercially dependent distributed logistics and maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.”

As network and electronic warfare capabilities are introduced to the forward edge of the battlespace, individual capabilities represented by on-hand quantities of different technologies and trained personnel will truly define a unit’s ability to execute the mission-essential tasks demanded in the complex warfighting environment of a peer adversary.

The impact of logistics beyond readiness grows exponentially when taken in the context of the larger complexities of strategic logistics capabilities such as national and international rail, port, and sealift capacities. Reductions in the size and capability of the industrial base, limitations on our national sealift capacity, and aging of the infrastructure needed to move personnel, weapons systems, ammunition, and fuel all directly challenge the ability of the United States to project military power.
 
Requirements for recent conflicts pale in comparison to the requirement laid out for the future military force in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The future fight will require significantly greater responsiveness and diversity in the face of a greater threat. The NDS requires a military that will “be able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection platforms.

This will include capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in complex terrain.” To achieve mobility and resilience, our military will be required to field “ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack. Transitioning from large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that includes active and passive defenses will also be prioritized.”

The force of tomorrow must be ready to defeat a peer competitor in a broad battlespace that requires security for each logistics movement, the ability to off-load across various widely distributed locations, with minimal infrastructure, and in a communications-degraded environment.

The ability to meet the NDS requirements requires a significantly more agile force. It must be able to dictate the time and tempo of its buildup and control the massive capabilities of the U.S. military. It must coordinate with allies and partners to place combined force capabilities against the adversary’s weakness and develop and sustain a broad array of overseas advanced bases that will change frequently and provide the responsiveness and effectiveness needed to prevail despite enemy efforts to prevent U.S. forces from getting to or operating within the theater of combat.

U.S. military has not had to “fight its way to the fight” since World War II. Equally absent since that time has been the need to apply combat power to preserve logistics capabilities.

Given the evolution of competitors’ abilities to threaten the logistical underpinnings of U.S. combat power, force logistics planning now requires innovation in both technology and operational concepts. In a time of constrained fiscal resources, this means doing differently with less. There is no option to fail, and there is no hope of unlimited resources. The combination of innovation and new technology is therefore critical to maintaining the competitive logistical advantage that U.S. forces have enjoyed since World War II.

The NDS focuses on investments needed to improve the ability of forces deployed abroad to maneuver against an enemy and ensure that the posture of those forces (how they are arrayed in theater) has resilience (the ability to sustain losses and remain effective). Not explicitly addressed in the NDS but fundamentally implied is the equally daunting challenge of winning the “home games” by having the critical military–industry partnerships and dedicated infrastructure that serve as the preparation and launching pads for our forces. technical support for contract maintenance, and the ability to replace warfighting platforms that are well beyond their service life, be it ships, aircraft, or major land-component systems (tanks, artillery, reconnaissance vehicles, personnel carriers, radars, ground vehicles, etc.).
 
When the instability of funding that results from continuing resolutions and an inability to pass budgets on time is added to these challenges, one can see that the problems confronting the industrial base are magnified at a time when they most need to be reduced so that our ability to supply the force is responsive and resilient.

Maybe counterintuitively, a constrained ability to build “new iron” (ships, aircraft, and major ground weapons systems) actually increases the logistics burden and budget because the cost of maintaining older systems necessarily increases.

The problem is made worse by the complexity of dealing with both old and new technologies in a single logistics enterprise. Add to these challenges the reduction of skilled manpower in the active and reserve forces, the increased difficulty of retaining seasoned military personnel, and a decreasing number of civilian and contractor artisans in the logistics workforce, and the need for modernizing the logistics force, from training to developing new concepts, becomes even more obvious.

Modernizing “home game” infrastructure must also include improved, state-of-the-art ranges and maintenance facilities, which are critical to supporting the readiness of new platforms that are being acquired in every service.

Such facilities must also be made resilient in the face of network security challenges, now a common feature of modern conflict. Integrating simulators and virtual reality capabilities into range design will also help to reduce the logistical impact of home-station training and generate much-needed efficiencies in major range training opportunities while also improving overall warfighting readiness.
 
The hybrid logistics attributes are a mixture of legacy and evolving technologies. They are delivered from the sea by means of modern connectors, platforms, processes, and concepts with the flexibility to enable multi-domain fires and maneuver. They are innovative in concept design and practice, with a command and control architecture that is guarded against cyber and electronic warfare threats, and data-driven through predictive analytics.

They also are applicable across the entire U.S. military from the strategic level to the tactical level. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any logistics capability is determined at the tactical level, but sustained success at the tactical level requires effectiveness further upstream at the operational and strategic levels.

Success at the operational level requires integration of logistics capabilities contributed by all entities involved in military affairs, to include service, coalition-partner, interagency, private/commercial, and host-nation capabilities. The operational integration of these various capabilities provides the linkage between the tactical and strategic levels.
 
Logistics survivability upgrades can achieve reduced targetability of the logistics force through development of manageable electronic signatures, a reduced logistics footprint, and improved distribution with reduced static inventory. Static inventory is distribution moving at zero miles per hour, and anything that is static on the modern battlefield has little chance of remaining survivable.

The ability to make the force more survivable requires both technological improvements that reduce the need for large footprints in bulk liquids and ammunition and refocused training and logistics concepts. Technologies such as additive manufacturing, improved man–machine interfaces, and advanced robotics will contribute significantly to improved survivability. Ultimately, change must ensure both speed and reliability of logistics systems that build trust from the tactical level to the strategic level. Improvements in munitions and energy systems will directly improve the speed and reliability of the force and, thus, its logistical survivability and effectiveness.
 
While not a new consideration in designing a force for tomorrow that remains relevant today, the development of integrated, agile, technologically advanced, and effective logistics systems that drive efficiencies into every corner of the military is increasingly essential in today’s dynamic, fast-paced, and ever-changing national security environment. The shift in our military focus to competing in an era of great-power competition demands an even greater understanding of logistics and highlights the breadth of the requirement to support the entirety of the force in innovative ways, from training in the United States to deploying far from home.
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Whether the unit engaging the enemy is in the air, on land, at sea, or in space or cyberspace, it must embrace innovation in logistics that not only integrates new technology, but also innovates in the “hybrid” environment of old and new in order to retain our military’s true advantage as the world’s only force that can “prevail in conflict both today and well into the future.
 

1. Military logistics involves the interaction of military and government entities with private, commercial, foreign, and multinational organizations worldwide.
2. Unlike commercial companies with global distribution operations, the military faces conflicts that usually erupt with very little warning
3. Conflicts immediately create enormous demands for support
4. Unlike commercial firms that can prepare by the calendar, the military must operate without knowing when the date of each event occurs
5. Military must have the ability to respond to a sudden change in the “latest hot item” within hours, if not minutes.
6. Military forces must receive such support regardless of network condition
7. Network disruption could limit or make intermittent access to networks
8. Supporting logistics forces must meet the demand while an enemy is trying to destroy customers
9. Must operate at home and away zones
10. Must confront enemy intent to destroy the delivery fleet at every opportunity.

 

Focused logistics will provide military capability by ensuring delivery of the right equipment, supplies, and personnel in the right quantities, to the right place, at the right time to support operational objectives. It will result from future improvements in information systems, innovation in organizational structures, reengineered processes, and advances in transportation technologies. This transformation has already begun with changes scheduled for the near term facilitating the ultimate realization of the full potential of focused logistics.
 
The Air Force is especially vulnerable to threats because of its reliance on prepared airfields. While the service can overcome some disadvantages with long-range bombers, a war in which missiles knock out American air bases and prevent the ability to launch and recover short-range fighter jets is unlikely to end well.
 
Agile Combat Employment ACE is an operational concept that leverages networks of well-established and austere air bases, multi-capable airmen, pre-positioned equipment, and airlift to rapidly deploy, disperse and maneuver combat capability throughout a theater.

Paired with aircraft fueling, arming and limited maintenance activities, ACE expands the number of bases from which air forces can generate combat sorties. Through cross-major command initiatives and coordination, ACE has evolved to produce multidisciplinary support personnel, expanded to recurrent use in exercises and served as a foundation to further interoperability.

Access to airfields must be expanded. The ability to “pick up” and move at a time, and to a place, of the combatant command’s choosing is markedly diminished. In turn, capability in theater risks becoming static and could make for easy targets.

Procurement of pre-positioned equipment must be accelerated. To reduce theater airlift requirements, it is imperative to pre-position equipment that airmen will need to support forward aircraft. This is particularly true in theaters that lack  well-established multimodal networks.

 But procurement timelines for these materials are often lengthy. For example, full fielding of deployable air base system kits is not expected until 2026. This will be protracted further for regionally based cluster pre-position kits, which have yet to receive funding as part of the Air Force’s latest budget request.

If troops cannot posture these kits in a timely manner, America’s air forces may risk moving to insufficiently outfitted locations — a result that would adversely impact ACE execution.

Planners should assess the role and capacity of airlift. Airlift will invariably incur a heavier burden to execute ACE. Needed to carry the crews and cargo supporting fighter aircraft from one location to the next, transport assets prove integral to this concept’s agility.

However, given the fleet’s high demand, it is smart to evaluate whether it could sustain ACE across a contested environment. This examination should account for current and future demands to fully identify air mobility limitations. The findings would serve to determine the right mix of airlift and whether requirements exist for an airframe not in the inventory.

Finally, the Air Force must broaden its training to create multi-capable airmen. Due to finite capacity to rapidly shift support personnel worldwide, the Air Force is training airmen to take on roles outside of their traditional jobs. This effort reduces the logistics tail required to project combat power.

So far, multi-capable training has been developed and executed by various major commands, and Air Force has begun crafting a program baseline. To build on this foundation and produce multirole airmen from the outset of their military career, incorporating the new training standard into applicable technical schools would aid in growing the requisite skills needed to compete in tomorrow’s fight.
 
Importance of Small-team Distributed Logistic Operations

In practice, commanders and their staff plan for activity ‘two-down’. For a combat brigade this means a focus upon coordinating the efforts of combat teams that are usually allocated to a battlegroup. A brigade can only generate so many combat teams based on its company or squadron level headquarters elements. Within the battlegroups, commanding officers group armoured troops, infantry platoons and other capabilities together.

A range of additional enablers are often attached to these combat teams at different times for a specific task and purpose. These groupings are not  templated, but usually reflect teams established and practiced during training prior to battle. From this mix of combat teams the brigade commander establishes battlegroups, based around a battalion or regimental headquarters.

The services now concentrate much of its sustainment capability at the formation level with battalions and regiments possessing small integral echelons. Logistic capability is allocated to battlegroups to support tasks in a similar way as combat forces when they are assigned to combat teams and battlegroups.

There are two ways in which this allocation occurs as defined by duration, distance and threat. In the first, combat service support (CSS) capability is allocated for a set time or battle phasing. Alternatively, the brigade headquarters provides coordination and sets control measures which allow CSS capability bricks to independently navigate the battlefield to allow the sustainment of forward combat teams.
 
It is possible modularity could be taken further with logistic teams of platoon size the basis for CSS ‘capability bricks’ within a combat formation. This means that a CSS battalion commander like peers from combat units would need to generate small and capable platoon-sized ‘replenishment teams’ to include:

Proficient distribution teams, transports sections, and transport troops that can group and regroup to achieve the distribution effect across the battle space.

Technically qualified and proficient forward repair teams and forward repair groups to maintain and repair brigade equipment across the battle space.

Bulk fuel section, ammo sections, and warehouse platoons capable of defending, holding and preparing combat commodities for distribution.

Logistics command teams that can command and employ any capability brick allocated to it.

Replenishment teams could operate in direct support to combat teams. To achieve this level of dispersal in a formations logistics capability would be difficult for reasons of control, but technology could assist future logistic commanders. In the near future, enabled by a range of new platforms, replenishment teams should possess the ability to communicate, provide their own protection to some extent and have sufficient situational awareness to navigate a complex battle space, and most importantly, protection and weaponry stay alive.

As a CSS commander at any level, it is a sobering thought to realise you command a high value target and a physical vulnerability of the formation. This is especially the case if logistic capabilities are centralised and made static in large positions. There are ways to mitigate this risk, but it is likely dispersed, but mutually-supporting platoon-sized CSS capabilities, is the best way for sustainment to be assured without tempting an enemy with a large logistic target.

Moving in small packets, below detection thresholds if possible, and responding with overwhelming firepower if required should become the norm for logistic elements. In applying this concept, losing a replenishment team to enemy action will pose a significant problem for the combat team being sustained. However, considered in the context of a non-dispersed formation, such a loss would seem minor in comparison to losing either a company-level CSST or the Brigade Maintenance Area or Support Group.

How can the formation staff execute this concept and give the brigade its tempo? It won’t be an easy task. With a set number of Combat Teams and replenishment teams available to a brigade, coordination and control measures become central to their effective and efficient use. ‘Road space’ must be managed efficiently as CSS elements will routinely move forwards and rearwards as the battle moves back and forth.

 Intermixed in this movement, combat teams will leap frog in tactical bounds; requiring replenishment at various intervals. Further rearwards bulk commodity movements and distributed, and continually moving, ‘Logistics Nodes’ will very quickly stretch the ability to sustain tempo. Managing this complex battlespace will require the best out of the formation staff.

Logistics Teams must ‘think smaller’ when considering the use of logistic capabilities. Future wars and operating environments, particularly in littoral or urban domains, will require logistic units to operate independently, and most likely in platoon-sized elements supporting combat teams in combat. Just as members of the combat arms need to develop new tactics, techniques and procedures to operate in a dispersed battlefield, so too will logistics teams.
 
Transferring what was once a regimental echelon sustainment task to formation level logistic units will require them to develop a different approach to generate capabilities that are suitably structured to interact directly with combat teams so to effectively sustain the brigade.

This requires more of logistics teams who must understand the building blocks of the brigade and the mechanics of how combat teams move, fight and execute tactical tasks. This will enable them to better visualise and plan sustainment requirements. Doctrine should guide them in developing such an understanding.

Undoubtedly seeing it, exercising it and simulating it will lead to better outcomes; logistics teams must practice the concept regularly in collective training. Furthermore, logistic commanders must trust junior logistics officers to command and fight logistics capabilities in the battle space. Logistics teams have been reluctant to do this in the past, and is a culture that must change.

Changing old approaches to logistics to focus upon small-team operations will better prepare logistics for the requirement to be responsive and agile. Coordinated effectively with the formations battle plan, small-team operations will better support the Brigades’ tempo and contribute to it winning the land fight.

Capacity of Logistics Enterprise

It may seem that it is easier to build up logistics forces, and support organisations, than it is to have combat forces at battle disposal. This is because it is generally easier to procure equipment for logistics purposes than it is for combat forces, there is assumed familiarity between logistics operations and industrial activities which suggests that any conversion between the two is relatively simple, and there is always the possibility that the commercial sector can be turned to overcome any deficiencies there may be in organic logistics capabilities.
 
.If military forces are to be responsive, fully trained and equipped, logistics forces must be available; processes ranging from strategic activity to tactical action must be coherent and well-practiced. A combat force without efficient and effective logistic support is ineffectual and, in the end, a waste of organisational effort.

