Logistics is critical to success on the battlefield. To remain a vital contributor to military success, logistics must adapt continuously so that it bridges old systems and capabilities while embracing new technologies and concepts. In addition, the success of every new system and concept, every new technology and military organization, must be evaluated against new revolutionary technologies sure to impact logistics sustainability.
 
Logistics is critical not only to employing the force, but also, even more importantly to building the everyday readiness of the force. At the tactical level, we only need to look at the various elements of readiness reporting reviewed by senior leaders to discern that the fundamentals of logistics directly affect the majority of elements defining readiness across the services—personnel, equipment, and supply readiness—which in turn directly affect the ability of the services to meet the recurring needs of ongoing deployments and generate the forces needed for war.
 
Logistics is the foundation for the success of military operations from entry-level training to the most complex operations across the spectrum of conflict. From providing the facilities that house the members of the force and the ranges where they train, to sustaining the equipment warriors operate and wear, to providing fuel and ammunition in operations and training, the interconnectedness of logistics inextricably links logistics to military combat power.
 
Military logistics’ defining attributes—agility, survivability, responsiveness, and effectiveness—are measured by the breadth and depth of these core functions, which affect the military from force generation to training to the readiness of units stationed at home and abroad.
 
“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”
—General Dwight D. Eisenhower
 
Logistics strategy includes a comprehensive process to reconcile Focused Logistics, Force-centric Logistics Enterprise, and Sense and Respond Logistics. The strategy also encompasses other transformational operations, intelligence, and logistics concepts to provide a more comprehensive approach to achieve Joint Focused Logistics capabilities.
 
An aggressive experimentation campaign and rapidly developed operational prototypes are included to test, refine, validate and integrate transformational logistics technology and concepts. These efforts will enable DoD to better manage logistics developments and to integrate and coordinate with developing concepts for military operations.
 
Distributed adaptive operations assumes that each element-- or unit of action, can autonomously perform particular tasks, using one or more methods and each element may carry out an entire task itself, or it may coordinate with other elements that perform parts of the task.
 
 Incorporation of network-centric operations and warfare concepts and technologies are critical to ensure each element’s global awareness of the strategic, operational, and tactical environment to permit informed, coordinated operations focused on meeting commander’s intent.
 
Elements are empowered, using globally-established rules, to seize the initiative, to exploit success, to redesign or task organize themselves in response to threats and opportunities, all guided by achievement of commander’s intent.
 
Organizations, composed of these elements, will learn and adapt to successes, failures, and other situational changes. Future joint forces will act in this distributed adaptive manner to generate desired effects in support of the commander's intent.
 
The commercial sector has advanced modern supply chain management disciplines and methodologies, built upon advanced information technology to achieve distributed, adaptive logistics support. The end state vision of this effort is integrated joint logistics that fuses information, logistics processes, and platform embedded sensor-based technologies to support tactical, operational and strategic sustainment levels operating in a joint integrated logistics environment.
 
A set of overarching transformational military concepts, specifically network-centric operations and warfare are emerging that require close integration of operations, intelligence, and logistics functions.
 
A major component of the logistics transformation process is the use of experimentation and rapidly developed operational prototypes to support and enrich reconciliation of advanced concepts and technologies, and to test the operational, organizational, and technological validity, impact, and military utility of transformational elements, especially in a larger context across the range of military operations.
 
Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, supplies, and support in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantities, across the full range of military operations. This will be made possible through a real-time, net-enabled information system providing accurate, actionable visibility as part of an integrated operational picture, effectively linking the operations and logistics across joint forces, Services, and support agencies, the commercial sector, and coalition partners.
 
Sense and Respond Logistics (S&RL) is a network-centric, knowledge-driven, knowledge-guided concept intended to sustain modular, reconfigurable force capabilities to execute Joint and Coalition effects-based operations and to provide precise, adaptable, agile support for achievement of commander's intent.
 
S&RL relies upon highly adaptive, linked and dynamic physical and functional processes, employing and enhancing operational knowledge development, sense-making, and decision support. It senses, predicts, anticipates and coordinates actions that provide competitive advantage spanning the full range of military operations across strategic, operational and tactical levels.
 
S&RL promotes doctrinal and organizational transformation, together with technological advancements, and supports scalable coherence of command and control through functional integration of operations, logistics, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
 
The S&RL concept is being developed and tested, through experimentation, to provide an end-to-end, point-of-effect to source-of-support adaptive construct of logistics resources and capabilities. Within the S&RL vision, every entity is both a potential consumer and a potential provider of logistics.
 
The S&RL vision is intended to deliver flexibility, robustness, and scalability across the full range of military operations through adaptive, responsive, real-time demand and support logistics within U.S military and  coalition operations. The networks promise greater tactical logistics agility, superior survivability, more comprehensive support for the full range of operational forms, and a potential for reduced in-theater logistics footprint.

Logistics touches every aspect of military strength and is the sum of the capabilities brought to bear by all of the U.S. military services and those of a wide array of international partners.

Equipment readiness is a key area of concern. Military units cannot perform their mission without the equipment needed to do so. Availability and delivery of parts and spare components, maintenance capability and the capacity to surge increased maintenance volume on short notice, the ability to contract additional support when necessary—all of these logistical elements are essential to military effectiveness.
 
Within logistics, the supply function is critical to equipment readiness. Simply stated, supply readiness is the ability to have the right types and amount of equipment available for a ground unit, a ship, or an aviation unit.
 
Maybe not so obvious to many leaders is the interconnectedness of supply readiness to all other aspects of unit readiness. Without the right equipment, units cannot train to the full complement of their mission sets. Lacking something as simple as power generation capability on a ship, on the ground, or on an aircraft can prevent a unit from establishing the command and control capabilities that are vital to modern warfighting.
 
The core functions within logistics are supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support OCS. Logistics includes planning and executing the movement and support of forces as well as those aspects of military operations.
 
In assessing the true value of logistics, we need to distinguish between efficiency and effectiveness, even though efficiency certainly affects effectiveness. Effectiveness is ultimately what matters at the tactical edge. Efficiencies should be pursued to free resources for use elsewhere, but those efficiencies must never be taken at the expense of troops who have been committed to battle.
 
Many logistical challenges will remain unchanged in the near future because of the sheer physics of distributing ammunition and bulk liquids and the requirement to move major ground warfighting equipment and personnel. Nevertheless, changes that positively influence the agility, survivability, responsiveness, and effectiveness of logistics systems can and must be made.
 
Change must be made that ensures logistics agility by designing procedures and acquiring systems that adjust to changing requirements across a widely distributed force constantly and with domain-wide visibility, highlighting the needs, resources, and capabilities of the force.
 
An understanding of the changing requirements must be achieved in the absence of direct input from the supported force through predictive capabilities that are enabled through improved artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities.

Future logistics command and control systems can ensure agility by operating despite an enemy’s efforts to disrupt communications.  This can be done by developing the means to transfer logistics data systems seamlessly from digital-based processes to analog-based processes and back. This requires both technological and training/conceptual change across the force, not exclusively in the logistics enterprise.
 
 
Improvements in logistics effectiveness require improved integrated capabilities and authorities that allow logistics challenges to be resolved at the lowest levels, leveraging shared awareness, and focused on effectiveness. The ability to measure effectiveness against efficient performance is critical. This focus on effectiveness will prioritize the force’s critical logistics needs by evaluating all requirements against mission success.
 
Responsiveness can be improved by leveraging industrial-base support from the point of manufacture to the tactical edge forces. Improved responsiveness through domain-wide visibility and predictive logistics capabilities driven by improved artificial intelligence capabilities will provide sustainment based on finely tuned metrics that eliminate the need to request support. In short, we need to have the ability to autonomously anticipate the needs of the commander, not simply respond faster to bottom-up needs identification.
 
The use of unmanned platforms will be critical to the future of logistics. Unmanned platforms that support ground distribution will complement unmanned aerial platforms that deliver vital sustainment to widely distributed forces.
 