At the root of logistics readiness is the bond between acquiring and maintaining military capability to have it available, and the establishment of a logistics process which enables or constrains its use operationally. The acquisition process, and military capability management typically executed by Service headquarters, limit the combat forces that can be created and made available.

However, it is logistics capabilities and practices that limit the forces that may be actually employed on military operations. The combat unit that is formed and given the latest technology, best armour and capable of overmatch against any possible adversary will be ineffective – undeployable in practice – without a logistics system capable of sustaining it.

Logistics readiness is particularly vital for those militaries that are expeditionary. Not only do robust logistics capabilities define the capacity of a military to project force, these same capabilities underwrite the ability of a military to respond quickly, affording them time to overcome the distance there may be to the operational area.

Militaries rarely assign logistics readiness issues as their highest priority to resolve. Instead they are typically consumed with ensuring that the elements at the forward edge of the operational area are as ready as practicable. But if compromises are made with regards to the preparedness of the logistics ‘system’ as a whole, or the logistics process is inefficient or ineffective due to poor practices and inadequate logistic discipline across the military, the readiness and preparedness of any unit destined for operations will itself be compromised.

Operational reporting consistently identifies forces as having culminated as a consequence of system-wide logistics failures that may have been otherwise prevented. Less well known are the times in which senior commanders have had to make choices on which forces they chose not to deploy based on the readiness of the logistics forces and the logistics process more generally. In strategic decision making, where logistics becomes the ‘arbiter of opportunity’, if not the arbiter of choice, and the true measure of whether a military is ready for combat.

1. Is there ordnance that UAS could deliver in an overwatch role?
2. Do UAS currently have the endurance to provide overwatch?
3. Watch to detect the threats likely to confront logistics sites?
4. Are there data links to deliver the sensor data to the logistics site?
5. Do UAS currently have the endurance to provide support?
6. How effective is long-duration coverage of the site in question?
7. Are there UAS capable of flying the mission?
8. Are there sensors that could find the cargo?
9. Can the cargo platforms somehow be instrumented to aid in locating them?
10. Can the UAS carry a radio adequate to transmit cargo location information to the recovery unit?

Weapons, weight and sustainment in the multi-domain battle are required to support operational combat power in multi-domain battle. This is a well-known, historically proven, trend. However, there are measures which can be taken to reduce this effect, or eliminate it in some areas.

It is possible to create a lean ‘tail’ capable of adaptively responding to operational needs in spite of logistic demand. However, without comprehensive planning, there is every likelihood that inefficient operations can result in a ‘tail’ that monsters to a force-compromising ‘iron-mountain’, or a ‘tail’ so austere that it invites an inconvenient force culmination in battle.

Logistics is rarely just a Logistics Team problem. Very few logistics teams, in low tempo, will ever be responsible for the strategic procurement decisions upon which logistics demand is based. However, they must be consistent advocates for demand reduction and management.

This is not as simple a task as it first sounds, because many proposed solutions have a habit of challenging the assumptions made by force designers; designers who have a tendency to assume logistics abundance in an operational setting, or, alternatively, fail to fully consider logistic demand as a planning factor at all.

Platform efficiency strategy is one logistics teams have the least ability to influence outside of describing logistics costs to key decision makers in the acquisition process. Platform efficiency is the application of technology to minimise the amount of logistics support required to deliver and sustain a capability.
 
Technology will be transformative, but it is a long-term solution typically reflected in multi-decade procurement processes. But some land forces have only just recently introduced new combat capabilities. This means the opportunity to influence platform efficiency will be very limited for some time yet.

Another strategy for reducing logistics demand – force efficiency – is an option that can be implemented now. Force efficiency refers to initiatives which require fewer force elements to achieve a desired effect. In developing Army Stryker-capability, for example, the organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance available to brigade combat teams, coupled with precision fires, complemented and enhanced the capability of the medium-weight properties of the platform.

In this case, you might say force efficiency didn’t deliver operational effectiveness – at least in terms of the operations that the Stryker would subsequently find itself in. But we must be reminded that the combination of modern armed, and increasingly cheap, UAV’s supported by surveillance capabilities and guided weapons offer forces firepower with little permanent presence on the ground and logistics cost as a consequence.

In terms of logistics-specific activities there are other force efficiency opportunities that can be undertaken. Adopting common components, ammunition and other items, and standardisation across coalition boundaries greatly simplifies supply between likely partners. Collectively, and in an operational environment, there may be possibilities to share capabilities and prevent the unnecessary duplication of effort.

Elsewhere, the modularisation of vehicle components, supported by information systems that better predict maintenance requirements, has been touted as offering opportunities to improve force efficiency. Implemented effectively, this approach limits the need to forward position maintenance personnel with most deep repair occurring rearward but you might see a maintenance problem as one of distribution. Self-offloading distribution vehicles, or more effective ways to store and package supplies, also exemplify a force efficiency strategy.

Force efficiency can also be improved through conceptual and doctrinal means. At the macro level, land forces – as part of joint forces – can achieve greater efficiencies by removing duplicate functions, or if demand can’t be reduced, sharing functions to create greater opportunities. This approach is a cornerstone of the multi-domain battle concept, a natural evolution of joint operations.

Doctrinal approaches to logistics that move away from constructs of logistic elements are devolved and owned at the lowest level, to those where modularised logistic capabilities are surged to support particular missions and tasks for limited time periods, also offers the prospect of improving force efficiency.

Rethinking assumptions about who ‘owns’ what in the battlespace, and the logistics control methods such as ‘lines’ or ‘levels’ of logistics support must be part of future logistics transformation efforts, as well as land forces which tolerates the inevitable periods where limited logistic support must be directed away from one unit to another to support combat operations.

Closely aligned to force efficiency is personnel efficiency. An example of personnel efficiency, where less personnel are required to do a particular job is given example by logistics and combat force personnel ‘mixing’ tasks such as armoured fighting vehicle operations and maintenance. Noting the training burden and competency risk it imposes, some small military units extensively cross-train limited logistic personnel.

There is no reason the skills possessed by personnel from logistics or combat arms cannot be similarly transferred between one another in such a way. Technology can also support personnel efficiency. Examples include modernising ‘logistics information systems’ and ‘common operating pictures’, both of which promise to improve supply chain performance to enhancing the capacity of logistics teams to respond to emergent tactical requirements.

The last strategy presented here is mission focus. For many militaries who have transitioned their forces to enable a consistent, rotatable amongst available combat elements, readiness cycle the term mission focus is not always apparent.  Mission focus refers to the specialisation of formations for particular tasks thus avoiding the costly logistics capabilities that might enable the formation to be prepared for all tasks, or those tasks which might be perceived as unlikely. But there are inventive ways in which land forces can be structured appropriately to achieve mission focus without abandoning preparedness-based force design methodologies.

Temporary allocations of modularised logistics capabilities based upon emerging operational requirements is probably the best-known method and should be rigorously applied in future attempts to transform land forces. Even so, land forces should always be prepared to abandon force design models which are based upon an assumption of being able to ‘do it all’ when the need arises, and prepare logistics capabilities accordingly.
 
Logistics is an end-to-end process, and although land forces may seek to reduce logistics demand through a variety of comprehensive strategies, their work can be undone by a failure to properly integrate their planning with other activities and change programs elsewhere

Plans must be built for logistics teams to more efficiently support combat capability and a structure must be formed, for it will be their lot in the operational environment to advise, if not resolve, numerous challenges which come from increased combat power.

It’s a problem if substantial improvements in combat capability now being seen in land forces are curtailed by the supply shortages, maintenance limitations and distribution constraints that are so very routine in war

Commanders will always exploit success as far as their logistic capability will allow, so much so that they may willingly bring severe logistics risk on their force to win. To prepare land forces for such occurrences, logistics teams must be professionally active and understand tactics and concepts implicitly to shift weight and through adapting their own practices ensure the force remains steady for its ultimate test.

Establishing Communication between Logistics Teams and Commanders

An effective and robust dialogue is just what logistics teams need to achieve with their commander.
Why the need? Logistics Teams must understand the motivations of their commanders, and in return, their perspective must be reflected in their commander’s understanding of the operations.

This applies in low tempo where materiel and personnel must be ready and prepared for operations. However, it should go without saying that the dialogue is even more fundamental during high tempo operations. Without an effective dialogue between commander and logistics teams, operations and logistics planning requirements risk becoming unbalanced, with logistics and combat elements potentially ‘unhinging’ each others operations at a time they should be working effectively together.

Before any operational dialogue can occur, we should consider what the commander and logistics teams should seek to understand. The commander likely wants to know several things: Is this plan doable or not? They have a plan and they just need a yes or no as to its feasibility. They don’t necessarily need to be provided with tons of calculations although the most will want some sort of evidence to your conclusion, especially if your answer is no.

When is the battle going to end? And restart? In an ideal world, formations would be able to operate forever over unlimited distances, with logistics quietly sustaining the force. Commanders get this is not realistic, if for no other reason than they get that their people need to sleep at some point. They want to understand when or where they need to pause, and at what point they can resume their preferred activity.

How much is this going to cost me? Be it time, money or tactical opportunities logistics will cost a commander and his plan. What is it, can he afford it and what is he giving up to be sustained?

Logistics teams are seeking answers to key questions: What are you thinking of doing? As logistics teams, there is a lot of difference between the ‘fight tonight’ and the ‘fight tomorrow’. It is too late for the ‘fight tonight’ to be influenced by a logistics team, the right stuff must already be in the right place, right now, because there is little opportunity to change plans. The ‘fight tomorrow’ is key business for the logistician.

What opportunities are there to reset the battle? As much as sustaining in background is desirable, fleeting opportunities in the lull of the fight must be taken to enable the force to recuperate itself. Identifying, along with operational planners, when these opportunities might be taken by consulting the commander will be vital to enabling the force to reset and recuperate.

Contractors

With an increased operations tempo and cuts to budgets and force size, military contractors have shifted from supplemental to operational necessity. Contract support in both garrison and contingency environments is now not only common, but also expected by commanders.

With this excess, however, has come increasing dependence on contract support as well as a decrease in utilization of organic military logistics both on and off the battlefield. The result is a growing military logistics experience gap, presenting readiness challenges for future battlefields on which contract support may not be a viable option.

At some point, the money that enables contractor support will vanish or the military will be asked to fight in locations where contractors cannot follow. Proper balance between contract support and organic logistics forces is imperative to ensure ability to meet the future demands of a multi-domain battlespace.

While contractors do not participate directly in executing or planning military operations, they do fulfil needs essential to combat operations, and those needs seem to have grown over time. In particular, during periods of increased restrictions on the presence of military forces, reduced force numbers, and increased operations tempo, the Army turns to use contractors. With manpower limitations and increases in combat demands, Army leaders use contractors to provide logistics support to allow the military to focus on their kinetic missions.

Many operational commanders would much rather fill their ranks with combat forces instead of force sustainers. With contractor utilization becoming more commonplace on the battlefield, commanders began expecting similar support at home during exercises. During large-scale military exercises, it is typically less labour intensive for the military to outsource things like chow halls and transportation of equipment.

 It saves headaches and late nights for the planners and sustainers, making it an easy choice for them to support. Unfortunately, these challenges are precisely the point of exercise training. This is the time for sustainers to practise their skills so they become capable and confident in their ability to accomplish their mission.

While contractors are an essential component to sustaining the Army, the US military desperately needs to set a new organic-to-outsourced logistics balance if it wants to ensure readiness for future conflict. Future conflicts will be not only be more complicated, but more complex, with land forces fighting in dispersed locations to create effects in multiple domains, while defending against multi-domain attacks. This environment requires a more agile and dynamic organic-to-outsourced logistics balance.

The question is how to determine the right mix of forces and contracted support to complete a mission in the most effective and efficient manner. Often, contracted logistics support may be the easiest choice. However, it is not a perfect fit for every mission and it does not provide the right solution for all skill and manpower shortages it is employed against.

Like all things, when the military uses contract support in military operations, leaders need to evaluate the risks and benefits of each decision. Using a contractor does not ensure the desired performance in the same manner as using an organic Army asset. A key consideration in finding balance is recognizing that the Army and the contractor have inherently different interests. Army leaders must not forget its current and future core interests, balancing today’s logistics demands against maintaining a force capable of sustaining itself on austere future battlefields.

In addition, having the ability to use contract logistics support does not release sustainers from being able to perform their mission-essential tasks. For the Army, the three sustainment warfighting functions are: logistics, personnel services, and service support. All other warfighting functions (mission command, intelligence, movement and manoeuvre, fires, protection, and engagement) depend on their successful accomplishment in whatever threat context the Army is engaged in.

Logistics Teams must find a balance between organic and contract-provided support that does not compromise the Army’s future logistics capabilities. Forces must revitalize the ability to support and sustain future operations while balancing the fiscal responsibilities of using contractors with the readiness benefits of maintaining organic logistics capabilities.

In part, this means decision makers must roll back the mission and guidance creep and opt for increased utilization of organic logistics functions. Above all, logistics teams must emphasize the importance of re-developing the processes, procedures, techniques, and training at the tactical level. Organic sustainment must be challenged and empowered to experiment, advance, and refine their skills during exercises just as their battlefield counterparts do.

One of the primary reasons cited for Army increasing use of contract support is “the need to compensate for a decrease in the size of the force and a lack of expertise within the military services.” In order for the Army to decrease spending on operational contracts and continue its global coverage, the military would need to increase instead of drawing down and fill the knowledge gaps they have created.

There is no argument that Army requires contract support to enhance its capabilities, especially when actively engaging in numerous roles throughout the globe. However, creep in both contractor mission and guidance on their utilization is eroding the Army’s logistical core competencies and degrading requisite skills and knowledge. Having the ability to use contract support to ease logistics operations does not release logistics teams from being able to perform their mission-essential tasks.

 In future expeditionary operations, especially due to multi-domain considerations, it is unlikely the Army will be able to rely as heavily, if at all, on the abilities of contractors. Logistics teams must have confidence in their ability to execute sustainment missions without contracted support.
​
Sustainment does not just appear on the battlefield, or even in the area of operation. Without exercising the action of sustainment with organic logistics elements, the capability will continue to erode until the US military is unable to support itself in the future fight. The contractor logistics easy button may not be available on future battlefields; so it is time the Army prepared for the hard work of sustaining the fight in that emerging context.

1. Equipping logistic convoys with small reconnaissance UAVs
2. Reduce manpower requirements?
3. Remove personnel from dangerous jobs or circumstances?
4.  Improve force protection?
5. Reduce materiel requirements associated with the operation or task?
6. Accelerate the tempo of operations in useful ways?
7. Simplify processes?
8. Reduce the likelihood of attack?
9. Reduce the costs incurred from a successful attack?
10. Are there sensors that could detect the threats logistics convoys seem likely to confront?

 

Joint All-Domain Operations JADC2 concept provides commanders access to information to allow for simultaneous and sequential operations using surprise and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains.
 
Current decades-old platforms cannot adequately leverage new technology; and the supporting structures to enable future C2 either do not exist or require maturation. DoD officials have stressed that a JADC2 architecture would enable commanders to 1) rapidly understand the battlespace, 2) direct forces faster than adversaries, and 3) deliver phase linked combat effects across all domains.
 
JADC2 envisions providing a network battlespace for the Joint force to share intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, transmitting across many communications networks, to enable faster decision making.
JADC2 intends to enable commanders to make better decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial intelligence algorithms to identify targets, then recommending the optimal weapon—both kinetic and nonkinetic e.g. electronic weapons to engage the target.
 
DoD uses commercial ride-sharing services as an example to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Ride-share services combine two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ position, the AI tool determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers, among other variables.

The ride-share application seamlessly provides directions for the driver to follow, delivering the passenger to their destination. DoD has its own network requirements to transmit data to match riders and provide driving instructions. 
 
JADC2 is not an easy endeavor.  Sharing information across multiple security layers, harvesting data and then turning it into accessible, discoverable and transportable information is a challenge.
 
Army Network Exercise Tested Sharing of Targeting Data from Newest Weapons” Army is looking at the potential integration of all of our fires into a fires network. Currently, Army has one network, AFATDS, to pass data about ground targets to its offensive artillery units – howitzers, rocket launchers, surface-to-surface missiles.
 
Meanwhile, it’s developing a different network, IBCS, to share data on flying targets – incoming enemy rockets, missiles, and aircraft – with its air and missile defense units.
 
The two networks and the sensors that feed them must meet very different technical demands, since shooting down a missile requires split-second precision that bombarding a tank battalion does not.
 
But there’s also great potential for the two to share data and work together. For example, the defensive side can figure out where enemy missiles are launching from, then tell the offensive side so it can blow up the enemy launchers before they fire again.
 
While this year’s Convergence exercise focus on the Army, the service is already working with the Air Force to meld the two. “We have been in discussion with the Air Force for the better part of the year on how we integrate with the effort they have going on like live meetings on JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command & Control] with all of the architects of ABMS.”

Those discussions made very clear to both the Army and the Air Force participants that “it all comes down to data and it all comes down to the architectures you build.
 
A common theme emerges from Army efforts to field several new communications technologies: for the foreseeable future, the service's comms programs are about pushing more data to and from the front lines in the face of increasingly aggressive electronic-warfare activities.

Two Army pilot programs aim to bring cloud storage closer to the front lines.
The goal of the first pilot, which operators have just finished testing, was to move training software from a fixed location into a cloud for use anywhere. That will be useful as the Army deploys its new Integrated Visual Augmentation System, or IVAS: augmented-reality goggles that will allow soldiers to review and retrain on different operations they’ve experienced.

The second pilot looks at virtual and container clouds — basically, smaller cloud environments within larger clouds. The objective is to sideline data that operators use only rarely, and prioritize access to more valuable data in environments where there is a lot of jamming and hacking.

The Army has built several prototype communication tools highlighting new prototypes in cryptography alternatives, as in methods for sending secure coms beyond traditional encryption, for tracking friendly military units (also in electronic warfare-heavy environments) and satellite communications tools that rely less on commercial, wideband satellite signals.
 
They’re also working with the service’s Future Vertical Lift team — manned and unmanned helicopters — to build wideband satellite communications gear that can “operate on our platforms through rotor blades.”

The Army is working with industry on prototypes for multi-orbit and multi-path (meaning in low-earth orbit, geo earth orbit, etc.) satellite communication tools, software-defined radio programs for the CMOSS standard, which refers to the modular open suite of software standards that allows for different military vehicles to share the same software platform, unified network operations, identity management, data transfer that’s less hackable or jammable, and techniques for converging disparate data sources into a common fabric.

Technologies have come out of the Combat Capabilities Development Command  ready for wider, experimental use in the field include cyber situational understanding, application security, integrated tactical network operations, canceling interference for the TSM waveform, which is commonly used in tactical settings, and greater spectrum awareness “so we can see what our signature looks like and take actions to mitigate against that signature.”

Communications are a modernization priority since it provides the basis for sharing data between a wider array of Army robotic vehicles and device-carrying soldiers. It remains to be seen how well all of those Army pieces will connect to other services as part of the Pentagon’s new Joint All-Domain Command and Control networks.
 
To find targets for its new long-range weapons, the Army is experimenting with cloud computing and AI that can bridge the gap between intelligence networks and combat units.
 
It’s critical to get data on potential targets from intelligence systems to combat units fast enough to strike them with the new long-range artillery and high-speed helicopters now in development. Digitally connecting the widest possible range of “sensors” to “shooters” in this way is the focus of Army Futures Command’s Project Convergence experiment.

The types of data you want to access range from full-motion video to electronic warfare detections of enemy transmitters. Quickly pooling that many kinds of data, from that many different sources, will require heavy use of artificial intelligence and cloud computing.

“We’ve initiated two kinds of cloud pilots to help inform how we’re going to adopt cloud within the tactical environment, but that’s very different from implementing cloud in the benign environment of an Army base in the US.

When people say data is “in the cloud,” that means it’s on someone else’s computer, usually a massive server farm somewhere, that you can access remotely. No access, no cloud, no data. But frontline units can’t drag fiber optic cable behind them wherever they go. Tactical networks have to move data over radio transmissions, which can be disrupted by terrain – mountains, reinforced concrete buildings, even dense forest – or by enemy hacking and jamming.

Future exercises will require moving larger amounts of data over longer distances than ever before. “Our integrated tactical network is really being pushed to the limit so extending its range and capacity are high priorities.

“We’re going to be extremely challenged by the bandwidth of the network. That means you can’t dump all the data on a single, central mega-server and expect everyone to access it over long-distance links. Instead, you need to selectively decentralize the data, pushing at least some crucial subset of it all the way out to the frontline edges of your network.

“Data that we don’t access routinely, we can host inside the cloud. “Data we need to access more rapidly and on demand, we can put into edge nodes.”

“We have to spend some time to really understand how we want to deliver data and to whom, when, and where. “One of the things that we’ve been working on is expanding our Army commercial cloud provider services to edge nodes provided by the same vendor… How do you get that data in and out of a FOB [Forward Operating Base]? How do you get that on a plane? How do you move it around the world?”

Army is not trying to do all things in the cloud instead trying to figure out what are the things we can containerize right away.

Sorting all this data and moving it through the cloud requires automation. Today, moving data from intelligence collectors to combat operators is “a very labor-intensive process.
 
In the future it needs to start “doing that work in a much more digital way that’s a lot more seamless and easier to do at scale and at a distance.”

Enter AI

One potential solution: artificial intelligence. Army artillery units did a live-fire experiment with targeting data provided by two complementary pieces of AI software, Prometheus and SHOT (Synchronized High-Optempo Targeting).
 
“Prometheus is looking at all that intelligence imagery and being able to pluck out potential targets of interest, and doing it very successfully.” Prometheus’s output then feeds into SHOT “where we’re looking at how do we automate and use machine learning … to come up with the right information to address the attack guidance matrix so we can actually do effective calls for fire.”
 
Prometheus analyses satellite data, spots enemy forces, and sends targeting data to shooters. The artillery corps is working on a complementary AI called SHOT (Synchronized High-Optempo Targeting), which will take targeting data from Prometheus and other sources, match it against the commander’s priorities and an Attack Guidance Matrix stating which types of targets are best attacked by which types of weapons. Then SHOT will output an automated call-for-fire, something missing from this year’s exercises.
 
AI is still young and “brittle,” Its machine-learning algorithms need to be trained on much more data before they can reliably detect a wide range of targets in a wide range of environments, not just the open desert.

Experiments in what’s called Joint All Domain Command & Control, like the Army’s Project Convergence and the Air Force’s ABMS “on-ramps,” aim to automate that process by transmitting data directly from machine to machine. The vision is that spy-satellite photos and other reconnaissance information flow into artificial intelligence software, which spots concealed foes far faster than human analysts can, picks priority targets and sends precise targeting data to whatever friendly unit is best armed and located to strike, be it an aircraft, ground-based missile launcher, or other weapon.
 
“Can we actually look at the intelligence community to help feed us tactically and provide us tactical data for deep fire targeting with long position fires?

“And then the last piece of this, which we will address probably on the follow-on phase is BDA, how do we do battle damage assessment?” “How do we use machine learning to determine that my effects actually were effective?”
 
There’s no one master algorithm that can solve all of these different problems. “There’s no one-size-fits-all machine learning capability out there,” We’re on the verge right now of a big wave of machine learning capabilities coming out of industry…. Can we actually put multiple machine learning methods into the architectures?”

But no amount of new technology will be enough without the human element. Success will also take policy, procedural, and even cultural changes to streamline coordination between intelligence networks.

“Policy and data governance, at scale …. whether it be at the enterprise level, or the at the tactical level-- that is a gap that continues to  challenge us at least every day
 
Some critics take a skeptical approach to JADC2. They raise questions about its technical maturity and affordability, and whether it is even possible to field a network that can securely and reliably connect sensors to shooters and support command and control in a lethal, electronic warfare-rich battlespace.

Critics ask who would have decision making authority across domains because traditionally, command authorities are delegated in each domain rather than from an overall campaign perspective.

1. What is the relative priority for JADC2 compared with other major DoD programs?
2. How have combatant commands embraced the JADC2 concept?
3. Is there some resistance within DoD?
4. What are the initial takeaways from Army and Air Force demos to implement JADC2?
5. How do Navy/Marine requirements differ from the other services to implement new command and control concept?
6. What personnel, equipment, facilities, and training resources would be required to achieve JADC2?
7. What is the estimated cost for force-wide implementation and lifecycle upkeep of JADC2?
8. When could the network become operational?
9. What role would AI have in JADC2 development?
10. How much human-in-the-loop decision making is necessary if sensors are linked to shooters in real-time?

Army has been experimenting with breaking up and dispersing its forward-deployed command posts to make them more survivable.

Army leaders have been concerned about the survivability of command posts that are placed close to battle zones. A series of experiments started to break command posts up into a series of dispersed nodes. This is a different approach to previous efforts that had the command post all in one place, but concentrated on tearing it down and packing it up quickly before an enemy attack.

Combatant commanders can choose the best option based on the circumstances. “Command posts are incredibly important to the Army formation. “However, they're in a tough spot now with needing to do the complex operations they will need to do in the … multi-domain operating environment where they will also be under a lot of stress from adversary capabilities to try to target and destroy them.”

Network modernization is one of the command’s top priorities along with long-range precision fires, next-generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, air-and-missile defense, and soldier lethality.

Other technologies tested included protected satellite communications, cyber defense, soldier-to-soldier communications and hardened waveforms.

The idea was to geographically disperse a single command post into separated nodes to make them harder to find and allow them to fare better against an attack if they are targeted. The main problem was maintaining connectivity.

“As we disperse the command post, the people physically disperse apart and they get farther from their data and services infrastructure that they're used to working with.” The project worked on providing continuity of mission-essential functions through data resiliency and data replication so the information that the users need at their platform is there for them should they be disconnected from the other nodes.

The Army used new communication technology to transport the data to the nodes. The experiment sought to discover how far it could extend, if the wireless tech functioned in a military environment, and "what needs to be changed to enable that. To add realism, the experiment transmitted data using current command post software.

As far as the number of nodes and how far they can be dispersed, those are the kinds of questions the Army is trying to figure out the answers to. “We're helping to further that discussion, inform those requirements, and in this case provide the science and technology … first step toward better dispersing the command post.”

Meanwhile, the experiment did not offer any new technologies to mask the command posts’ electronic signatures, but had a goal not to add any new signals that could be detected by adversaries.

In the future dispersed command post concept will undergo a series of operational field tests where soldiers can provide feedback. They will integrate the dispersed command post with the command post integrated infrastructure program of record, which will be the new command post’s technological backbone.

Dispersion won’t  be the only way you would employ your command posts in the future, but that will be one more way that you can achieve a more survivable posture when needed and still have an effective command post.

Whether that is at the battalion, brigade or division level is “yet to be determined. At a minimum, division-level and below, should have coders there in uniform, not contractors, fixing the computer problems that we have, the computing problems that we have, the communication problems that we have, the aided target recognition problems that we have because the enemy will evolve, they will change and if we don’t have the rapid capability to correct or to counteract what the enemy’s trying to do to us, well, then they’re going to be able to make decisions faster than us and that is totally unacceptable.”

“It was very complex and took us weeks of hard coding. “What was really, really powerful was when we identified something that wasn’t working …we had the computer expertise on station to recode the algorithms … to make it better on the spot.”

When dealing with a “living, breathing, thinking threat, we have to provide capability that can be able to adjust on-the-fly at that pace. But having coders on the battlefield isn’t simple because networks have to be configured so they are secure and such a possibility will still require a hard look at tactics, techniques and procedures.
​
“There are things that we can do with open systems architecture,” which means the we need to own the data. Often what folks get focused in on is the ownership status and as long as we control the interfaces, we can provide things like a ‘Pep Boys toolkit’ so that soldiers out on the edge can have a developer’s kit.”

Then as the threat, information and sensors change, “whatever the process may be, they can tailor that based on their mission without having to go all the way back to the factory of the industrial original equipment manufacturer to make that change.”

Having such a capability is “well within the art of the possible., “We have to think through the configuration management just to make sure that we continue to keep our systems hardened on the battlespace.
 
For future battlefield operations, speed is the name of the game. The side that can make decisions faster has the advantage .A new, AI-enabled effort can give operators the ability to detect, identify, process and engage targets quicker than ever and at longer ranges than before.

The Tactical Intelligence Targeting Access Node, or TITAN, offers frontline forces, as well as headquarter commanders, a resilient tactical ground station capable of rapidly sifting through massive amounts of incoming sensor data to find and track potential threats. TITAN can connect to the future Joint All-Domain Operations enterprise, an all-domain, interconnected network to plan and execute operations in a synchronized, collaborative and streamlined manner.
 
“The goal of TITAN is to link Army commanders at all echelons to timely intelligence data, speeding up the data-to-decision timeline. “Today’s systems limit timely access to the intelligence information needed to engage in the ‘deep fight’ – distances greater than 200 miles.”
 
Paratroopers communicate using the Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) during a battle drill to clear buildings during a live fires exercise.
 
When paratroopers with the 82nd Airborne Division’s First Brigade Combat Team landed in the drop zone during a night jump, it took leaders 45 minutes after hitting the ground to locate about 90 percent of their formation.
For contrast, at an exercise early last year, the commander of that brigade didn’t achieve 75 percent accountability of formation until the second day of the exercise.

That’s one of the major improvements that’s coming to three more Army brigades as part of Capability Set ’21, a new set of network tools that will be fully fielded to the First Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd.

The exercise provided a solider touch point opportunity  for the Army's Integrated tactical network (ITN) teams,  made up of Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications-Tactical and the Network Cross-Functional Team, to hear what soldiers thought about Capability Set ’21.

And leaders from the Army’s tactical network modernization team received some important feedback: the technology works, but the training needs improvement.

“It does what we thought it would do, which is increase situational awareness up and down. “That’s the critical thing … we don’t know where people are on the battlefield unless we can talk with them. Now, we can see them and that just speeds up processing.”

That’s good news for the Army as it’s set to deploy Capability Set ’21  to three more infantry brigades. The effort is working to provide a resilient tactical network to enable faster communications and data transfer to enable multi-domain operations (MDO) or Joint All-Domain Command and Control.


“Our obligation is very simple: we have to make this work. And if it doesn’t, MDO, all-domain and everything else, is a pipe dream.”

The network tools fielded to brigades significantly improve communications, but that soldiers need improved training with the batteries and additional cables.