In addition, unmanned platforms that can evacuate the injured from the point of injury without sacrificing high-cost combat platforms and additional combat capability will be critical in the dispersed battlefield. Every facet of military logistics must embrace unmanned platforms, from unmanned sea-based ship-to-shore connectors to platforms for the refueling of ships to the use of unmanned platforms for aerial refueling.
 
To say the least, the challenges of military logistics are unique. Although many of industry’s best practices and technologies are relevant and even vital to the modernization of military logistics, the agility, survivability, responsiveness, and effectiveness of military logistics require another level of integrated innovation in technology and operational concepts.

The Logistics Construct is a tool to enable strategic, operational and tactical movement and sustainment of forces and materiel in support of military functions.
 

1. Integrating force projection and sustainment functions into a coherent operating system
2. Anticipating through war gaming in the planning process and sensing during execution
3. Interpreting feedback from the interaction of activities and the environment, and then responding through networked capabilities
4. Focusing on precision from point-of-effect to the source-of-support
5. Projecting and sustaining the joint force in global context.
6. Merge force projection and sustainment to support operations
7. Employ a knowledge-enhanced effects-based approach
8. Sense and interpret force projection and sustainment requirements
9. Use collaboration to allow execution of an effects based approach
10. Balance operational effectiveness and efficiency and ensure comprehensive force protection.

 

We have made incredible strides in tactical readiness, generating and sustaining highly trained, disciplined and fit tactical units, and maintaining the capacity and capability to meet the operational demands of the joint force. As a result, the Army is more combat ready and better prepared to face potential near-peer adversaries than it has been in decades.

While combat troops have always been the foundation of the Army, our strategic advantage has been our ability to mobilize, deploy, move and sustain the force—strategic readiness. From management of installation infrastructure to mobilization operations, and from deployment to sustainment in the field and redeployment, the materiel enterprise has a significant role in building and delivering Army strategic readiness.

Mobilization, Power Projection

Strategic readiness starts on Army installations, key hubs where soldiers and work, train and live. Installations include headquarters, ranges where soldiers train, the motor pools and maintenance facilities where they maintain equipment, and the supply support activities and logistics readiness centers where they store and equip their units—all key enablers of mobilization operations.

Installations are also the foundation of strategic power-projection capability, which enables deployment of people and equipment rapidly and efficiently. Railheads, roads, airfields and ports are how soldiers get to the fight. Our enemies know the best way to defeat the greatest Army in the world is to stop it from leaving its own territory.

We must ensure the critical infrastructure that moves our force from fort to port, port to port, and port to foxhole is not only ready today but modernized to support next-generation platforms and secure enough to withstand threats.

To that end, the U.S. Army Materiel Command has developed a comprehensive facilities investment strategy that looks at today’s requirements, as well as those 10 and 20 years out, considering factors that will impact our ability to mobilize and deploy from installations. The strategy prioritizes the infrastructure most critical to successfully project and sustain our forces for large-scale combat operations.

Moving equipment from our installations by land, rail, air and sea requires close integration with Transportation Command, commercial operators at strategic ports in the U.S. and overseas, and our allies and partners. The Army continues to demonstrate this capability with recurring deployments to wide-ranging theatres of action.

However, to fight and win against near-peer competitors, which will require moving even more equipment more quickly, the Army must continue to build the skills and reinforce the critical infrastructure that comprises our strategic power-projection capability.

By easing the need for strategic air- and sealift requirements for units deploying from the U.S. and reducing costs associated with permanently basing large forces overseas, Army pre-positioned stocks are key enablers of strategic readiness. Pre-positioned stocks speed forces to the fight by anticipating needs and pre-positioning equipment, supplies and munitions in key areas aligned with combatant commander requirements.
 
For the past several years, we have worked hard to improve the condition of the equipment in the sets, ensuring the communications and weapon systems, and combat enablers, are fully configured and ready to go when units arrive to draw the equipment.
 
We are turning our attention to a review of pre-positioned stocks to ensure the right equipment is in the right location in the right condition. We also continually assess our munitions stockpiles in the U.S. and abroad to ensure strategic positioning that enables flexibility and speed. Strengthening pre-positioned stocks not only supports our strategic readiness but also serves to reassure our allies and deter potential aggression.

Sustaining the Force

Soldiers cannot fight and win on the battlefield without weapons to fire, tanks to drive, food to eat, and the logistics support to ensure those necessities get to the right place at the right time.

For that reason, sustaining the force is also a key tenet of strategic readiness.

When it is time to deploy, it is too late to practice battlefield sustainment skills for large-scale combat operations, something the Army has not done in decades. To better prepare, logisticians are engaged in tough, realistic training that stresses people and equipment and improves their ability to anticipate requirements based on their environment, the operation and the mission.

We are also reviewing our organizational structures, doctrine and regulations to ensure our combat sustainment support battalions are organized, aligned and resourced to best support the operational force.

We have made great strides in relearning and exercising our expeditionary abilities. The end state is to ensure the right commodities are in place when commanders and their soldiers need them, and front line soldiers never have to wait on logisticians to catch up to their movements.

A key enabler of sustaining the force is the Army’s organic industrial base: maintenance depots, manufacturing arsenals and ammunition plants. When the force needs equipment or parts manufactured, repaired, upgraded or modernized, industrial artisans at the Army’s organic industrial base deliver.

This base must be optimized to support current unit readiness across the force, maintain the ability to surge, and modernize and retool to sustain the next generation of equipment. From machinery and advanced manufacturing, to technical competence within the workforce, we are resourcing the organic industrial base and implementing new processes and systems to ensure these facilities keep pace with a modernized Army.

Exercising Capabilities

The Army will exercise its strategic readiness capabilities with allies and partners through large-scale training as part of our multinational Defender series.

First, at our installations, we will assess if our training ranges, motor pools, supply support activities, logistics readiness centers, railheads, airfields, ports and other infrastructure and processes are capable of supporting mobilization and deployment operations.

 Second, we will exercise and validate our ability to draw, employ and turn in full-unit, configured-for-combat Army pre-positioned stocks.

Third, once in theater, our focus will shift to assessing field support brigades, contracting support brigades and transportation brigades to ensure that munitions, repair parts, food, fuel and other materiel and services are sourced, produced, transported and delivered to soldiers in the field.

Finally, we will assess our ability to redeploy troops and equipment and receive them back at our installations.
 
Critical to all we do—in both tactical and strategic readiness—are our people. We will not lose focus on providing the quality support and programs they need and deserve. Increased quality of life is directly tied to increased readiness, and Materiel Command is committed to delivering the best services to soldiers every day.

Mobilizing, deploying and sustaining a globally engaged Army requires synchronization and integration across the materiel enterprise to effectively move troops and equipment at scale and speed. We cannot rely on industrial age processes and systems to deliver Army readiness. We must ensure our resources—not just funding, but time, people and infrastructure—are aligned and precisely executed to build strategic readiness today.

The Army’s ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain combat credible forces is a critical component to Army readiness and a strategic advantage over adversaries. From weight to size, and ease of mobility,  we must consider the factors that impact our ability to mobilize, deploy and sustain our force, and modernize accordingly.

1. In-transit visibility of sustainment and asset visibility of all major military end items
2. Engineering support including horizontal and vertical construction of ports, airfields, and other military support infrastructure
3. The acquisition, storage, distribution, use, maintenance, and disposal of materiel
4. Troop support services for movement, evacuation of personnel affected by operations
5. Facilities and infrastructure acquisition, construction, use, and disposition
6. Operational contract support including contract management to include Infrastructure assessment, repairs, and maintenance;
7. Common-user logistics support to Service Branches, other organizations, and other nations
8. Establishing and sustaining large-scale and enduring personnel compounds
9. Planning, coordinating, and integrating host-nation support from overseas partners;
10. Disposal operations that deal with the removal and remediation of unusable military property

 
 

​Military Exercises rely on Logistics Information to see ourselves across the entire materiel enterprise, from the organic industrial base to the battlefield.

Logistics Dashboard Systems make data easier for commanders to access, will allow us to see military operations in motion, while the Global Combat Support Logistics system will track supplies, spare parts, organizational equipment, unit maintenance and other financial logistics-related transactions—but only if we understand and know how to harness the data these systems provide.