A major difference maker is Capability Set ’21′s End User Device that works in tandem with the soldier’s radio to broadcast their location to all other users across the formation, as well as provides mapping capabilities. On average, the new “revolutionary” capability allows commanders to see his formation 45 minutes to two hours, much improved from last year and a “game changer” when it comes to fighting battles.

We have to resource those companies, troops and batteries in the fight mainly through fires, whether that’s Army indirect fires, or its joint aircraft. If they aren’t visible and there isn’t a real-time data on where they are, then they can’t be supported. And so now we can support them faster more quickly and bring everything in closer to get that into the fight.”

The devices also allow soldiers to mark enemy positions and broadcast that information back through the rest of the formation. Shared understanding and increased situational awareness across the formation will save lives, and the EUDs increase both by an “untold variable , because the capability eliminates the game of “telephone” played between the brigade commander and soldiers spread throughout the field.

Another Capability Set ’21 technology, known as the Variable Height Antenna, a tethered drone flying a TSM radio, successfully extended communications by several kilometers further than a standard, ground-based antenna would reach, the exercise found.

These capabilities are a critical component of the Army’s work evolving its network into a mesh network that gets away from line-of-sight communications and uses individual radios as nodes that extend the range of the network to allow soldiers to talk to each other beyond line-of-sight, across the battlespace.

“We can always talk to the lowest radio to the highest radio because we have this mesh network and in ITN terms, that’s game changing for us. It is moving us beyond line of sight, so for the first time, and that beyond line of sight is movable and fixable.”

While the devices provide greater situational awareness, during the exercise the location data wasn’t coming in with specific identifiers for what dots representing locations meant. But, in a way that highlighted the DevOps approach that the Army is taking to the modernization of its tactical network, the software was updated during the exercise because the vendor was in the field.

In addition, the Army discovered some linkage challenges between the radio and device, finding that the radio and device would lose the link between them if they were switched off. Leaders in the field want the devices to connect automatically so soldiers don’t have to connect them together themselves.

A new approach to training

But one major challenge Army tactical network officials learned from talking to soldiers using the equipment on the ground was that the training process for teaching soldiers how to use the equipment needed to improve.

The radio and EUD are connected together to broadcast location information, but soldiers were trained to use the devices separately. But since the devices need to be used as a system, leaders learned that the soldiers needed to be trained on how the system works.

“What needs to happen is soldiers need to be trained with the equipment as they are worn and functions as an overall network because everything affects everything else.” depending on the terrain.

So while classroom training on the devices is important for the soldiers to learn the technology, they also need to learn how to use the technology in the field and how the terrain can affect it. The big takeaway was adjustments to training.

“It needs to be as hands on as possible. You need to get in the terrain and actually test the radio. The classroom won’t cut it just because it’s no longer programming the radio and walking away.”

These new capabilities also mean soldiers must carry more batteries and more cables with them. The team identified a couple issues with battery life, one that requires training soldiers different configurations to optimize battery life. The other battery life problem was addressed through a firmware update by the vendor. Several Army personnel in the field also noted that soldiers needed to be taught best practices for cable management.

Soldiers “weren’t experts on how it’s powered or how to manage cables and that’s not a fault of the paratroopers. That’s a fault with the way that we were addressing training.”

As the Army perfects Capability Set ’21 and moves forward with Capability Set '23, its next iteration of network tools,  it will continue to rely on the feedback of soldiers to ensure that technology works, while being simple and intuitive enough for the user.

“The beauty of it is that feedback we’re going to get because soldiers right now has a really good idea that’s going to make this better? And that’s the feedback we’re really looking for.”

1. Maintain reliable network schedule: capture activities, establish duration/sequence, assign resources and integrate schedule
2. Establish  network ops control, transform service architect, portfolio process and active monitor/report for service level agreements
3. Solve network scope problems with directed action for visibility and situation aware, network ops, root cause, log keep, tech refresh upgrades
4. Satisfy network requirement goals: identify ops system solutions, establish quant. for evaluation and assess ability  of alternate measures
5. State network scope cost estimate, disclose ground rules/assumptions, data sources, calculations perform and results for risk rationale
6. Implement characteristics of high-quality, reliable network cost estimates: documented, comprehensive, accurate and credible
7. Authorize network deploy to support ops testing for achieve mission capability verify with independent tests/evaluation implement at installations
8. Plan, program, budget and execute network processes with goals conforming to security, architecture and investment areas
9. Assess current tool capabilities for support network service management processes, develop design requirements and tool integration specs
10. Evaluate and validate current network infrastructure inventory consisting of tech. data, assets, config. items and system components

“Commanders on the front line need to quickly identify and assess threats to their forces. “To do that accurately, they need a system that can rapidly collect and fuse data gathered from every available sensor – regardless of domain – and quickly share the information with them. The goal is to speed up how fast data moves from sensor to the executing platforms, such as aircraft, artillery or jamming systems.”

Getting all these systems to work together over such distances is hard enough within a single service like the Army. Getting different systems’ technology to trade data is harder still. That’s true even for an aircraft like the F-35, which is so packed with advanced electronics and data-fusion software.

“We want all the intelligence we can get.  “We want to access all the sensors that we can get.” But the Army’s learning it doesn’t need to overload the network – and soldiers’ brains – by sending everyone every piece of data. Instead, the AI needs to be smart enough to send each user only as much information as they need: While an intelligence analyst might need high-res pictures of the target, for example, a cannoneer might just need the right coordinates to shoot at.

“The information needs to go to the right command post at the right time and in the right level of fidelity. We’ve got to respect the network, and we can’t overwhelm it with everything.”

While technically feasible, “we’re struggling to implement the concept because of the way we built our data structures, our pipes, etc., inside DoD. Our links and nodes structure is not really built for cloud-based structures and moving data around like that. We still like direct feeds. We like firewalls.”

There has to be a redesign of how the Pentagon manages its data as well as policy changes to manage security and configuration control.

“The real problem isn’t as simple as, ‘Hey let’s just make sure it’s any sensor, any weapon.’ It is to really make sure that you’re getting the data that’s needed to the right assets. And sometimes it’s to the display console, making sure that data is on the table.”

We put a bunch of devices in their hands and, after they came up, the exact same command and control, the exact same toolset, with the exact same access, all of the power that they had in the command center was now in their hands as a tablet. They could do command and control anywhere. We’ve never done that before.”

That entailed giving commanders access to both classified and unclassified information together on one device, moving information that was once only available in a command center to a thin, handheld computer.

“So think about that common data layer, think about communication as a service. So we’ve talked about infrastructure as a service with integrated combat system – think about comms as a service where I have multiple data paths that I can send traffic based on precedence.

The system will route that data accordingly to get it to achieve the end state in that fire control loop because of the precedence, not because of some prescribed first in, first out, last in mentality.”

So this is a key idea of the tactical grid to allow us to have multiple data paths working at the time and route the messages to try to present options for those multiple sensors.”

“When you lay the data strategy out and you really go to the principles inside of it, what you’ll see even down to the vision statement is it really is about creating operational advantage and efficiencies. The operational advantage puts JADC2 right at the heart of the data strategy and it was designed to be that way.”

Requirements to Deliver on Commander’s Request to see Intelligence Assets on one Updating tracker led our team to address the hardware, software, and contractor resourcing that makes this type of tracker possible. It’s not that the technology didn’t exist; it just didn’t exist in the conventional Army due to the projected costs of acquisition and integration.
 
Our requests for converter kits were consistently denied at higher echelons and the system manufacturer warned us that attempting to convert the legacy system could irreversibly harm its functionality.
 
This applies beyond the intelligence warfighting function—it could also inform the acquisition or retrofitting of systems to improve mobility. The Army’s commitment to MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) uniformity is evident. With slight variants, it is likely that a Stryker BCT in in one theatre will have essentially the same equipment as a Stryker BCT in another, despite drastic differences in home-station operating conditions.
 
Right now, the process is restrictive, empowering some units to achieve “shooter’s preference” while hindering others with contractually obligated, decade-old technology. These bureaucratic procedures can and should be modified.
 
The recommendations made here—reducing footprints, rethinking bandwidth needs and interoperability, and enabling tailored acquisitions—do not represent a significant departure from the original mandate to improve Army headquarters’ mobility and survivability in the transition to large-scale combat operations.
 
However, the inability to solve the structural problems arising from the retrofit and replacement of legacy systems is a risk to both the mission and the force.
 
Even something as seemingly trivial as connecting to the wrong port can create wider problems.  And then there are the much bigger questions that the Army cannot answer yet. How much data, about what, does any given commander really need to make the right call in combat? What data do some units need but not others? What unneeded information is just cluttering up the network?
 
“What we’re capturing here…is going to drive our design goals” for future systems.  “It’s been a great forcing function to get all the teams working together.”
 
What we really want are standards systems that are built with a well-defined, clear interface to some kind of standard. It makes this job of on-demand interoperability, much, much, much simpler.”
 
There is a desire to craft common data standards and common data protocols as well as ease integration. “Those things are hard at first, but as you start to lock those into places you start to build momentum and can go faster.”
 
When the time comes to make some changes to your network capabilities, and you’re tasked with evaluating network design proposals aimed at delivering the most suitable, cost-effective solutions, it’s important to make sure you’re not overlooking any essential factors.
 
 If you don’t know exactly what you should be looking for from a prospective provider, the process is going to become complicated and frustrating, and you’re unlikely to end up with the outcomes you’re expecting.
 
A network upgrade or implementation project affects your budget and your operations, so you want to make sure that you’re considering all necessary components and enabling a smooth undertaking with a provider that's fully equipped to meet your needs. The best way to prepare for this effort is to educate yourself.
 
Consult this outline of key network design proposal inclusions to determine which provider can deliver the most value and fulfill all of your requirements. 
 
From initial network assessment and site survey to full implementation and ongoing maintenance, a network design proposal should lay out a full timeline of expected events and roll-outs. A provider’s ability to carry out these plans and services in a reasonable time frame, one that minimizes the burden or impact on your daily operations, will be a key factor in your decision-making process.
 
Ultimately, the task of deciding how to move forward with your network implementation can be a complex and overwhelming one. The choice regarding which provider can best meet your needs requires a dynamic, multifaceted approach. Get expert advice and information about how to ease this process and make the best decision for your organization.
 
 
Analysis and Problem Identification
 
This section is the foundation of the entire project, as it shows an understanding of the reasons why you need a network design in the first place. A prospective provider can’t begin to map out where your network should be headed  until they completely comprehend the details surrounding your current situation.
 
Unless the provider has a complete view of these components, you may end up with inaccurate quotes or expend lots of wasted time and effort.  Make sure the proposal reiterates an awareness of the following issues:

1. Whether you have an existing network or are implementing one from scratch
2. How many user profiles are expected to utilize the network and in what capacities
3. What the entire scope for your network is, including location(s) and number of buildings
4. What types of systems and applications will rely on network usage
5. Any user priority levels
6. The types of data that will be transmitted
7. The level of security that is necessary for your specific industry and operations
8. Your storage and speed and scalability requirements
9. Impact on the business if the network has an outage
10. The level of ongoing maintenance and support

 
 
Upgrading Existing Networks
 
It’s essential for the provider to complete a full network assessment to perform an even deeper audit of your network needs, including identification of capabilities and shortcomings

1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of your network?
2. What are the sources of any interference?
3. Where are the areas of user density?
4. Which applications are expending the most bandwidth?
5. Where are the current bottlenecks and what device is causing them?  
6. Where are potential bottlenecks based on the upgrades being implemented?
7. Are bottlenecks being impacted by outdated hardware, the number of users during peak times, specific locations of high density, or specific applications?
8. Are there issues with equipment installation or network devices (e.g., routers)?
9. Where can bottlenecks be freed up for improved performance and strengthened infrastructure security?  
10. Was one part of the network upgraded, thereby moving the bottleneck to another sector of the network?

Proposed Product Actions
 
Based on the provider’s analysis and problem identification, they should be able to outline recommendations and proposed solutions. This section may also offer a diagram of the proposed network design, illustrating how the provider plans to create an infrastructure that will support your stated needs and address the challenges exposed in their network assessment 
 
In order to execute a network installation or upgrade, various products will need to be purchased and employed. Whether old equipment needs to be replaced or new products are needed to fulfill a requirement, there should be an explanation of recommendations for you to consider.

The action items in this section will vary depending on your specific situation, but some of the ones you will likely need to take under consideration include:

1. Is your network’s bandwidth sufficient for your needs
2. Do your goals require an upgrade
3. A possible increase in the number of access points in your network infrastructure
4. A cabling solution that can carry your network before it becomes obsolete
5. Options to beef up security measures
6. Explicit reasoning for the product design
7. Implementation/deploy
8. Technical capabilities of new devices and equipment
9. Quantity, cost and availability
10. Managed sustainment service information

 
 
Costs
 
 
With all of these recommendations, proposed products and provider man hours comes the cost of doing business. This is the area your high-level decision-makers will be most interested in, as they’ll want to see a return on the investment.

1. Is the provider showing a true value proposition
2. Is provider itemizing not costs
3. What are long-term financial benefits investment is poised to bring?
4. Cost of solutions to ramp up security
5. Cost incurred from a single data breach.
6. Faults in network performance
7. Loss of capabilities your organization is equipped to deliver.
8. Factor these components into your expense projections
9. Consider value each provider proposes  to deliver
10. Evaluate potential so you can make the smartest investment.

 
Inventory of Hardware and Information Technology Assets

1. What do you already have?
2. What do you need?
3. What’s there that shouldn’t be?
4.  Is there hardware on the network that is slowing things down?
5. Is there anything causing security gaps?
6. Is there any firmware that needs to be updated?
7. What hardware and devices are running on your network?
8. Which ones are unsafe or come with unnecessary vulnerabilities?  
9. Are there outdated drivers, or older software revisions
10. Are you taking advantage of newer protocols or releases?

Marines are about to revolutionize infantry training, more than doubling the length of initial training for enlisted infantry Marines and weighing consolidation of its core grunt specialties into a single, all-around infantry warfighter. 

The transition – which aims to build Marines adept in ground weaponry that can tackle the higher-end threats they will face on the dispersed battlefields of the future – will focus as much on smarts as on being Tough.
 
Battalion officials took a deep dive into infantry training and how it should develop Marines who have a broad array of combat skills they’ll need in future battlefields likely spread out and far from higher-level commanders. The existing course creates “an automation who has some finite skills that they can use in very specific environments, in specific times – so it’s not an all-around player.”
 
“Currently, we train a Marine that is automatic. What we are looking to do is deliver a Marine who is autonomous,”
 
“We understand this is a novel approach, that this is different than what the fleet is used to getting. This is different than what the Marines are used to seeing,” The changes may meet some initial skepticism. But the Fleet Marine Force will get Marines “that are better trained, better prepared, better equipped – and they’ve been taught to think through this entire process.”
 
A Fundamental Shift in Training 

Battalion leaders and course instructors considered: What kind of infantry Marine should the training produce? They tasked an out-of-cycle training company to “come up with any idea that you have.”Just lengthening the existing course wouldn’t add significant value by itself. “We identified that just getting more training in the field is not the solution to the problem.  Marines are trained to operate “in any place, anytime, but the kind of automation training was insufficient. We also have to have the ability to learn, as well.”
 