We must be able to leverage our Logistics enterprise resource planning systems for critical data that allows commanders and logisticians to make predictive, real-time and informed decisions. We will validate that our Logistics enterprise resource planning strategy, focused on streamlining systems and overcoming connection gaps, will move us into the information age environment, as intended.

Logistics operations matter not only at the company level but at national and regional levels. At the national level the focus is more on logistics performance parameters such as cost, safety, and efficiency. At the company level, we have included a focus on logistics cost because of its impact on the bottom line and it is instructive to other operational goals.
 
Some organizations are looking beyond simple cost measures and monitoring a range of other parameters that affect performance as well as cost. Transportation, for instance, is one key area where unnecessary supply chain cost can be incurred. Inaccuracies in load planning lead to longer cycle times and higher operating costs.
 
With little remaining to cut in production costs, and most companies having ready access to technology, logistics is no longer merely a functional or non-value added operation. It has, to an extent, become a cost-optimizing strategy for intelligent enterprises.
 
Logistics is so integral to an organization that changing one aspect of it can impact the entire enterprise. For example, network optimization has far-ranging benefits beyond cost savings. It influences the breadth of a company's functions from warehouse design to carrier management, helping to streamline the entire operation.

To manage logistics costs, some companies try technology-enabled solutions; others seek the help of an experienced partner. Some managers consider it a safe option to hand off logistics operations to a solution provider who knows the game well.
 
Some enterprises that could invest in their own logistics infrastructure do so, and others move on to external providers. Unfortunately, however, many companies have fallen short of their goals despite these initiatives. So, whether for self-managed or outsourced logistics, the fundamental question becomes: which process-level factors need closer attention in order to improve operational performance?
 
Logistics operations are complex and the parameters are difficult to measure. Challenges include collecting error-free information from routine processes and reconciling fiscal entries related to logistics. The choices an organization makes in reporting logistics costs under various overheads only add to the difficulty. Tracking and measuring costs allocated between the company and its suppliers when it comes to inbound and outbound logistics is a grey zone.

Complexity also lies in the design and layout of the logistics operation. Even enterprises with much reach and experience, can struggle with low shipment consolidation and high transportation costs. Many enterprises don’t have an effective means to maximize loads going to all those locations, wasting truck capacity and driving up fuel and other costs.

Any method an enterprise engages to track and measure the logistics function can reveal areas for improvement, but in order to really control the supply chain, businesses must focus on reducing these and other complexities arising within the network.
 
Some are turning to detailed analytics frameworks, hiring consultants, or attempting technology solutions, but these alone cannot manage the problem. It takes a bigger approach to understand and manage logistics and associated costs.
 
A combination of analytics that extract data from deep in the network to determine where gaps and complexities lie; better technologies that provide real-time, actionable insight; and smarter processes that manage end-to-end workflow and administration are critical to success.
 
While metrics are instrumental to performance monitoring, too much data—or the wrong kind—might only get in the way. Logistics managers therefore need to determine what, specifically, to monitor and how to improve it.

There are requirements for standard metrics related not only to logistics costs but to a wide range of parameters at the company and the industry level. This not only brings uniformity into the logistics industry but also ensures improvement in the logistics sector.
 
As the complexity of modern logistics and transportation continues to increase, no enterprise can afford to wait until its proliferating supply chain grows out of control before grappling with all of the moving parts. Nor can it expect a technology solution alone to predict the unexpected, or analytics to resolve deep-rooted process problems in its logistics operation.

Companies determined to outcompete must take a coordinated approach aimed at improving global effectiveness, reducing costs, and maintaining the long-term process improvements required to sustain operational success. Driving a  comprehensive logistics program starts with truly understanding the key performance measures and their impact on the business outcomes of costs and transportation cycle times.

Since prices for input materials and services remain volatile, it is imperative for organizations to deploy a framework for understanding key drivers of cost and performance, and focus their efforts on optimizing such drivers. A sound measurement discipline at the very foundation of logistics will support lasting process improvement.
 
The costs associated with product logistics represent one of the main drivers of a product’s final cost, where warehousing, inventory and transportation are also crucial. Logistics plays an expanding role in the overall performance of all companies, so it’s important to closely monitor the performance of individual components of the logistics system to identify opportunities for improvement of these systems.
 
Observing the lack of monitoring tools, we focus on developing a framework for tracking and improving the efficiency of logistics and transportation resources at an aggregate as well as individual scale. The developed framework yields two results: a logistics cost index to monitor system trends and overall efficiency and logistics performance metrics to benchmark the efficiency of specific freight movement rates.
 
The project focuses on the analysis of traffic lanes, a common unit of measure for all logistics companies; specifically, the project focuses on the behavior of logistics costs and freight rates throughout these traffic lanes. The relevant factors identified were used to form a small set of clusters with the purpose of grouping lanes with similar behavior together.
 
Although the developed index is a valuable tool for reflecting the behavior of the logistics system, using it for benchmarking specific lanes is difficult. The  index and corresponding efficiency rating metrics open a great amount of future applications and opportunities. All of these expansions have great potential to improve logistic performance.

Apart from the measures that focus on profitability, companies should also spend time, effort and money in building sustainable logistics systems. This requires improving parameters such as the safety of the logistics system measured is to track the number and the cause of mishaps on a periodic basis.

Some of these "beyond profit" metrics can be enforced by companies only when there is monitoring and tracking at higher levels.
 
Logistics Management Systems are always looking for ways to improve efficiency in logistics. LMS is a platform, typically digital, designed to streamline several aspects of the goods delivery process. This revolutionary platform is being used by leaders in logistics and automates the supply chain, provides multiple insights, reports, and allows logistics network partners to save time, money, and spend fewer assets on future shipments.
 
Major features of Logistics Enterprises include the flexibility of use. Essentially, if you have a hand in any aspect of the supply chain, you can utilize a Logistics management system LMS. Digital Logistics organizations, distribution companies, shippers, carriers, and anyone else who ships commodities and freight on a regular basis can use LMS to their advantage. LMS systems manage multiple sections of transportation management, What are the Benefits of Logistics Management System? As with any new technology, there are benefits and hurdles that all users should be aware of prior to investing in them.

1. Planning and Decision Making Reporting  

LMS system helps to locate and determine the most efficient transportation for unique parameters and utilize flexibility to create multiple reports, which helps to fine-tune supply chain solutions.

2. Transportation Execution and Follow Up  

LMS solutions permit the user to execute transportation services such as dispatching carriers, accepting rates, and more. The LMS solution permits the user extended traceability of freight – at multiple touchpoints of transportation.

3. Capability  

 As an operational unit, using a LMS system arms you with the latest and best technology to expedite the logistics process. LMS permits you to route freight based on transit time, quotes and with a wide-carrier mix. It’s a location command estimation and routing system – that allows you to complete full logistics planning, execution, and tracking.

4. Simplifies Processes  
Use of LMS can simplify your search for the right carrier – for the right shipping needs. It reviews the commodities you are shipping and finds carriers that are better served to transport the goods safely and efficiently. It also permits you to create profiles for quicker routing and shipment planning as you move forward.

5. Track Freight  
LMS solutions are exceptional for tracking freight while it’s in transit. You can set up a LMS system to provide you with alerts – via multiple platforms. If there are delays in the transit, you’ll be able to update customers and shipping recipients.
 
6. Business Insights  
Some of the best LMS solutions offer in-depth reporting and insight capabilities. LMS can store multiple shipping profiles and create easy-to-review reporting – in multiple reporting formats. Custom reports, invoicing, and more are possible with LMS.

7. Technological advancements
 
Tech can be developed to improve operational efficiency. In the logistics world, there are multiple challenges that shippers/carriers and others must battle on a daily basis.

8. Improving organization
 
When you work with multiple shipments, carriers, customers, and other variables, keeping your metrics quotes organized and easily accessible is a major challenge. Instead of jumping from website to website or using multiple screens, using a LMS system to improve your organization is a key feature of this solution.

9. Improves Communication  

Regardless of the type of business you are in – maintaining clear and transparent communication is a critical component to customer service. A major hurdle that all industries face delays in the delivery of freight. The tracking solutions offered by today’s advanced LMS solutions permit you to track shipments in real-time, with instant updates

10. Future of Supply chain
​ 
LMS is scalable, customizable, brandable, and can be set up specifically for your industry, consumer base, and needs. Just like any other technological solution, the more education, training, and information you receive about LMS solutions – the easier it will be to determine what type of system is best suited for you.

Navy has formed new working groups to problem solve the issues contributing to its maintenance and sustainment problems. Service has created ten different teams with more than 100 individuals as part of its Sustainment System Working Group initiative to tackle the Navy’s issues with its supply chain and moving ships through maintenance at the yards.
 
“Supply chain and spares and cannibalizations is a major problem.. “Shipyard throughput is a major problem – how do we fix that? How do we incentivize the private shipyards to fix things?”
 
The sub teams include undersea, carriers, surface ships, aviation, innovation and Marine ground forces with goal is to pinpoint the current state for each sub-group, name the problems each face and find solutions for the issues.
 
“How do we make sure that we are thinking about and elevating the sustainment needs early in the development and design phase, such that we’re not always playing catchup in the sustainment phase. We have got to figure out a way to do that better.
 
“That is also one of the areas of focus of the sustainment system working group, which  having established their problem statements, that team is now embarking on the next phase, which is to develop the as-is states that kind of drives the problem, and then coming up with recommendations for how to improve all of those problems.
 
As the Navy pursues its ship maintenance logjam, the service has sought to replicate efforts its aviation enterprise pursued in trying to increase the mission-capable rates for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. emphasizing the Navy’s focus on managing its supply chain and materials through a closer working relationship with Naval Supply Systems Command.
 
The working groups provide a way for the Navy to form a more cohesive approach to both planning and performing ship maintenance. “They’re collecting a lot of good ideas on the end-to-to end — all the way from the initial planning process, through ship delivery, and the expenditure of funds,”
 
We ‘ve got fundamentally the right initiatives that we’re working on, but we really got to drive these down to the deck-plate level. That’s one of the challenges we haven’t gotten to that effort.”
 
Navy’s sustainment requirements only increase with time, adding more systems and the systems getting older. “We have done a not very good job of trying to figure out how to reduce our costs for sustainment.”
 
As part of the working group effort, the Navy is also looking at how it can pursue new technology and better integrate it into the sustainment process, which the Navy has not historically done well.
 
“We struggle with the transition of new technologies from development of those to deployment of them. We simply don’t do a good job of that, and the Navy has trouble integrating new technology in regards to both sustainment and warfighting.
 
While the working group effort is concentrating on the current problems and how to fix them, Navy should also do more preparation for the out years, like forecasting its long-term plans to both industry and the regions where it performs various sustainment work so there is an adequate workforce.
 
“We should be building that site picture five, ten, 15 years out and providing it to organizations like this one and then to regions and then to companies so that everybody understands the demand signal that’s going to be there, that exists today, and that it’s also going to be there in the future.”
 
Navy, despite delays is making progress on getting its ships out of the shipyards on time. Over the past three years, the Navy is on track to more than double the percentage of ships getting out of maintenance on time, key to the service’s efforts to make deployments more sustainable for its ships and sailors.
 
“On-time ship maintenance availability completion rates in private shipyards improved from 24% in FY18 to 37% in FY19. “Current performance trends in FY20 are projected to be 65%.”
 
It’s a sign that the Navy may be turning the corner on a fight to restore readiness from its nadir in the early part of the last decade, when the Navy was running ragged filling unsustainable requirements for forces around the globe.
 
Getting ships through their maintenance cycles on time is the linchpin of what the Navy calls its “optimized fleet response plan,” which is the system through which the Navy generates deployable ships that are maintained, manned and trained.
 
Delays in the shipyards are undermining the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan, and turning that around is vital. “We are getting 35 to 40 percent of our ships out of maintenance on time: that’s unacceptable. We can’t sustain the fleet I have with that kind of track record.”
 
Getting out of that hole has been difficult for a number of reasons: High operational demand for Navy forces makes planning maintenance difficult, and inevitably when the ships go into maintenance after years of hard use, workers discover more work that needs to be done, creating delays. And those delays make executing OFRP difficult.
 
“OFRP provides the construct to best assess and optimize readiness production — down to a unit level — taking into account all the various competing factors to produced Navy readiness.
 
Bottom line: OFRP helps mitigate fundamental points of friction, such as shipyard capacity and manning gaps at sea — but in itself doesn’t solve key degraders like depot level maintenance delays and extensions.”
 
But some key factors in the delays have been identified and the Navy is working to mitigate them. One area that has a tendency to drive delays is when workers discover things that need to be fixed, the fix may not cost much but the adjustment must go through an approval process that slows everything down. Those kinds of changes add up to about 70 percent of the so-called “growth work.”
 
Part of it is anticipating and building in ways to deal with growth work into every maintenance period, and the other part is making it easier to address small changes to the scope of the work.
“When we began this initiative, cycle time for the small value changes averaged about 30 days. “We’re now at six and aim to bring it down further to only two days.”
 
Other things that have helped the problem has been bundling maintenance periods for ships, meaning that contractors bid on multiple ships to fix, and can plan hiring further out. . Additionally, improving base access for contractors has helped, as well.
 
“For example, we have averaged 110 days delayed per ship in private avails,  “maintenance availability.” Now We go from about one-third avails finishing on-time to two-thirds. That is great. But, again, each delay has real impact on our readiness, and we need to keep working together to do better.”
 
Because Navy is set up to meet standing presence requirements and missions around the world, it must cycle its ships through a system of tiered readiness.
 
That means ships go on deployment fully manned, trained and equipped. Then the ships come home, and after a period of sustained readiness where the ship can be redeployed, it goes into a reduced readiness status while undergoing maintenance. Following maintenance, the ship and crew goes into a training cycle for another deployment as an individual unit, then as a group, then returns to deployment.
 
The whole cycle takes 36 months: Rinse and repeat.
 
OFRP was designed in the 2013-2014 time-frame when the Navy was deploying well beyond its means, with carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups going out for nine-to-10 months at a time.
 
The excess use wore hard on the ships and sailors who manned them and put more wear on the hulls than they were designed to sustain. That meant that when ships went in for maintenance they were more broken than they were supposed to be, and funding to fix them was hampered by spending cuts.
 
For nuclear ships — submarines and aircraft carriers — the funding cuts were a double punch of work stoppages and furloughs that contributed to a wave of retirements in the yards, meaning the public yards were understaffed and had to hire and train new workers. Work took longer, throwing a wrench into an already complicated system of generating readiness.
 
All that added up to significant delays in getting ships through their maintenance cycles and contributed to astonishing delays in attack submarine maintenance especially.
 
What OFRP was meant to do was create a system whereby the Navy could meet combatant commander demands but not break the system. That meant that the Navy would generate as much readiness as it possibly could but that the demand would have to be limited to what the Navy could reasonably maintain, man, train and equip.
 
But getting to that system has been immensely difficult because of the deep hole the Navy dug meeting requirements that well outstripped funding and supply.
 
For example, there was a two year period when the service was forced to supply two carrier strike groups to a key region of interest at all times, a requirement only canceled when automatic across-the-board spending cuts in 2013 made it impossible for the Navy to fund the two-carrier requirement.
 
Adding to the difficulty: some of OFRP’s founding requirements were impossible to pull off. One was that the all the ships in group would go into and come out of their maintenance availabilities on time and together.
 
Another was that a group would go into the first phase of their training, the so-called basic phase right after coming out of maintenance, fully manned.
Both have been immensely difficult to pull off. But Fleet Forces was given ample warning that those assumptions would be difficult to achieve.
 
Getting ships to come out of the yards simultaneously is hard. “The challenge is, let’s say you want four destroyers in a battle group, all to come out at the same time in one port? That’s a real challenge.”
 