Students at the Infantry Officers Course “are incentivized to learn They are given problems, they are given tactical decision games…where the officer is presented a problem, a mission-type order, and then what he or she is required to do is look at our own techniques to be able to analyze a problem. Our enlisted marines are not trained that way.  But “in distributed operation, that may cost us time – time that we may need to make a valuable decision.”
 
Training isn’t just about telling Marines to “think more” but, rather, to engage them in ways where they can exercise their creativity with a warfighting mindset, This is just a different way for them to train their brains, which they’re pretty much not asked to do – up until this point.”
 
Wargames are a vehicle to allow Marines permission to learn. “The object here is to look at the battlefield in a number of different ways. So what we want the Marines to do – our end state – is to effectively understand where the Marine exists, where he or she can understand themselves in an environment with complex rules and within a complex scenario, where they understand their actions affect others, and how the enemy’s actions affect Marines.
 
In those potential scenarios Marines need to be able to understand the mission type order, and based off the commander’s intent and resources along, continue to execute their mission.”
 
With a modern Marine learning model, the course better reflects how today’s high-tech generation learns develop infantry Marines skilled in weaponry but also skilled cognitively will better position them for future operations, since Marines in the future might have to make decisions when geographically apart from their higher commands or if the adversary disrupts communications
.
The new approach is rooted on the commandant’s broader vision outlined in recent articles and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, Force Design 2030, and Learning, the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 7. “The effective message to the commandant is: We are listening. We hear you loud and clear.
 
“What we’re doing is we are taking a fundamental shift in our learning ideology of how we’re going to shape the Marine of the future, and wargames are one of many revolutionary changes we are making within the infantry curriculum.”
 
Wargames allow “the Marines to contextually understand where he or she exists in battlespace,  and by introducing it early in the training, they learn to think and become conditioned to make decisions. “If Marines don’t  understand the fundamentals of wargames  we will teach them. We are not interested in teaching them rote memorization anymore. … We want free play. We want freedom of thought.”
 
Small-unit infantry leaders “are going to have to make decisions that are outside of their pay grade, and we want them to be comfortable in understanding that they can make those decisions.”
 
Wargames
 
“Anybody can play this wargame at any time from any position. You walk by it and you recognize whether Blue is on top or Red is on top, and that is the next person to move. You may have to shift sides, requiring a new strategy.
 
“What this says is, you don’t get to execute your own plan. “You have to assess the battlefield as it is, identify strengths and weaknesses – and you sometimes have to abandon your own plan because now you’re working against what your initial onset was.”
 
Instructors will teach those unfamiliar with the game, and with incentives they hope to “make it make it interesting by challenging instructors “in not only a pull-up or a run competition but also a wargame.” By playing, it’s making smart Marines who can make decisions faster than their opponent or see deeper into several moves down the road.”
 
Among the ideas is Fire Team version, students one-by-one make their moves against another fireteam but under a time constraint. In another version, each fireteam member controls specific board pieces, “so now they have to be able to battle track one another,” And “they don’t have the opportunity to execute their own plan. They have to talk as a group” while under a time constraint, all while the “enemy” is there to hear and watch them.
 
“So it allows for nuanced communication, non-verbal cues, figuring out your own method to be able to move the piece when your enemy can sense what you’re doing and, in real time, react to it.
 
Instructors are looking at taking game boards to the field so Marines can talk about tactics, they can talk about shooting manipulations, patrolling formations. … So we’re exercising their mind as much as we’re exercising their bodies.”
 
Success in wargames comes with experience but also some luck. “You could only become better by exercising your mind.  “So anyone is capable of beating anybody with their own skill.”
 
If Marines haven’t played the game, unlike some instructors in the battalion, it can be rough going initially. For example a battalion gunner is used to being the person who is the end-all, be-all with infantry, but sometimes they got routed several times by a sergeant.
 
Pieces on the board can represent tactical components more familiar to infantry Marines, like a combined-arms ground force: direct-fire weapons. enfilade fire that can shoot at an angle, indirect fire weapons, since they can jump over other pieces and aren’t limited to specific boundaries. There’s also light infantry that can block, defend and envelop with supporting arms and, if used effectively, can become more powerful if they reach enemy territory. Some pieces that are more powerful and limited in number can represent special operations, since they are few but move most freely. Then there is the piece that is your commander.
 
Marines leaned quickly that you want to keep indirect-fire assets as along as possible, even though they might be worth the same amount of points as something else. A different piece might be more valuable because with indirect fire you can attack the commander, where maybe another piece, through a direct-fire line of infantrymen, you may not be able to penetrate.”
 
All that might very well become more relevant in the new course as students train toward a single, multi-discipline infantry specialty, which according to a Marine Corps Training and Education Command is yet to be finalized.
 
In the wargame, the Marine has to decide which weapon will create the needed effect. So instead of just focusing on a machine gun, for example, a newly-graduated infantry Marines will have to think about machine guns but also mortars, rifles, rockets and other weapons systems. “Wargames allow, since the pieces are all complex … to think about how your actions combine the effects of these pieces to achieve an overall effect.”
 
Changes were instituted to the learning atmosphere and culture at infantry training. Students won’t be marched together around camp but will be expected to manage their time and figure out where to go on their own.
 
“We wanted to take away the restrictions we have on Marines and get rid of them and actually have them think on their own. It came up as we are erasing, in almost its entirety, the whole program. “This could fail massively, but “we don’t just want to keep doing the same thing we’ve been doing.”
 
There’s a general excitement around the School of Infantry. Instructors recognize they are at the forefront of this entire thing. They recognize that this is their course and that we are the advocates for them and we trust them.
 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 7 Learning MCDP 7 has established a doctrine on learning for the Marine Corps. MCDP 7 has much to offer Marines. For example, it addresses current issues found within Training and Education Command, such as the obsolete “training versus education” argument, and it reinforces principles found in other Marine Corps publications.

It took courage and a lot of effort to be sure, for Marine Corps leaders to produce this doctrine. It signifies the first steps toward establishing a valid representation of learning. The application of MCDP 7 will permeate through all that the Marine Corps and Marines do.

Many others would like the chance to contribute to this new vision and suggest additions to the MCDP7 conceptual framework like focus on developing the professional competence and capacity of Marines and their ability to learn through the complexity and uncertainty of today.

Possible additional contributions to the Marines valiant effort is to propose a framework of 21st Century maneuver warfare, a topic that is much in need of updating based on new threats Marines will face in the future. MCDP7 is a great start, but much remains to be done.

Most important, MCDP 7 validates the need for and value of a learning construct. MCDP 7 can be improved. Indeed, MCDP 7 delivers only a partial construct of learning. Therefore, we offer the following critique in the hope that it moves the Marine Corps to develop a more complete learning construct and revise MCDP 7.

Stated goal of manual is to “describe the Marine Corps’ learning philosophy and explain why learning is critically important to the profession of arms.” But critics say MCDP 7 stops short of delivering on that promise, because it lacks the applied science, research, and philosophy of the field of professional learning. And there are more than 40 years’ worth of research in  learning research fields that could provide Marines with the tools to think through problems encountered in the profession of arms.

MCDP 7 identifies its purpose as creating “a culture of continuous learning and professional competence that yields adaptive leaders capable of successfully conducting maneuver warfare in complex, uncertain, and chaotic environments.”

This is a strong justification for the creation of such a doctrinal publication. But in the succeeding pages, critics say MCDP 7 does not provide convincing arguments to support or achieve its purpose of preparing Marines to fight. The manual should provide Marines with a framework—beyond previous conceptions of learning—that allows them to apply it to their context in preparing themselves and others for military operations.

MCDP 7 spends much of its time on areas encouraging Marines to remember things because circumstances may not always allow them to digitally search for information. This is a prudent warning, but MCDP 7 misses an opportunity to provide Marines with insight into cognition and memory or resources for empowering themselves to recall information in action.

MCDP 7 offers other tips, concepts, and discussions on learning, but less time is spent on providing Marines with concepts of how they can develop their capacity to practice warfare in complex, uncertain, and chaotic environments.

Marine Corps doctrine should provide every Marine, from the newest private to the most senior general, with a practical learning construct they can draw on in war and peace. It should challenge Marines to practice and embody its concepts throughout their lives, in and out of uniform.

In many areas, MCDP 7 lacks the depth to do this. For instance, it contains dangerously few definitions for the concepts it introduces, which severely handicaps any discussions on learning.

Why is this dangerous? Because the lack of clarity in the definitions confuses Marines, it is not creating a foundation from which to build themselves as lifelong learners. Marines are already referencing MCDP 7 as the Marine Corps’ central authority on learning; however, some shortfalls could be improved.

There are some questionable parts of MCDP 7, given that a lot of people have identified that individuals and teams have differences in the way they learn, with varying sensory preferences for learning, competencies, and strengths. These differences are essential components of the learning process and can be useful knowledge for structuring or engaging in learning events to that learning is more effective.

The passage refers to learning styles. In one of the rare times MCDP 7 cites existing research on learning, some critics have stated that cited article actually contradicts the passage in question. According to research, tailoring one’s teaching to a trainees preferred learning style does not make learning more effective. In fairness to MCDP7, this conclusion about learning styles is not limited to MCDP 7, others have also come to that conclusion.
But even some Marine instructors who have investigated the topic have reacted with “shock” and “disbelief” because they find that much of existing practice rests on false premises.

MCDP7 defines critical thinking as “the reflective part of . . . reasoning. Critical thinking skills include inference, evaluation, interpretation, and explanation.” This is oversimplified. It leaves a false sense of a person’s capacity to think clearly when instead most thinking instead remains biased, distorted, partial, uninformed, or even prejudiced.

Many organisations have tried and failed to teach critical thinking and instructors tell Marines to think critically without providing a measure of what thinking critically actually means. Critical thinking has seemingly devolved to mean novel, creative, or just plain good thinking, but critical thinking is anything but a natural or innate ability.

MCDP 7 asserts that the “most effective instructors use the coach-teach-mentor approach to provide learners with constructive feedback.” This implies that the best instructors simultaneously exercise three distinct roles with their learners. But, in fact, each of these functions vary in activity, effort, time, and outcome in relation to the organization and learner.

MCDP 7 makes no meaningful distinction among the roles, and—to complicate things further—the other Marine Corps publication that discusses these roles, Marine Corps Training Publication 6-10B Marine Corps Values, misrepresents coaching as a subskill of mentoring.

Critics also say that MCDP7 simplistically defines experiential learning as to learn by doing. If it was stated that the concept of maneuver warfare requires practitioners to always avoid surfaces and seek out gaps, that would be a similar oversimplification. A well-known, better definition describes experiential learning as a process of making meaning from or grasping and transforming experience. That is, learning occurs not from the doing, but in the reflection on that experience.

As with the complex topic of maneuver warfare, there has been much debate and different definitions created for experiential learning. Marines must ask the questions: How do we know learning actually occurred from our experiences, and was it the right learning?

MCDP 7 frequently references “self-directed learning.” However, the extrinsic motivation of “encouraging and holding Marines accountable for it” may not directly result in or sustain professional curiosity about it among Marines.

MCDP 7 should be able to refine its definition to mean either 1) a goal of instruction to instill in learners, 2) a process for a learner to follow, or 3) a characteristic of the learner that one could measure. Developing lifelong learners through extrinsic means seems similar to teaching fitness and nutrition by providing people with personal trainers and private chefs and then wondering why the individuals did not continue the regimen after the trainers and cooks departed.

MCDP7 insists that “leaders also recognize that we are not an expert in every topic i.e., self-assessment. ”Although this appropriately warns Marines about being overconfident, the self-assessment example misses a crucial point, in that it fails to make Marines aware of potential cognitive bias that leads to difficulties in recognizing our own shortcomings, that is, the less expert you are at something, the harder it is for you to recognize that you are not an expert.

MCDP 7 also compounds issues with outside critics by stating that when “a Marine begins to feel more confident, it is because he or she is closing the gaps between their goals and their actual capabilities.” But sometimes confidence indicates that the individual remains a novice, while genuine experts recognize their own shortcomings and deficiencies.

Marines may unintentionally leave MCDP 7 with the lesson that they should study topics only directly related to their profession. The overuse of the word “profession” and its related forms—“professional,” “professionally,” or “professionalism”—sends the wrong message, since the document doesn’t really define or use the concept of the professional consistently.

As a result, MCDP 7 encourages Marines to narrowly view professional content and learning opportunities. It fails to provide a complete picture of what professional curiosity and development should look like, and how Marines and the Marine Corps would benefit from more diversity of thought, study, and practice.

If  Marines develop “hyper focus” on narrowly, or undefined, professional learning over the cultivation of curiosity could lead to “cloning,” the tendency toward seeking new leaders identical to old ones, a danger that organizations are susceptible to without concerted efforts.
 
1. Leadership
 
Process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. Command is the authority a person in the military service exercises over subordinates by virtue of his rank and assignment or position.
 
2. Understanding
 
Process related to an object, such as a person, situation, or message where military commanders are able to consider the object and use concepts to deal adequately with that object; implies abilities and dispositions with respect to an object of knowledge that are sufficient to support intelligent behavior
 
3. Decision Making
 
Knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide. Includes understanding the consequence of decisions. Decisions are the means by which the commander translates his vision of the end state into action.
 
4. Vision
 
Provides direction and describes what the commander wants the organization to achieve in the future; it’s more about the “what” of the organization. It is different from a mission statement, which describes the purpose of an organization and more about the “how” of the organization.
 
5. Intellect
 
Capacity for higher forms of knowledge, as distinguished from the power to perceive objects in their relations. power to judge and comprehend; aptitude, understanding, potential to do certain kinds of work whether developed or undeveloped.
 
6. Initiative
 
Going the extra mile or going above and beyond your normal job responsibilities to make things happen; ability to see something that needs to be done and deciding to do it out of your own free will without someone else telling you to do it.
 
7. Judgement
 
Being able to weigh your options accurately and plan what works; result of analyzing multiple solutions, identifying what is wrong with a solution and changing what does not work.
 
8. Building Relationships
 
Setting expectations to help avoid complications and disagreements over which partner should handle what; taking time to iron out issues where potential for overlap and other conflicts is substantial; establish capability to share resources and adapt over time.
 
9. The Ability to Communicate
 
Creation and exchange of meanings from one entity or group to another;  process of assigning symbols in an attempt to create shared understanding through verbal or nonverbal means, including speech or oral communication;  writing and graphical representations, behavior.
 
 
10. Learning from Experience
 
Reframe your mistake as an opportunity to learn and develop. Review what went wrong, to understand and learn from your mistake. Identify the skills, knowledge, resources, or tools that will keep you from repeating the error. 

Marine leaders are directing commands to go faster and equip warfighters with the tools they require to fight and win in a more timely manner.
 
The Marines largely did away with large service-level experiments that focus on new ideas or concepts, but recently brought them back as a means of out innovating adversaries.
 
The acquisition community is now leveraging experiments such as Sea Dragon and the recent generate requirements and feed mature systems into programs of record.
 
Following the S2ME2 ANTX, Marines were able to put some contracts in place after identifying some systems worth pursuing.
 
For other technologies and experiments, the service might be able to buy some systems that are ready for fielding or use what was learned through that experimentation to feed into requirements generation.
 