It’s also particularly challenging in places with less infrastructure. “Your big rub there is, the challenge of OFRP is … all those ships in a carrier strike group, they go through maintenance together, they go through training together and they deploy together.. "So, what our challenge is, is to be able to take all that work from all those ships and try to schedule it for roughly about the same time, and to get all that work done on time. So that’s our challenge.
 
“Now, in a port like Norfolk or San Diego, we have big shipyards, a lot of people, a lot of ships. You can kind of absorb that type of workload. When you go to Mayport, they’ve got like 10 ships down there and typically cannot work on more than one or two destroyers at a time.
 
Fleet Forces has to be responsive to the shipyards because at least that way they could plan for delays.
 
“They know if they give us all this work at one time, it’s going to go long anyway.  “So they’d rather be able to plan that and at least know when they’re getting the ship back, as opposed to, ‘nope, we’re not going to talk to you, you’ve got to go do it,’ and then the ships go long because we don’t have enough people to do the work.”
 
Fleet Forces Command has been reviewing its assumptions and is preparing to release a revised OFRP instruction, but the core is likely to remain the same. In any case, it’s always going to take a long time to dig out of the hole the Navy found itself in when OFRP was implemented fully in 2015.
 
“It was clear at the inception of OFRP, and remains clear today, that it will take the entire 2015-2025 period to recover readiness and establish stable readiness production.That makes sense when readiness production is planned over 9-years and large blocks of time have already been scheduled for depot maintenance periods.”
 
Ultimately, if the process of OFRP is funded correctly and ships can get out of maintenance on time, it’s a sound way of moving forward.
 
The bottom line here is that, as a process, OFRP works. “If we are looking where to improve upon it, each of these studies came to the same conclusion: the biggest inhibitor to fleet readiness is maintenance and modernization performance in the shipyards. We simply must get better.
 
Working groups have been particularly effective at laying out a good training program, but, more work remains to be done on overseas maintenance, as well as addressing some lingering design reliability issues.
 
“Number one, we still continue to have some design problems on some of the engineering components on those ships.”
 
On the maintenance side there’s some more work to be done. We’ve now successfully had deployments and we got some good lessons learned, and we need to kind of figure out, okay, what is our global maintenance concept of operations?
 
We need to figure out how are we going to repair these things forward. … And what does that maintenance team look like?”  Past working groups half tried to come up with “sort of set up for what we thought it looked like, but based on what we now know and what we’ve done, it might be a little bit different than that. So there’s some work we need to put into that as well.”

The working group identified several areas for future exploration, including command and control, training, global expeditionary maintenance and logistics. Now that we’ve executed more rotational deployments, we have an experience base from which to draw.”
 
“It’s important to note that this is  it is logical follow-on work to the previous working group – work that we can now do based on what we now know. Changes implemented as a result of the working group helped stabilize the program and were incorporated into the rotational deployments that began in earnest last year.
 
 We’ve learned a lot from those deployments, but we still have more work to do, and the Navy wants to take a close look at how we’re employing the ships to make sure they meet the specific mission needs of our Fleet Commanders.”
 
Specifically, the study has four main lines of effort: operations, training, organization, and maintenance.
 
“The ships have been successful in accomplishing their missions in support of our fleets and combatant commands, but the reliability must improve. We are gathering lessons learned in material issues and maintenance and support methods. Our focus on reliability is in key ship systems, such as propulsion and controls, deck and handling systems, and radars.”
 
“We have stood up a strike team, a cross-functional team of our shipbuilders and sustainers and engineers and logisticians who, in cooperation with the fleet, are using a metrics-based approach focused on availability drivers to generate and execute action plans.
 
The action plans include material fixes to be installed on in-service ships, although many have already been done so in construction. The team is also focused on maintainability, working with our Regional Maintenance Centers, in-service engineering agents, and original equipment manufacturers to make the support process more efficient.”
 
“And, although OEMs are a key part of sustainment, we want to ensure the Navy has the ability to better organically support the ships, including in improvements in Navy ability to troubleshoot, to source spare parts, and to perform appropriate levels of maintenance ourselves.
 
“We are working with OEMs, showing them the metrics for how their systems are doing, and working to get the data and tools we need to be self-sufficient at the right level. I’m committed that our team is going to make a difference here, relying on the lessons learned, and the metrics and the drivers, and drive up availability for the fleet commanders.”
 
“We’re doing really good at fixing the problems we have with them right now, but … we need to do better than that. They need to not be breaking the way they are. And we’ll get to some resolution there. We’ve been encouraged by the work Naval Sea Systems Command has been doing, but we cannot let off on that. So that’s number one, getting that design reliability built back into some of those systems.

1. Coordination of field, depot, intermediate-level maintenance workloads
2. Sustain operating forces with responsive depot-level maintenance, repair, and technical support
3. Depot maintenance capabilities fully integrated into a warfighter-focused sustainment enterprise to support full spectrum of operations
4. Sustaining production, maintenance, repair, and logistics for military operations of various durations and intensity.
5. Maintaining advanced research and development activities capable of ensuring technological superiority
6. Providing for the development, manufacture, and supply of items and technologies critical to  production and sustainment of weapon systems.
7. Aligning Maintenance Operations Metrics with Warfighter Outcomes
8.  Identifying and Sustaining Requisite Core Maintenance Capability
9. Sustaining a Highly Capable, Mission-Ready Maintenance Workforce
10. Ensuring an Adequate Infrastructure to Execute Assigned Maintenance Workload

 

Mission readiness depends on secure and reliable connectivity to successfully maintain electronic workflows. Without it, we cannot effectively connect its bases to provide effective and efficient communications. Without it, personnel cannot seamlessly communicate with each other, order parts, access technical documents and manuals, upload and analyze aircraft data, or access secure information in maintenance hangars, munition bunkers and airfields.
 
DoD needs to prioritize and establish a path to enabling the flight line of the future; that is, ensuring and providing connectivity — everywhere.
 
The flight line of the future encompasses the entire communications system on a military base, including applications, databases, logistics, facilities and more. To meet future mission requirements, the DoD can upgrade and streamline communications with advanced technology that meets every military base’s unique requirements so all airmen have access to the information they need, when they need it.

Successful use cases can be used to replicate communication systems globally across all military bases to realize the full mission value of electronic workflow. This will enable the DoD to save time and money, while becoming much more efficient in accomplishing its mission.
 
A focus on data-driven decision-driven decisions helped solve a problem that couldn’t be fixed through more money alone. By embracing data and developing the Naval Sustainment System and Performance to Plan frameworks for aviation readiness, Navy had 340 more aircraft flying in March 2020 compared to March 2019, including 90 more Super Hornets.

As an example of how data changed the approach to boosting aviation readiness, an initial dataset in 2018 showed the two quickest ways to improve readiness were to tackle intermediate-level maintenance and manning at the squadrons.

Improvements in both areas were ordered, but continued data analysis showed that, “even if you do that –this was specifically for strike fighters – it said you are not going to get the 80-percent mission capable rate in your strike fighters.

That’s when we, all the sudden, because of that, made the decision to go ahead and do reform basically across all the tenets of naval aviation: at our squadron level, our intermediate level, our depot level, the way we do engineering, the way we run the operations center now and make decisions – all of that was because of the insights provided to us through data. And the results are, we’re at 341 Super Hornets mission capable. We’re at 340 more airplanes of all types  flying today than last year. So it really a testament to the power of data-driven decisions.”

Leaders have made sure that everyone – from the squadrons up to the chief of naval operations – has access to the same data on unit readiness and manning through his weekly Air Boss Report Card, to ensure the proper alignment and prioritization of money, manpower, parts and leadership attention.
 
Dedicated Data Analytics Team

Force Readiness Analytics Group (FRAG) stood up to take existing data in the aviation realm and apply machine learning and data analytics models to turn routinely collected information into something more actionable and predictive.
“We have to be able to man, train and equip better, more granular, more with outcomes in mind: mission capability rates, fire execution. How do we be very precise with our resourcing of that to enable those outcomes?”
 
Though the military sometimes wants to wait until a system is perfected to begin using it, that wasn’t an option because “we need answers today. Leadership can’t wait a month to go gather the data, figure out what your null sets are and “we learn by do”

We know what data we have, and working with the experts we know what the data means. And by doing that, by bringing it together in one place, we understand where our gaps are at. And the question is, how do we close those gaps: is it other data sets, do we need another software tool or something?”
 
The early days of the FRAG’s work weren’t easy, with data being siloed and not always kept in compatible formats. Navy has 20-plus years of data on every maintenance action that has taken place on every airframe, as well as every time a pilot flies, every training event associated with each sortie, the financials for every flight hour flown or maintenance action taken, and so forth – but some of the data is recorded daily versus monthly, and other variables that didn’t make them all easy to mesh together into a single database.
 
“Over the years we’ve had different organizations stand up different software and different databases to collect information to answer their questions or to answer their interests. And it wasn’t really in the scope of the technology to say, how do we do this in one big cloud.”
 
An early win for the FRAG was looking at 84-day aircraft inspections. Under the Naval Sustainment System, a squadron-level initiative was to improve scheduled maintenance, including inspections on each airframe that take place about every 84 days.

There was no real standard for how long those inspections should take, and completion times ranged from two days to 12 days based on how each squadron prioritized that routine scheduled maintenance.

FRAG wanted to better measure those maintenance evolutions – for most squadrons, at least one aircraft is undergoing an 84-day inspection during any given week, meaning slow completion times can have real consequences on the number of up aircraft and therefore the number of flight hours the pilots can achieve that week.
 
After some work diving into the maintenance action forms and other available data, FRAG determined that the goal should be three days for the inspection and that the bulk of inspections were actually taking about five days.
Armed with that knowledge, the air wings on the East Coast and West Coast have both been able to bring the inspection durations down by transparently sharing these numbers weekly and looking at what resources are needed to help squadrons that aren’t meeting the three-day goal.
 
In a more complex initiative, the FRAG looked at how safety affects readiness – specifically, how towing mishaps that cause Class C and Class D damage affect readiness rates in squadrons.
 
“For the longest time we’ve been reporting mishaps A through D and the day and the community, but we were never able to really understand the impact to the jets’ mission capability. So we asked the question, what’s the average time, due to a mishap, how long does it take to get back to mission capable?

So we realized, in our safety database we have an aircraft number, and in our maintenance reporting system we have, by every day, we have the status of that jet. So we could actually tie when the mishap happened to the status of that jet, and then how long it took to get back to MC.”

“And that was just one of the questions he’s had. So now we can actually measure for [Fiscal Year 2019], due to ground mishaps, a jet takes this long to get back to MC, and then track the status of that jet.

And then the next question is, how many maintenance man hours went into building that jet back up? So we can go into another data set, same thing, tie the maintenance action form to the date-time period and aggregate all those maintenance man hours.”
 
Once the knowledge exists on how a Class C mishap affects the entire squadron’s readiness, smart decisions can be made specific to an individual squadron and where it is in its deployment cycle.
 
So if we just had another mishap, the aircraft is fine, pilot is fine, but there’s going to be an impact to this squadron: it’s going to take them probably 40 days and 1,000 maintenance man hours to rebuild this jet, and they don’t really have, if they’re in this phase of the deployment cycle when they’re trying to execute their flight schedule, there’s going to be this much more drain on resources to this jet.

So maybe we move that jet to another squadron, or maybe we move that to another location so they’re not having to rebuild it, or bring in contractors to do that. So understanding the result not only on the jet but the squadron and where they’re at.” 
 
The dashboard, shows the readiness of each squadron and the status of each individual jet for leadership up the chain of command to use in making decisions about applying resources.

The dashboard, used to generate the Air Boss Report Card, that’s the culmination of culling data from different sources, generating a user-friendly interface and applying machine learning tools to auto-update the dashboard every morning.

Through the dashboard, a viewer could look at the entire Super Hornet inventory, for example, and see all relevant information: total inventory, required versus actual number of mission capable aircraft, 30-day mission capable trends and more across top; a look at each squadron, organized by carrier air wing, and a color-coding of each jet’s status of mission capable, down for maintenance or down for supply; a look at other Super Hornets outside of carrier air wings, such as training and testing units; and more.

Clicking on an individual squadron shows more information: flight hours; the fit, fill and experience level of the maintainers; and additional notes for the air wing about the squadron’s performance or needs.

The key is the data being automatically pulled and updated daily. To generate the dashboard’s information by hand for any given day would take several weeks, since the data comes from many sources.

The team implemented the Performance to Plan (P2P) mandate to increase fleet readiness and a rapid data-driven decision making process for senior leadership.

The team created machine-learning models for determining the monthly number of mission capable jets per squadron by incorporating manning-training-equipment datasets from Naval FA-18 squadrons.”
 
The team “developed machine-learning models to track and predict aviation fleet readiness. Their work analyzes historical information to seamlessly view data and predict future performance, improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and readiness of the Naval Aviation Enterprise.”
 
The next step is using the data to become even more predictive, to not just reveal hidden readiness deficiencies but to actually avoid them in the first place.
 
“We’re just tackling the easy stuff. Now it’s, how do we do more, how do we start to get predictive with certain things, and tackling some of the gaps in the data and how do we augment that? There’s a lot of work, there’s a lot of people trying to do stuff in this realm. We were told to run with scissors and be first to the whiteboard; people are now starting to come online, and how do we do what you guys are doing?”

“The whole goal is to help others join the practice so they can use their data in the same way.”
 
“That’s where we’re really finding, at least through that leadership, that alignment of that data, we can get in front of a lot of the issues we’re facing.”

“That is a big piece of our business at the business now, and that’s not going away any time soon, its just going to continue evolving.”
 
Depot job site performance consists of multiple dimensions. Often, performance is measured in terms of ratios of output/ input factors.

1. Deployed equipment orders, lines and units

2. Quality measures such as order completeness, error-free and on-time deployment

3. Flexibility to cope with changes in demand,

4. Agility to meet/adapt to changing requirements

5. Innovation-- use of new supply line concepts to yield components required for successful missions.

6. Number of full-time work hour equivalents

7. Investment in modern information systems

8. Creation of top-notch physical work sites

9. Process organisation

10. Assortment of equipment items carried.
 
1. Managing Equipment Structural Maintenance

2. Equipment Inventory, Status, and Utilization Reporting

3. Improving Equipment Reliability and Maintainability

4. Performance Management

5. Core Automated Maintenance System Manuals

6. Technical Order System

7. Maintenance Inspection Data Documentation

8. Comprehensive Engine Management System

9. Engine Configuration, Status

10. Deficiency Reporting and Investigating System
 
1. Satisfaction of Equipment Mission Agents

2. Use of Work Order Job Space

3. Condition of Technical Installations

4. State of Materiel Contact

5. Teamwork & Motivation

6. Storage & Order Picking Tech

7. Equipment Inventory Strategies

8. Supply Line Coordination

9. Level & Use of Information Systems

10. Commitment to Quality Services
 
Top 10 Constant Communication Problems between Sortie Generation and Plans/Scheduling Elements Vital to Inspection

1. Lead operations scheduler changes week to week. 

2. Continuation requests are approved by whoever is around. 

3. Late landings or early takeoffs are the norm. 

4. Reconfiguring instead of servicing in the turn. 

5. Ground abort and Cannibalization rates are on the rise. 

6. Squadron regularly flies more hours off its fleet than the phase dock can regenerate
. 
7. Major changes occur to next week’s flying schedule. 

8. All scheduled maintenance is saved for phase. 

9  Maintenance schedule does not receive the same attention as the flying schedule.
 
10. Maintenance scheduling effectiveness is 100 percent, but there are many overdue items in the planning requirements report

Top 10 Rapid Response Capability Enhances Maintenance/Operations Planning

1. Perform test and evaluation of F/A-18 A-G Automated Maintenance Environment (FAME) products Data Courier, Tech Data, MAPA, Hardware, Software, etc… using system engineering principles.