Marines are working to generate rapid requirements, then buy a few capabilities, put them in the experiment and then use that to take a concept of operations and inform requirements fed back into the process and eventually into a program of record.
 
Marines have opportunity for engineers to take technologies from mature experiments and put them in the hands of Marines.
 
“When we put it in their hands, they figure out how to use it and they come back and tell us this is how we need to use this thing, this is how we to develop the concepts of operations and the concepts of employment and the tactics, techniques and procedures to put it out there and field it.”
 
“It’s up to us as the headquarters to say OK, got it. We’re going to figure out how field it to you and get it to you.”
 
 
The Marine Corps is looking at ways to insert new technology into its forces earlier in order to prepare for future battles. Key to this effort is experimentation.

Last year, the service introduced a new operating concept called, “How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century.” The document — which focused on how Marines will fight in 2025 — put an emphasis on the need for the service to return to its seafaring roots, conduct maneuver warfare and fight as a combined arms force.

“We have a campaign of Marine Corps Force 2025 and within that campaign we have a Sea Dragon 2025 experimental process.  The goal is “to get our force postured for 2025, to be agile, lethal, naval and expeditionary, and we found that as we go through the experiment process, we’re building closer and closer relationships with the research-and-development enterprises.”

Testing new technologies with Marines in live experiments allows the service to realistically see if a particular system is fit for the battlefield.

“We understand that warfare is inherently, despite all of the technologies, … a human endeavor.  “We want to recreate the uncertainty and fear and the danger associated with that so that we can get the best picture.”

The first phase of the experiment concluded in the fall of 2017 when the service took an infantry battalion and established it as an experimental force.

“We put them in the construct of a sea-based Marine Air Ground Task Force and we reorganised them, changed some of their training, their equipment, and over 18 months we conducted a series of operations and experiments before operationally deploying them in this configuration.

Much thought went into creating an adaptive enemy red team that reflected not what today’s threats look like, but what tomorrow’s would resemble based on how fast U.S. adversaries are adopting new technologies.

“Our experiment force could lose and could lose repeatedly during our experiments and we could learn from those losses.

The service looked at the size of squads, contemplated how to incorporate manned-unmanned teaming and examined mobility issues.

History shows that mobility often is key to determining whether a unit will accomplish their mission or not, he said. Forces with the greater tactical and operational capability have an advantage.

One of the biggest takeaways from the experiment was that the individual Marine is a “tremendous innovation engine.

“The creativity of our Marines and small teams gives us a significant advantage.
“The Marine that grows up with access to the education we have, when compared to the rest of the world … is a factory for good ideas.”

When exposed to new tools developed by industry and other research-and-development partners, Marines often find unique ways to employ the technology in a way that has a strategic effect.

Other efforts the service embarked on recently include its first advanced naval technical exercise experiment, where it asked industry to develop new ways to move Marines from the ship to the shore in contested environments.

How these innovations would be implemented was open for debate. “We won’t necessarily do it the way we did it in the past. We’ll take your ideas and try them out.”

The service built a “playground,” where industry had access to sailors and Marines from the amphibious force.

“What we ended up having was a playground with young Marines, young officers and a lot of industry engineers and scientists … solving the problem.

The Marine Corps benefits from bringing warfighters and industry together.
“There’s something special when the engineer and the young Marine put their resources together and come out with a better product right on the spot.


Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental, better known as DIUx, is pushing forward new technology that will give the service added capability by focusing on several technology areas including autonomy, artificial intelligence and machine learning, information technology and human systems.

The unit is meant to cut through the Pentagon’s red tape and make it easier for firms in tech hubs to do business with the Marines. Officials hope the outfit will speed the acquisition of cutting-edge warfighting tools.

DIUx has been working on a number of technologies that can be used by the service,
“We’re really quite satisfied with what’s going on there for the Marine Corps. The service pushes for “projects that tend to be more practical, more physical. One promising program is known as the electric vertical take-off and landing aircraft, or EVOTL platform.
 
The platform will be able to travel 200 nautical miles at 200 knots and carry four passengers or 800 pounds of payload.  The system uses six rotors to fly. It takes off vertically and is able to immediately transition to forward flight and take a Marine company landing team and break them into smaller, four-man teams and put them ashore in separate aircraft.

“That enhances your mobility, it lets you surprise the enemy … and it really de-risks the force because instead of six aircraft you can now have 35 aircraft,” which makes the invading troops harder to target.

The organisation is also working on giving the system autonomous capabilities. “Initially it will be piloted, but we’re paying to get the autonomy developed.

For now, the company is “living on the DIUx dime” because it doesn’t have commercial customers. They will eventually, but this is a great example of someone who is reliant on us.”
 
The Marine Corps turns to its Warfighting Laboratory to help counter threats. The lab’s divisions—Futures Assessment, Concepts and Plans, Wargaming, S&T, and Experiment—all play a role in shaping future needs, trends and technologies as well as the operating environment the Marines will face. “We are the headlights of the Marine Corps modernisation effort. We are looking out a little further than other Marine Corps offices.”
 
The warfighting lab is currently looking into autonomous systems and robotics; artificial intelligence; counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities; lasers; electronic warfare; and systems coordination, among other technologies. The lab considers size, weight and power issues “in everything they do to support a mobile, agile Marine Corps.
 
The warfighting lab has been looking at autonomous systems and robotics for quite some time now. “We’ve always recognized that autonomous systems, whether they are in the air, on the ground or at the surface, are going to play a role in the future landscape and future warfighting environment.
 
The big question is how best to incorporate the technology so that it becomes a force multiplier rather than a burden. Naturally, the service wants to avoid robotic technologies without the capabilities it needs to perform specific missions.
 
Unlike robotics and autonomous systems, AI is an area the lab is just starting to explore. We don’t fully understand yet what AI could mean or what it will mean in the future. We do have smart people looking into it, and we do recognize it as an emerging capability that we need to take advantage of it.”
 
Technologies are especially needed to counter the proliferation of what the Marines are calling “U-Excess,” unmanned aerial, ground, surface and subsurface systems. “We now are living every day with the fact that unmanned aerial systems are flying pretty much everywhere.
 
We are predicting a quick migration to enemy use of unmanned ground systems, surface systems and subsurface systems.
 
“Envision a future where you have a patrol that is looking for an aerial system, and instead a ground system comes up or is sitting along a trail. It could be in a sleep mode and camouflaged and then activates based on vibration or voices. Then it does what it is designed to do, which could be a collector to listen to discussions and stay quiet, or it could become basically an improvised weapon.
 
To combat this risk, the warfighting lab is broadening its work in unmanned systems. “Based on our experience from the counter-IED fight, we recognise that as we start to develop capabilities to counter air systems, it is only logical that the enemy will start to look at other capabilities. Our goal is to stay one step ahead and anticipate what is coming.”
 
New tech will allow the Marines, for example, to walk into a operational theatre and already know where the hot spots are, potentially shuting down these connections in advance and turn them back on when they leave. “It is important for that tactical unit to be able to have immediate effects as they are experiencing them.
 
The warfighting lab will take fast growing technologies and put them to the test in several experiments,, including smaller events called “limited object assessments as well as larger events, giving Marines opportunities to put technologies into the hands of operators in the field, along with other lab partners, to gain a common understanding of potential capabilities and technologies.
 
“These experiments are crucial in sorting out useful technologies and capabilities.”
 
The technological renaissance is providing a lot of options, and with all the technologies you could make a case for each one. But they cannot all be pursued. “The problem is that we can’t afford to buy everything so we have to make an assessment of capabilities and to make recommendations on capabilities that will have the greatest return on our investments.”
 
The lab has developed processes that allow senior leaders to make smart decisions about the technologies they need for programs of record, the technologies they do not need and the technologies that may be obsolete in three to five years. But making choices can be challenging, he says, because people are swayed by technology and the “bright, shiny new object.
 
“The hardest part is trying to make sure that the people who are in love with their technologies understand what it is that they are in love with. It is difficult to convince people that, ‘Yes, it is a great capability, but is it greater than this other capability over here?’
 
“Everything we consider has to get a fair shake. There have been technologies that nobody liked that turned out to be pretty effective.” And at the end of the day, when the Marines are kicking in the door, those technologies could make all the difference.
 
 
Innovative ideas from all levels are helping to reshape and modernise the force. “No rank has a monopoly on good ideas”.  You don’t need to develop a ground-breaking new project to channel an innovator’s idea process. Continuous improvement or incremental change contributes equally as transformational change. Let’s focus on how you can bring innovation into your everyday work, and foster a culture of creativity in your team.
 
 
Generate your idea and link to innovation cell strategy. Identify the problem statement and the expected benefits of implementing a change. Identify if the idea is in the category of: 1) Just Do It (problem is known and the solution can be implemented with extant resources); 2) Continuous Improvement Initiative (an improvement activity where the solution is not known and the problem requires further analysis); or 3) Project (more complex and affects multiple units or Groups). To gain momentum and sponsorship, link the initiative to innovation cell strategy at the capstone or individual unit level depending on the scale of the proposal.
 
Seek out your champions. Engage your mentors, sponsors, and champions to help refine your concept and give your draft pitch a sense of urgency. Clarify how the future will be different from the past if the innovation cell embraces your idea, and how you can make this future a reality.

Choose a methodology and design your plan. There are a number of tools available for working out your concept and planning your strategy. Small projects just require sound judgement, but success in selling your idea still depends on the background knowledge of a structured approach.

Pitch your idea.  Make sure your vision and strategy is clear and refined prior to pitching to your chain of command. Remove as many barriers as you can to make it easy for them to support your idea. With your chain of command’s approval, consider a trial of your proposed new process or source a prototype of your capability idea early in the innovation stage to demonstrate how it could benefit Marines.

Move at the speed of change. Operational Tempo will only move faster; so this is the time to inspire your team and direct their mindset to identifying opportunities for change. Change management is complicated, and cultural reform at an organisational level even more so. As a leader you can foster an innovative culture.

Know your team dynamics. If you understand the unique knowledge, skills and attributes of your team members, then you can leverage them to get better outcomes. An innovative team with strong leadership can be invincible. Host a brainstorming session with your team to identify their own strengths and weaknesses, and discuss how you can apply these together to the opportunities and challenges for the upcoming year. Look beyond rank or assumed skill sets. Create a sense of healthy competition for innovative ideas and ways to do business better.

Incentivise and reward innovative behaviour. Include goals relating to improvement initiatives when drafting performance reporting expectations. Highlight these in the end of year reports. Bid for extra training funding for courses that help your team develop critical thinking skills, apply change management methodology etc. And most importantly, ensure that credit for innovative ideas is attributed to the individual or team that created them, not to yourself.

Create the space your team needs to innovate. Communicate to your team the ways in which you can support them with their ideas. Follow through by continuing to assist them in developing concepts, committing resources within your remit and using your own networks to help reach champions.

Ensure they’re not spending their own money in the development of the concept as they get more invested in the success of their idea. And most importantly, avoid crowding them through the process, just empower them to develop their own ideas and offer them the time for creative thinking.

Good ideas are only the start point of innovation. Passion, drive, utilisation of networks and some savvy business acumen are essential to ‘challenging the status quo’ and getting your innovation off the ground. The execution is what matters – and the journey can be risky and frustrating. But by focusing on ideas within your sphere of influence you can develop innovation skills to generate positive change, as well as build your reputation as a valuable forward thinker.
 
Engage innovators in their areas of expertise. You’ll see world leading results in rapid time. By engaging them as a team, you will see world leading capability. Creating change in a large, capability-driven organisation like the innovation cell can be overwhelming and will always come with a level of risk. Embracing innovation is vital in ensuring the innovation cell evolves faster and smarter than its adversaries and overcomes the challenges ahead.
 
Stimulate both top-down and bottom-up approaches to innovation. By focusing on the command post, you can provide top-down direction against a key problem your command could solve. Then, harness the innate, bottom-up ingenuity of Marines, through venues like open-mic nights, against their everyday problems.
 
Build units’ efforts by telling the world what they learned. Despite this clear call, pinning down a definition of military innovation is tough. One definition has been promoted as “development of new warfighting concepts and/or new means of integrating technology.” Crucially, this definition captures that innovation takes forms beyond technology.
 
From this broad definition, two axes of innovation emerge. Much discussion around innovation focuses on the disruptive or revolutionary type, which typically relates to the integration of new technologies. Sometimes the Department of Defense deliberately develops these technologies, but other times they emerge independently.
 
Less discussion focuses on innovation at the tactical level, where innovation is more typically evolutionary. Evolutionary innovation seeks improvements from existing concepts. The  quest for innovation may merely involve “clear thinking about how to leverage the creativity and expertise of those already in the system.”
 
Tactical innovation leverages expert warfighters in combat units to experiment. While external actors promote a culture of innovation in national security it does little to directly help tactical units solve their most pressing problems.
 
Tactical innovation initiatives must both provide direction and connect experts in uniform with free time and other resources. Squadron innovation funds,” exist “so commanders can tackle their most pressing readiness and national-security challenges.
 
If you seek to start an innovation initiative, chances are good that you have some problems in mind. If not, consider tools like Design Generator to help better understand your desired endstate. Even if you aren’t sure which problems to tackle right away, consider unleashing your subordinates against the problems that often trip them up. Invite their bottom-up refinement and earn their trust. Early wins on problems your soldiers care about will help build your innovative culture—and may even bubble disruptive innovations to the top.
 
Combine Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches. We harness our battalion’s innovative potential through a top-down focus against our pressing operational problems, while stimulating bottom-up innovation by connecting innovative makers with time and money. Organizations that successfully innovate combine top-down efforts, which align innovation with the organization’s goals, and bottom-up efforts that engage the organization’s lowest level.
 
Our top-down efforts aim for revolutionary or disruptive innovation against problems our unit anticipates. In our battalion, we assign responsibility for each of our innovation areas to a subordinate company, but do not fence it off.
 
Instead, each company commander develops an understanding of the problem and designs a plan to solve the problem or better understand it. Generally, that commander will launch his detachments against related exercises or events. However, the commander might also identify opportunities suitable to other units and offer them up.
 
While commanders drive innovation forward toward their defined problems, we also recommend stimulating innovative potential at the lowest level. Soldiers know which kit works—and which does not. Harness the knowledge and interest of the lowest level solve problems that make their lives easier or advance our work toward the command-directed priorities.
 
Innovation comes from connecting soldiers with time and resources. A “micro-purchase” program could do this for your unit. On a regular basis solicit, review, and fund the best proposals at levels authorized for our command. Leveraging sustainment funds and purchase cards, we acquire equipment and services necessary for innovation. Once we approve a proposal, we prioritize purchases with the goal of delivering in time.
 
Our Company experimented with micro-purchases which helped the command see new gaps across the company. When one motivated detachment requested funding to experiment with an off-the-shelf drone, the company’s leaders re-assigned a similar drone to that detachment. This cost-free reallocation of equipment demonstrates how sensitizing your unit to a demand for innovation improves outcomes at low cost.
 
Build an Innovative Culture. With both top-down and bottom-up programs in place, you must build a culture that supports innovation. Soldiers are unlikely to trust any new initiative until they understand the intent, see sustained command engagement, and are rewarded for their efforts. To educate the battalion, we plan to organize a significant launch event, host regular “collaborate and innovate” sessions, and dispatch battalion “makers” to innovation hubs.
 
Our collaborate and innovate sessions will to educate our soldiers about innovation generally, the battalion’s focus areas, and resources available. These sessions should be personally rewarding and avoid conflicts with training. We aim to bring in a mix of speakers from the military, industry, and elsewhere.
 
As an innovation culture gains traction, a transition to sessions led by internal innovators updating the unit on what they have learned should be made. This will reduce the burden on a unit’s busy staff and knock down innovation silos between units. But building an innovative culture is more than just education.
 
Troops are naturally skeptical of new initiatives, as commanders change frequently and sometimes are overcome by events. Commanders must demonstrate sustained engagement to a variety of audiences: the staff, subordinate leaders, and Marines on the line. Every unit is different, but we include micro-purchase statuses during command and staff briefings, while company command teams brief innovation updates at training briefs. The battalion commander also discusses innovation when they visit the teams, especially when an innovative system is at play.
 
For an innovative culture to take hold, it is imperative to highlight success. At regular “innovation convocations,” commanders can update interested stakeholders on their progress, micro-purchase winners highlight their successes and lessons learned, and outsiders can learn about what is feasible at the tactical level. Special focus on rewarding Marines willing to engage is important. Though internal motivation drives Marines, they often view new programs with suspicion. Leaders must set incentives properly to reward innovation.
 
Avoid Groupthink by Seeking Diverse Viewpoints. Bringing in diverse, external viewpoints will help your unit avoid groupthink. In our battalion, we plan to launch an innovation council chaired by our battalion commander. The council aims to provide an outside perspective while informing the battalion’s leaders of developments in innovation. The board will regularly in conjunction with the battalion’s innovation groups. While the ideal composition of your innovation board may differ, drawing in people with different viewpoints and careers may challenge your internal assumptions and improve your program.
 
Share What You Learned. Innovators in our ranks must share their progress and lessons learned. Consider the right ways to share lessons learned internally to adjacent units and externally to the broader community of defense innovators. Connect with doctrine writers. Write blog posts and post videos on your unit’s boards. However you do it, sharing of successful and unsuccessful efforts builds a broad-based innovative Marine Force.
 
Invigorate both top-down and bottom-up approaches to innovation. Build a culture of innovation through education, emphasis, and rewarding innovators. Solicit outside feedback as goal checks. Your unit and our Military will be better for it.
 

1. Action. Ability to act quickly upon an idea in uncertain or unclear situations includes risk-tolerance
2. Problem definition Asking the right questions and solution brainstorming mapping out a set of potential solution
3. Ownership. Mindset and habit of taking responsibility for individual and team outcomes includes being proactive and results/solution-oriented.
4. Prototyping.. Ability to turn abstract concepts into tangible and testable artifacts. This includes the instinct to and skill of rapid prototyping.
5. Goal-Setting. Ability to think ahead to a future point and set ambitious but attainable goals.
6. Task Management. Ability to break complex projects into smaller, interdependent and sequential tasks with deadlines done on schedule
7. Prioritization. Ability to determine the most important / valuable work and focus on it until completion.
8. Feedback. Ability to give and receive feedback in a way that promotes growth includes avoiding conflicts and effectiveness in difficult conversations to resolve conflict.
9. Intent: Discipline of working deliberately/independently towards a goal
10. Motivation: Possessing the ambition, curiosity and determination motor behind self-directedness and perseverance.

 

As Digital Tools have taken over the future of military operations, there are no more “tech” and “non-tech” companies. Instead, there are organizations that leverage data and automation, and organizations that fade into irrelevance. The Services risk irrelevance if it does not address its digital talent crisis: It does not have enough digital talent and it does not manage its digital workforce well.

DoD recognizes that it needs modern tools like AI and data analytics to succeed at multidomain operations, its strategy to fight and win across land, air, sea, and other domains on 21st-century battlefields.

Creating these capabilities requires a digital workforce: developers, systems engineers, product managers, data scientists, user experience engineers, technical program managers, and other roles.

The recent creation of the Digital Innovation Factory is a positive step to address the digital talent gap, but the DoD should be bold and create a “Digital Corps” to manage its growing digital workforce.

DoD has made some small, disparate efforts to harness uniformed digital talent through the Digital Service, AI Task Force and Enterprise Network Management Office. But enterprise-wide change cannot be sustained through piecemeal efforts.

Furthermore, “upskilling” or providing mid-career training to these servicemembers without changing their personnel management systems will create digital islands — skilled servicemembers with no career track and no institutional protection.

It is not enough to focus on putting the right people in the right places at the right time. DoD must develop new strategies for empowering administrators critical to the functioning of military specialties, but don’t fit within the traditional talent management system.

DoD must manage personnel policy, promotions, training, and certification of digital personnel in a way that the regular status quo could not hope to.

To understand where and why the Digital Corps fits within the talent management system, we should understand the other talent models: traditional, specialist, and professional.

The traditional model manages personnel in the core fields of the Services— infantry, armor, engineers, and artillery. These fields are unique to the Services and require training only within the branches.

Recruits are not required to have particular skills to enter and pick branches mostly on preference. Since the skill requirements for these fields are well-known and for the most part static, well-established recruiters treat personnel and roles as interchangeable parts. A job in these fields merely requires a person of a certain career field and pay grade, such as an infantry captain — any will do.

Personnel — both officer and enlisted — in traditional fields move between leadership, staff, and developmental assignments as their careers progress, grooming them for the broad needs of “generalship.”

Indeed, most of the generals in the Marines come from, value, and select these traditional fields and skill sets for promotion. Military planners have had decades to learn how to properly assign people and resources to traditional units.

The resulting system is an assembly line that moves traditional personnel from one established billet to another, treating them as items to assign to a unit, where the goal is filling vacancies, rather than a personalized approach to talent management where the goal is to align skills to teams and missions, but DoD has struggled since inception to retain Digital Innovation talent.

Specialist fields like aviation and special operations forces are somewhat similar in that they are also unique to the Services — though there are contractor helicopter pilots, few shoot Hellfire missiles or get shot at.

Specialist fields also have an established Service training pipeline. These branches differ from infantry, armor, engineers, and artillery in two key attributes: They require a certain level of assessed proficiency — either the Flight Aptitude Screening Test or special operations forces assessment and selection for entrance, and they have well-known but highly technical skill sets that atrophy quickly.

The military recognizes that pilots lose proficiency in flying quickly, so time in the cockpit is prioritized. Unlike traditional branches, aviation is heavily staffed with warrant officers due to technical expertise requirements.

Putting aviation officers into desk jobs actively deteriorates their skills — they get better at flying by flying a lot. Aviation officers also have many specialization options based on aircraft variants and special training courses, so the branch has many occupational specialties and additional skill identifiers to track and manage its talent pool within the same industrial-era framework that traditional branches use.

Finally, the military professional corps functions differently from traditional branches. These roles are not unique to the armed services and have contractor training and accreditation pipelines, generally require expertise prior to entering the DoD, and require specialized skills not needed within the traditional Service Structure.

In the professional corps the services delineate between technical experts and administrators. This model allows officers who are highly skilled experts to practice their professional skills rather than serve in traditional leadership roles as platoon, company, and battalion commanders or as staff officers, although they can.

This model — allowing personnel to serve a career promotion track while remaining with skills — is similar to how technology firms delineate between technical experts, ie, digital engineers, data scientists, technical program managers and operations roles, ie marketing, logistics, account managers while allowing for technical experts to be promoted in non-managerial positions to focus more deeply on their area of expertise.

DoD recognizes the importance of specialist labels in lieu of an over-generalized label. Instead of the “any infantryman will do” mentality, these professional corps have a variety of technical specialty and skill codes to more precisely define areas and levels of expertise. Assignments managers work closely with each person to account for unique roles and skills not tracked in the system, for example, personnel who also do research.

None of these models is perfect for managing the unique challenges of the digital workforce, but all have something to offer in shaping the new Digital Corps.

The traditional model works well for a force that needs to scale across hundreds of thousands of people but fails for people with specialized skillsets. The specialist model prevents skill atrophy and prizes specialization but struggles to account for the expertise required in accessions and dynamic changes in required skills. The professional model comes closest in guiding highly skilled individuals within the Services’ talent system, but still requires tailoring to fit the needs of the digital force.

Unfortunately, there will always be some uncertainty or gap around military force planning for emerging technologies. No model can project what talent is required to man future technology force structures with the precision needed to fit within existing Marine Resources Command manning structures.

The need for a comprehensive understanding of both talent development and assignment requires a model that communicates the full personnel lifecycle. Said differently, the Services needs an even more flexible model.

Rather than adopt an existing “professional” model lock, stock, and barrel, we will evaluate digital talent management through a Marine Innovation/Learning Strategy. The strategy is built on four pillars that comprise a Marine’s entire service experience: acquire (recruit, screen, hire), develop (train), employ (assign), and retain (evaluate, promote).

Acquire

Step one in building a digital force is acquiring digital talent — identifying, recruiting, screening, and hiring candidates. Despite arguments over the merits of technologists in uniform, the Marines decision to invest in AI experts and developers signals that they clearly recognize that making digital skills the exclusive domain of civilians and contractors creates a dangerous condition where the Services don’t understand how its core digital information technology systems function.

This lack of awareness invites future strategic risks as key leaders are unable to make rapid and effective decisions about employing or developing digital capabilities.

Since digital skills and best practices are more prevalent in industry, so Marines need to leverage a blend of all relevant ways to acquire talent. These include Digital Excepted Service authorities, and effort to hire skilled digital professionals. Direct Commissioning authorities enable skilled civilian technologists to serve in uniform at senior ranks and future investment in lower echelons.

First, DoD should look to traditional commissioning sources like the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps focused on digital skills. Digital skills like networks development and artificial intelligence have been identified in recent National Defense Authorization Acts, so DoD needs to respond by increasing the supply of digital officers. The new applied Digital Corps  program is a start, but the efforts should not stop there given the unfilled need for AI designers, innovators, developers, architects, and other skills.

Investing in traditional pipelines should be complemented by leveraging direct commissioning authorities, but there are risks associated with relying heavily on direct commissioning for the Digital Corps — especially now as the culture is forming. The shortened training program that direct commissioning entails is a clear trade-off in the service contract:

The Services accepts risk of less military training, decreased indoctrination, and higher projected turnover rates in exchange for commissioning contractors who already have special expertise. Filling the new Digital Corps with “outsiders” who don’t understand military culture and norms will erode trust and potentially create a culture of “technologists who happen to wear a uniform” instead of “soldiers who happen to code.”

In addition to creating an increased supply of digital officers, DoD should create the relevant assignments for these leaders to fill. While some junior leaders have been placed into digital transformation roles, many other emerging technologists have been blocked due to the lack of direct sponsorship from a general officer constraints like their professional timelines or professional education requirements.

Develop

Until the Services have a robust digital personnel acquisition pipeline it should focus on developing digital talent from the personnel it has. It is important to distinguish familiarity from expertise. Although creating a “digitally literate” force is necessary in the digital world, it is no replacement for digital experts.

For example, Marines are taught battlefield first-aid, because Services would never rely on artillery officers training in combat lifesaving in lieu of the Digital Corps. Coding boot camps and entry-level certifications create familiarity, but will not yield the full transformative value of digital skills. The military will need to rely on experts who can see through hype and evaluate expensive training programs honestly.

Developing talent can again rely on existing programs developed by contractors  in industry. For members of the Digital Corps, encouraging extensive use of the Pentagon’s Training With Industry program would be an invaluable broadening assignment rather than merely a “nice-to-have” and could be considered a requirement for promotion to high ranks.

Lastly, there is no centralized accreditation board for digital tech expertise. There are many certifications, but not a true credential. Degrees in computer science, electrical engineering, and information technology are strong proxies, but some candidates are self-taught and learned by doing.

Employ

Digital problems require certain expertise to fix, so digital experts cannot be treated as interchangeable parts. A machine learning expert may know little about website design, so the Digital Corps will need a detailed and evolving system of digital skills.

DoD Talent Management Task Force has been working on developing a structure for knowledge, skills, and behaviors, and is working to build a digital talent marketplace that helps candidates choose jobs and jobs choose candidates based on skill supply and demand.

Once these roles are created, innovative digital talent should be flexibly managed to ensure that they are assigned to teams that can best use their capabilities. If commanders had to compete for talent by pitching their projects and problems to technically talented servicemembers capable of building digital solutions, commanders might be less likely to relegate those hard-won technologists to PowerPoint slide-making.

The need for a centrally managed talent pool was a core part of the Defense Innovation Board’s Workforce Now recommendations, and should be included in the Digital Corps.

Retain

Once employed, retaining talent is a two-part challenge: The Services can choose to show people the door (involuntary) or people can choose to leave (voluntary). Bleeding talent in either way is costly.

Involuntary attrition occurs most frequently when a service member is passed over for promotion, reaches a mandatory retirement date, or fails to meet fitness standards. During promotion boards, officers are grouped by specialty into competitive categories.

Competitive categories collect specialties that can compete against each other for promotion. Creating a competitive category for digital technologists will likely improve officer promotion rates and may strengthen bonds between existing functional areas in technology areas by providing a collective sense of purpose and identity.

Furthermore, having technologists evaluate other technologists may help to focus the leaders on technologists’ contributions, whereas it’s plausible that non-technical administrators rating technologists may emphasize administrative minutiae or physical fitness over digital skills.

Two often cited risks for voluntary separation are pay and frustration. Like involuntary separation risks, pay is addressable within the DoD current structure. The military already pays for special skills — technical skills should be immediately added.

Frustration is likely to be a larger factor and is harder to fix. What happens when a highly skilled developer is not given the right tools to create digital innovative constructs? Do they need to jump bureaucratic hurdles to do a basic job, or leave the field of expertise for several years to check a box for a broadening assignment? These are harder problems. The last, however, is a talent management issue that can and should be solved with the Digital Corps model.

Let’s assume that the services commit to creating a Digital Corps. What happens next? What outliers will they need to confront? Organizational change often fails when leaders fail to consider second-order effects or edge cases.

Candidates who complete digital training are the top candidates for the initial Digital Corps billets, in addition to anyone who applies directly based on existing skills. This will give leadership time and space to maneuver and address the larger challenges.

The Services should understand their mid-term roadmap for civilians and contractors, but also work to avoid losing uniformed talent to become contractors due to pay or removing them from roles where they get to use their digital skills. Perhaps just as importantly, these personnel should be provided with unique leadership and cultural structures to flourish, which are distinct from the command and control concepts found in traditional military hierarchies.

Lastly, there are already existing specialties with overlapping skills, and service leadership should sort out equities. Operations research specialists are similar to data scientists but may need further training, while network operations could get pulled into the Digital Corps directly. The services should also create a path to upskill selected candidates from existing branches — the leader of the AI  factory could be a helicopter pilot after all.

The questions presented here show  managing digital tech talent is a “right now” problem for the Military and must build tools that are in the hands of users in contact with the battlefield every day.

It’s easy to try to fit digital tech talent into industrial-era models, but following the traditional branches will inevitably lead to the same mismanagement and attrition that is fueling current calls for reform. Talent management is an investment, not a cost, and the effort to execute a bold vision for uniformed technologists will pay off over the long term.