2.Review and provide technical inputs/recommendations of FAME Functional Requirements Documentation FRD. Conduct laboratory testing of system hardware and software.

3. Develop and document test points and test procedures for hardware and software components. Coordination and consolidation of AME testing events within multiple agencies supporting the F/A-18 FAME program.

4. Identify and set test schedules by leveraging knowledge base of AME development teams, training activities, Software development groups, program office, etc.

5. Interface with team, product and program leads on weekly basis communicating test results, schedule, resource allocations etc.

6. Responsible for test reporting, submission of Software Anomaly Reports SAR, data collection, analysis, and posting of data to the common data sharing systems.

7. Required to participate in periodic meetings supporting FAME system, SCS, and other FAME impacted systems

8. Continuous interaction with FAME test activities and software developers such as SPAWAR, Tech Data, etc…

9. Serve as IPT FAME Technical (SME). Selectee should possess experience in developmental test, and FAME Software Suite systems (HW & SW).
​
10. Identify, document and monitor system deficiencies including verification of corrected deficiencies. Maintain proficiency in the use of data analysis tools, systems, and software programs. .

Services are using powerful new computers to crunch data so it can better decide the optimum time to get rid of aging platforms such as tactical wheeled vehicles and other equipment.

There is an ongoing study looking at actual maintenance costs of individual types of equipment over periods of time to find out what the right duration is for a system.

The data being collected and crunched is helping the service understand the relationship between when a vehicle is truly is no longer maintainable, and when it is cost effective to continue evolving them.

“What we're doing now is putting real hard data behind it because frankly, the advancement in some of our computing capabilities is now allowing it.

The model is starting with vehicles they have a lot of them and therefore, a lot of maintenance data available.

The model will give the Army deeper understanding of the year-to-year costs of operations and maintenance.

“If I buy a Humvee this year, how much on the first year will I spend on maintaining it? How much will I spend on driving it? How does that change in the second year, third year, fourth year, etc.

“When does it make the most sense to rebuild them? At what point does it make no sense to rebuild them, but instead just to go ahead and absorb the increased expense of repair or instead replace them?”

Putting together a separate costing model where the data can be applied to different platforms and equipment.  The model will give pricing and ownership figures for the fleets and equipment.

The costing model is generic and can be applied to any platform. “It's also useful for building a truck model and a tank model and a Bradley model … so it just becomes a building block that we feed data into, and it gives us an ability to see the cost model over time.”

Teams have laid the groundwork by collecting logistics data and putting them into sets. Capturing that data and putting it in a coherent fashion where it can be applied “has been a bit of a challenge."
 
AI can span across data management, predictive maintenance, supply and inventory forecasting, optimizing tactical and technical proficiency and even using prescriptive analytics to better inform the selection of vehicle condition. And more AI use cases could easily be found in monitoring command post, aligning training, certification and deployment requirements.
 
 
Technical publications supporting the operations and maintenance of complex assets in the aerospace and defense industries play an instrumental role in operational enablement and mission achievement. These tech pubs represent the organization’s institutional knowledge.
 
As senior staff retire and take a wealth of knowledge with them, these organizations realize technical publications are critical to sustaining newer team members’ productivity. Luckily, modern technologies are enabling new ways to utilize tech pubs in productive and innovative ways.
 
The term “efficiency” keeps coming up – efficiency across the entire technical content supply chain. It’s about efficiency in the creation, delivery, understanding and utilization of the technical knowledge in every step in the product and service lifecycle.
 
What are some examples of efficiency? Perhaps by starting with what is meant by the “efficient utilization of technical knowledge”?
 
Historically, tech pubs have been used passively in the maintenance process. An issue or task arises, a work order is generated with the parts and tools required and the tech is assigned to complete the effort. The technician accesses the tech pub as a reference, either on paper or in the IETM. In other words, the information is passively pulled into the process, not proactively pushed.
 
As we move further into the digital revolution, assets are becoming more intelligent with innovations like AI, big data analytics, remote diagnostics and other emerging technologies.
 
Proactive delivery of technical knowledge is possible as the assets themselves can now communicate intelligently with digitalized content. For example, our customers have embedded our technology into asset platforms so the diagnostics data in the tech pub can work with the onboard monitoring systems to identify emerging issues.
 
What about further up the content supply chain - the creation and delivery process. How are these becoming more efficient? This is really focused on defense manufacturers and how they can streamline and standardize across programs throughout the enterprise, and even across their supply chains.
 
Consolidating their tech pubs applications on a common software will result in several benefits, including improved agility, quality and security across programs. Content collaboration and reuse will increase and IT support costs will go down.
 
Consolidated reporting becomes possible, providing deeper insights. These capabilities can then be expanded to their providers to streamline data exchange throughout the extended supply chain.
 
Both the US Navy and the US Air Force have seen the value of rationalization and consolidation. The Navy with their Standard NAVSEA Integrated Publishing Process, or SNIPP, and the Air Force with their Technical Order Authoring and Publishing, or TOAP, solutions.
 
AI is frustrating to maintenance officers. The special AI "task forces" and their massive budgets are great, but it's time to get honest about the rest of the military. Ask any every day soldier, sailor, airman or Marine their opinion of how things run on a daily basis and you will hear complaints about pay, lost orders or awards, broken gear, outdated software or perhaps the blue screen of death that happens when Outlook is open along-side too many websites.
 
That doesn't mean that AI isn't a good fit or shouldn't be pursued. But it does mean that AI success requires a force readiness approach. First, AI isn't new and it isn't new to the military. Marketing hype around the term has experienced a surge lately but the fact that something wasn't tagged as artificial intelligence historically does not take away the fact that it was actually AI.
 
Groups and organizations lauding artificially intelligent solutions are popping up everywhere with promises to create the next battlefield advantage using next generation weapons, gear, or satellites. The term artificial intelligence (AI) splashes the headlines with promises that we're moments away from revolutionizing the battlefield.
 
Despite the hype, AI is simply a field of science that trains systems to perform some human task through learning and automation. There are varying degrees of sophistication but most of the data mining, network analysis and mapping technology used over the past decade or more have all been forms of AI.
 
Weapons systems and combat vehicles have been leveraging AI for many years as well. So don't let the noise change the focus from the mission need.
 
There are varying degrees of sophistication but most of the data mining, network analysis and mapping technology used over the past decade or more have all been forms of AI.
 
Weapons systems and combat vehicles have been leveraging AI for many years as well.
 
Soldiers on the front lines need their supporting forces to be trained and armed with the appropriate technology to support the advances being operationalized on the battlefield.
 
If we look specifically at the maintenance field, the vast majority of military maintenance planners/crews are still using the same products and systems from a decade ago.
 
Efforts around collecting maintenance data are ripe for sophistication, but what about the analysts that have to sift through and make sense of that additional data? How has their training changed to account for a more technologically advanced battlespace? How have their products and solutions integrated requirements and workflows with real time information to truly augment their efforts?
 
The majority of data mining and visualization tools on the market have flashier interfaces than we saw a decade ago, but the true sophistication of what the vast majority of maintenance analysts have been offered doesn't really reflect the decade of advancements seen in the commercial market.
 
Monitor human developed courses of action (COAs) beside computer generated courses of action including the criteria for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness and completeness. A machine will see information differently than its human counterparts and may identify behavior differences present in data that human analysts may miss due to the sheer volume and complexity of reporting maintainers are presented with. Like-wise, humans have strengths of experience, intuition, rules of engagement and the context of real world dynamics that a computer generated COA cannot interpret. Comparing both options helps find the best COA.
 
You don't have to be a part of a high profile AI initiative to find value in the science for nearly all areas of the military.
 
At the Defense Digital Service, we often hear stories about quagmires created by the services when approaching modern software development. The services want to begin building software solutions in commercial cloud environments, but struggle with where to begin. The Defense Department’s first instinct is to pay a vendor to “transfer” current software to the cloud, rather than redirecting talent internally to build applications in a cloud-based environment.
 
Earlier this year, the Defense Digital Service and the Marine Corps had an opportunity to address the modernization of the software development process.
 