The military of the future will not merely shoot slightly further and move marginally faster. By creating digital innovation factories, and the talent factories that sustain them, the Services must clearly recognize the character of conflict is changing — just as it did during previous industrial revolutions.

If the Marines want to remain a dominant force the Service to keep adversaries at bay, ow better to demonstrate the characteristics of offense — surprise, concentration, audacity, and tempo — in the current security environment than by seizing the opportunity to build a digital force built for the information age?

No matter the type or their niche, there’s a common set of recruiting skills that every good recruiter needs to have to do their job well. Here are some of them and how you can spot them in a good digital corps recruiter.

1. Attention to detail.  Attention to detail is vital for recruiters so work can be done with a relatively small talent pool,

2. Marketing skills. Finding top talent in today’s market is extremely hard. The number of open positions is much higher than the number of applicants and candidates won’t rush to any company out there.

3. Communication skills. No matter the position they’re trying to fill, the recruiter is the key link between a company and a candidate. Depending on the impression they make, they can either attract or discourage the candidate for applying.

4. Relationship building skills. Great recruiters think of recruitment as a relationship between a candidate and a company. Similar to a sales process, it takes much more than a single touchpoint to make a sale, or in this case, fill a position
.
5. Multitasking skills. Hiring is a lengthy process, and there’s quite a lot between posting a job  and filling an open position. Recruiters need to, screen applicants, conduct interviews, etc. multiple things at once and excell in each of them.

6. Time management skills. With multitasking comes time management, as there’s only a certain amount of hours in a day and sometimes, companies need a position filled very quickly.

7. Patience. A successful recruiter needs to have a great amount of patience, as they deal with both candidates and companies. A simple task such as setting up a job interview can require quite a lot of patience from the recruiter’s end, as they often won’t be able to find a term that suits everyone.

8. Listening skills. Besides listening to the companies they’re hiring for, recruiters need to listen to applicants with great attention. Applicants, in particular, are very important because their feedback is crucial to placing them in a position that suits both them and their future unit.

9. Teamwork skills. Whether working externally or internally, recruiters need to function within a team to find the best employees for an organization.

10. Digital skills.  Basic understanding of Digital skills can go a long way for a recruiter’s success. Proficiency in digital programming, design, system administration, etc. can help find the best candidates in these fields.

Challenges facing commanders to make solid decisions based on identifying operational risk is not for lack of directives: Long lists of Defense leaders have urged the Department’s people to innovate, to take risks. Successful combat leaders have come to realize that part of the problem is: they don’t know how.

Making good judgments in the face of risk is hard. It involves a complex web of decisions, actions and counteractions that often spiral well beyond the scope of the original task. The higher the stakes, the tougher risk management becomes.

The same is true of combat — which is exactly why the military insists that its combat leaders train and study and review and practice, over and over again, in ever-more complex scenarios, so that they are as ready as possible to make decisions based on real risk.

Take the example of a Task Force, several hundred soldiers equipped with tanks and other equipment — charged with breaching the defenses an area of interest and clear debris.

An operations officer, an experienced tactician and planner, proposed to focus on two breach points. This was a tactically and doctrinally sound approach, yet the plan was changed to focus on a single point. Why?

Four reasons: First, our task force, assembled in the past 72 hours from unfamiliar units, would be working in close proximity, at night, with another organization from a sister service with whom we had never fought. The risk of losing our own in this complex environment was very, very high; a simpler plan was safer.

Second, we knew the terrain and enemy positions solely from satellite imagery, often weeks old. None of us had actually seen the ground or the places we intended to force our way through.

Third, while some leaders had spent years at Regiment Training for high-intensity combat, the same was not true of many subordinate leaders. Most of them had experienced some combat in the area we were tasked with securing, but had generally spent their recent years in a lower grade compared to full-out combat. Fewer still had participated in a company-level Combined Arms Live Fire, a maneuver exercise featuring live ammunition of multiple types.

And fourth, it was uncertain our unit’s leaders, inexperienced in this type of operation, would be unable to capitalize on a successful breach and avoid a long and costly fight. 

Commanders decisions weren’t based on a whim or their gut. They were made based on best judgment backed by the confidence that comes from learning why I “was defeated” on lots of mock simulated practice battlefields. 
A minefield got me the first time I led a company toward a mock breach point at the Combat Maneuver Training Center Later that week, I got beat again—in an artillery barrage that caught me behind a mud-mired vehicle in the breach lane. 

 A few days later, I was “targeted” again   by a well-camouflaged tank that my lead unit rolled past, unawares.
Years later I watched my tactically perfect plans unravel as small units got lost and key equipment broke. In subsequent rotations at the training center I got hit by friendly fire: an Apache helicopter that misidentified my vehicle, an unmarked friendly minefield that we drove into.

As the years passed, I got beat again and again and again in payment for my personal mistakes, poor planning assumptions, and for things out of my control.

Each of these training “defeats” was immediately followed by exhaustive after-action review sessions designed to highlight the events that led to our failures and help us learn the complex calculus that would enable us to accept and mitigate risk on real battlefields.

All this allowed me to recognize, as I weighed options for the current assault, that halving the number of breach points created some new risks — principally, that a failure at our single point of attack would leave the Marines to our right alone and unprotected. But my training also helped me understand how to mitigate this and other risks.

With less than 72 hours to prepare for the attack, we chose to keep the plan simple and focus our time on rehearsing it at every level. We built a massive mock-up of the battle theatre and walked everyone, down to the most junior leader, through their part of the first 24 hours of the attack.

We did this to ensure that everyone knew who was to their left, right, front, and rear; that they understood where they were moving to; and that they knew the control measures that would keep us from hitting our own people. 

Based on these rehearsals, we made adjustments. The night before the attack, we staged a full-up rehearsal, and made more adjustments. We timed our movement to the breach point and rehearsed the timing of our artillery fires. We surveyed the ground between our force and the defense; the commander walked up, then crawled further, to see it first-hand.

Based on what the company commander leading the breach force learned from his recon, we shifted the breach point 200 meters to take a cleaner, more protected approach. 

Then came the action, and we breached the complex minefields guarding the approach into and entered the battle zone on schedule. 

Things didn't go as well for the Marine task force to our right flank. “For five hours, 1/3 Marines attempted to create a lane into the , onto the conflict stage, only to be thwarted by the insurgents’ defensive positions and the railroad track.”

 “The 1-3 Marines were supposed to blow a path across train tracks, but they were well built and didn’t break the first time. Then an armored bulldozer got stuck in the breach…With no radio and poor night-vision goggles, the backup bulldozer couldn’t find the breach…The delay meant that several vehicles came together near the breach point. Insurgents took advantage, launching three mortars, wounding four as they struck two tanks and an armored troop carrier.”

For all our planning, this was a risk we had not anticipated or planned for. Unprotected on our right flank, alone in a city of enemies, our Task Force fought on its own for hours. There were losses.

A few days later, we were faced with an even tougher decision. Recognizing an opportunity to bring a quick end to the fight, we coordinated a plan to finish clearing our portion of the battlespace and that of the Marine unit to our right.

But as we began to move units into position the next morning, the company commander of our lead element got hit. The loss of a leader is tough for any unit to handle, but most have an executive officer, a “second in charge,” ready to step in and assume command. In our case, the unit’s had been hit the day before. Normally, the loss of two of the three senior leaders in a small unit would cause you to delay the attack or replace the unit. Unfortunately, we had no replacement available.  

Delaying the attack, which the Marine leaders offered as an option, would have enabled a fanatical and deeply entrenched enemy to reorganize, rest up, and burrow more deeply into the scene. Mitigating our own risk, therefore, would increase the risk to other units. Ultimately, we decided to press on with the attack. What ensued was a long, difficult night, but when the sun came up the next morning there was no fight left in the city, and we didn’t lose anyone else.

Many battlefield leaders such as these have little practical experience with business-based risk, but quickly found that my experience on mock, simulated battlefields gave me — and the people I trained — an edge.

Several things stood out. First, the skill that enables an individual to judge risk in complex situations is borne of repetitions of a challenge in varying conditions. Years of conditioning and multiple training exercises at Combat Training Centers gave me the experience to make the right decisions

The many rehearsals we executed before the attack ensured that my subordinate leaders understood my intent and could rise above the risk. We’ve adopted that strategy as creating accelerators at key installations that are now centers for training another generation of leaders in industry and DoD.

Second, no individual can properly understand all the risks in a complex situation. The chance of success is increased when a diverse group of leaders with different backgrounds work in concert with one another. Professional silos are the opposite of successful risk management.

Third, leaders who fail to find a way ahead despite risks don’t solve problems; they simply transfer the risk elsewhere. Often, it is transferred to lower-level leaders who lack the practice, training, experience, and resources to handle the risk — or even recognize it.

In the Pentagon, our acquisition and contracting rules and procedures seek, above all else, to reduce operational losses. But this has cost us countless opportunities to build the best possible combat force. In today’s fast-moving era, the ability to spot and seize on an opportunity may determine the success or failure of a company — or a military.

Pentagon Leaders must move past empty calls for more risk, past efforts to exactly copy industry best practices for innovation, and past a focus on technology scouting and venture capital.

These will not grow an acquisition force capable of taking the kind of risks that reduce the risks on the battlefield. Instead, we must apply what the military has long known about developing its leaders to use Mission Command Decision Making Models to issue orders.
 
Mission command: how to empower troops to act fast in a crisis
 
The ability of commanders to respond almost instantaneously to a crisis or potential crisis affects whether the event is manageable or escalates into something more serious.
 
Investigating how a mission command approach can help organizations create a crisis management system that is fit for the digital era where swift decision-making by effectively empowered people is vital.
 
What is mission command?
 
Mission command. In its military context it is a decentralised style of command that relies on initiative, the acceptance of responsibility and mutual trust. This approach empowers employees to use initiative and promotes freedom and speed of action through the establishment of clear intent and constraints e.g resources by senior managers or commanders.
 
Mission command has one guiding principle – the absolute responsibility to act and achieve the superior’s intent. It also has five further principles:

Unity of effort: Unity of effort stems from the setting of a clear intent, the use of common language, terminology and tactics, a high standard of collective training and the designation of priorities and a main effort for the mission or task.
 
Freedom of action: Troops must be able to exercise freedom of action within specified and implied constraints to act as they see fit to ensure the achievement of the superior’s intent without fear of repercussion.
 
Trust: Trust is a prerequisite at all levels. Trust improves speed of decision making and therefore improves the tempo of the operation. Trust must be earned not demanded, however the default must be for all levels of the organization to trust both their superiors and subordinates. In particular superiors must trust their employees to sensibly interpret their intent and persevere to achieve it.
 
Mutual understanding: Mutual understanding is developed over time through common doctrine and concepts.
Timely and effective decision making: Successful command requires timely and effective decision making at all levels. Despite the increasing availability and speed of information it remains essential for commanders to make decisions on the basis of incomplete and imperfect understanding. This can seem risky, and good judgement is required to decide when is the right time to act or not to act.
 
How can a mission command approach improve an organization’s crisis management capability?
 
There is a model in crisis management called ‘the golden hour’ which states that your response within the first hour of the crisis affects whether the event is manageable or escalates into something more serious.
 
But in the modern era of digitally connected operations, the reality is that the golden hour has been compressed into the golden few minutes, during which an organization’s initial response to a potential crisis affects whether the event is manageable or escalates into something more serious.
 
Organizations serious about their crisis preparedness have recognised this and are now searching for a means to enable this rapid, almost instantaneous strategic crisis response to happen. The application of a mission command approach in an organization’s crisis management system can help it achieve just that.
 
Most crises are dynamic, rapidly evolving and unpredictable and have extraordinary strategic implications. A mission command system allows troops to rapidly respond to a changing situation and seize opportunities by using their initiative, experience and ability to ensure that the commanders  intent and the organization’s response priorities are met. It also facilitates a rapid initial response to a crisis, prior to the activation through traditional means of the crisis management team(s) across the organization.
 
How can the key principles of mission command be applied to an organization’s crisis management system?
 
When an organization is experiencing a crisis its crisis management system needs to facilitate the creation of unity of effort within the response. It should establish the intent of senior officers this can be demonstrated through the documentation of:
 
Response priorities where it is common for organizations to use 1. People, 2. Environment, 3. Assets, 4. Reputation as their response priorities
 
Response approach – In its simplest form, an approach of prudent over reaction to a crisis or potential crisis empowers troops to act swiftly and decisively.
 
Management principles – these provide a guideline of how the organization will develop and deliver its response.
 
Definition of a crisis – A clear and concise definition of what constitutes a crisis
 
If Troops have this guiding methodology which explains the commanders  intent it empowers them to act, which supports freedom of action. The successful implementation of a crisis response requires investment from senior officers in a sustained competency development programme.
 
Developing troop competency in crisis response is essential, it develops confidence in the organization’s response system and their own capability to manage a crisis. A trained crisis management team has a far better chance of successfully managing a crisis than an untrained one, it will respond faster and work more efficiently as the response progresses. This in turn develops unity of effort across the response system and establishes a template for mutual understanding and trust to be developed across the organization.
 
Exercises also provide the basis for development of the crisis management system through a process of continuous improvement. Trust is gained in the crisis management system if responders know that their feedback, and any learnings identified in post exercise reports, are reviewed and any improvements are implemented.
 
Successful crisis response requires timely and effective decision making. By creating a crisis management system that adheres to a mission command philosophy, organizations can greatly improve the speed at which they respond to a crisis. This is achieved through unity of effort in the crisis response, mutual understanding and trust held by all members of the response structure, trust in the crisis management process and policy, and the freedom of action for troops to act using their best judgement and expertise within defined constraints, in line with the intent of commanders.
 
Summary
 
We have used best practices in crisis and incident management to be used as a benchmark to review how mission command approaches relate to, and can help organizations become better prepared to deal, with a crisis in the modern digital era.
 
It is clear that although mission command’s terminology is different, it is complimentary to the preparedness guidance presented in best practice. By using the guiding principle of mission command which is the absolute responsibility to act and achieve the superior’s intent, and the five key principles; unity of effort, freedom of action, trust, mutual understanding and timely and effective decision-making.
 
Organization equipped with a solid decision making model can create a crisis management system that aligns with best practices and allows it to respond quickly and effectively through the empowerment of troops to make swift decisions, which have the potential to minimise the impact of the crisis during the critical first few minutes. This increases organizational resilience.

Commanders seek to initiate combat on the most favorable terms. Doing so allows the massing of effects against selected enemy units in vulnerable locations. Maintaining the initiative allows a commander to shift the decisive operation to make good decisions so opportunities can be exploited as they arise. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by--

1. Defining types of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks.
2. Organization tasks of available forces and allocation of resources.
   
3. Arrangement and choice of control measures impact operational tempo
4. Gaining a position of relative advantage-- physical/temporal by rapid maneuver
   
5. Employing firepower to destroy critical enemy capabilities and systems.
6. Conducting information operations to isolate and degrade enemy decision-making abilities.
   
7. Denying enemy forces what they require for success, example terrain/airspace
8. Sustaining and protecting subordinate forces before, during, and after battles.
   
9. Planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating its branches or sequels.
   
10. Consolidating gains to defeat all forms of enemy resistance.