.It was clear to Defense Digital Service engineers that the Marine Corps had accepted that any software update or acquisition would be infuriatingly slow, potentially insecure, and expensive.
 
The Defense Digital Service engineers and product managers convinced the Marine Corps that it not only has the talent to code, but by developing software internally rather than purchasing cloud software from a commercial vendor, so Marine Corps could actually acquire a product of even greater quality and security.
 
Marines developed the System for Operational Logistics Orders, or SOLO. The joint project became an opportunity to reimagine software development in the department. We leveraged internal talent, we built the application in the cloud, and we tested a novel software authorization process to deliver a new cloud-based software application much more quickly than anticipated.
 
The Defense Digital Service and the assembled talent wanted to develop a software prototype that would both solve an existing problem and serve as a pilot for cloud-based development.
 
The Global Combat Support System was an ideal test case. It serves as a single point of entry for all logistics requirements and is known to be a big pain for Marines to work with. many marines’ existence. Every transaction involving a DoD-approved item, from motors to uniforms to ammo, goes through the Global Combat Support System. The system is essential.
 
The system is supposed to allow for rapid and flexible operations. In reality, it suffers from poor user experience: timeout issues during the login process, latency issues as more users log in during the day, and data errors that must be corrected regularly by support services. Because the system was built more than a decade ago, it has not kept up with improved software, web, and infrastructure capabilities.
 
Processing the receipt of goods at a supply house became our focus area after observing firsthand the pain of processing deliveries at a military workforce supply house.
 
Three drums of motor lubricant came into the warehouse for the motor pool that day. It took a marine 20 minutes to log the receipt of the drums. When an officer walked the 100 yards from the motor pool to the warehouse for the drums, it took the two of them 15 minutes to file the hand-off.
 
Once the officer was back at the motor pool, he logged into the same system to acknowledge the drums were delivered. Essentially, it took two marines the better part of an hour to manually do the work of a barcode.
 
It was settled: Receipt of goods was a daily task that impacted lots of users, fixing it allowed us to tackle the issues of logging into the system, it would not require changes to the legacy product, and it looked feasible to deliver in 90 days.
 
After meeting with users, the team sketched out a project workflow, information architecture, and the journey map for both the user and data.
After multiple Defense Digital Service development, security, and operations experts reviewed the infrastructure and security for the proposed system architecture, the team spent some time building out the software application.
 
 User experience discussions, design interviews, and individual storyboard exercises helped the team develop wireframes — or basic outlines — that were tested by users at the supply house.
 
With the infrastructure built and the front-end designs fully tested, it was time to combine the robust infrastructure with the web-based software application. Then, the team encountered a roadblock.
 
Even with the receipt of goods functionality finished, the team was unable to integrate the software application with the Global Combat Support System until the “authority to operate” was released by an authorizing official for the Marine Corps.
 
An authority to operate is a permit to use a product issued in DoD when implementing new technologies. Today, technology systems are put into production only after such an authority is issued. This process requires a technology team to respond to hundreds of security questions, or risk management framework controls. The process usually only begins when a system is complete or near-complete, resulting in a long lead time to implement new technologies.
 
The team planned to circumvent the slowdown by initiating the authority to operate at the same time as the software application functionality. The Marine Corps software compliance team decided to use SOLO to test out these parallel software development and compliance review processes, known as a rapid authority to operate. Following a successful demo, the authorizing official issued the authority to operate.
 
Having delivered SOLO, a secure cloud-based application that improves the “receipt of goods” function in the Global Combat Support System, we dramatically reduced the steps it takes to receive goods into a warehouse and distribute them to the ordering unit. SOLO combined more than a dozen steps into a single process, trimming the task down from 20 minutes to a matter of seconds.
 
More than a function in itself, SOLO was a pilot to prove a process of developing cloud-based software for the military. The application itself addresses one problem — receipt of goods — but it also contains a software-based server, database, and network infrastructure that can support up to a thousand functions. The Marine Corps can add on functions at a pace set by its needs and resources, without having to wait. The authorization to operate for SOLO was built around its infrastructure, so as long as the infrastructure stays intact, additional functions or changes need no further authorization.
 
The Team built SOLO within 90 days — an unheard-of feat for federal government software development. It represents a significant reduction of the multiyear timelines usually required to field a product from conception to completion to delivery.
 
The Defense Digital Service took on the SOLO project to prove a few points. First, the Marine Corps does have the technical talent in its ranks needed to build first-class software. Second, the Department of Defense can build software quickly and with greater flexibility for the future by looking inward, instead of to vendors. Third, modern software development requires adapting cumbersome processes like the Authority to Operate so engineers can work fast and iterate quickly to user and security needs.
 
This project should shape not only future Marine Corps efforts, but future Department of Defense projects for years to come. The team demonstrated a cost-effective, iterative procedure that can quickly field a precise capability needed to accomplish a task.
 
Now is time to empower military talent to build the modern software development capabilities the Pentagon so desperately needs. There is much work to be done.
 

1. Commit resources to recruit, grow, and retain experienced leaders who understand the battlefield, are technologically competent, and can manage risk like battlefield commanders
2. Create places to practice where they will learn by failing before the risk of failure becomes too great.  
3. Find, advance, and reward those who prove to be highly adaptive and creative in addressing emerging problems across the force—especially in the absence of guidance.
4. Support this cadre of leaders with the resources required to execute their mission
5. Develop a doctrine for innovation
6.  Establish a common language for communicating results of efforts
7. Connect outcomes of their actions to warfighting objectives.
8. Develop and resource a professional military and civilian roadmap for lifelong learning
9. Embed this doctrine in the skill sets of its entire workforce: operators, developers, acquisition officials, etc.
10. Establish workshops to provide guidance for practical, everyday problems

Senior leaders from across DoD arrived at the command and control hub for an ABMS overview and abbreviated exercise. All at once in a well-secured room, they watched real-time data pour in, and out of, the command cell.
 
They observed information from platforms and people flowing instantly and simultaneously across air, land, sea and space that provided shared situational updates as events occurred whether the information originated from jets, or passing satellites, or from sea and ground forces on the move.
 
Then, the group transitioned to outdoor tents to continue the exercise in a rugged environment, where senior leaders could also inspect first-hand and learn about high-speed equipment and networks that enabled the exercise.
 
Mission command is in part command empowering subordinates to act based on local initiative. Yet, there remains conflicting conceptions of what command and control means and what mission command even is. The military needs to reestablish a shared understanding of command and control.

The military decision making process is accomplished by members battle staff and participants from the different processes and occurs as needed. The output from this process is a division order. It is followed by a separate military decision making process that results in the commanders order for its subordinate units.

Command is what commanders do. Command and control is how they do it. Communications are the means by which they do it. These are simple facts about the nature of military leadership, but the fact that they are almost always used in conjunction leads to confusion about the difference between them.

In fact, command, command and control, and communications are frequently conflated, sometimes ignored, and oftentimes confined alongside a collection of unrelated concepts. This results in broad confusion about what the necessary elements of command and control are, and leads to people mistaking those same elements for the means of command and control (like communications and computers).
 
Command and control is a way of describing how commanders exercise authority over the military forces they lead. It can achieve a few things: First, it can mitigate, but never eliminate, the inherent uncertainty of war. Second, it is a way to manage friction, another timeless characteristic of war. Third, it allows commanders to make decisions based on an evolving situation. Fourth, effective command and control prevents surprise while enabling commanders to seize opportunities as they unfold. The degree to which command and control performs any of these functions depends on how it is exercised.

 
Digital Twin simulation system architecture integrating well-known simulation tools provides virtual testbeds for the simultaneous simulation of a network of different Digital Twins interacting with each other, ie, network of different systems, their components and their working space. This approach has proven useful for the simulation-based optimisation of parameters, system structure etc.

Digital twins allow you to access large amounts of data in real time. But you don’t have to keep all that data to yourself. In fact, you’d be wise to share it. Creating a digital twin network makes it easy to share data with internal team members, external supply chain partners, and even members of a warfighting customers squad. With access to the same insight, you, your partners, and your customers can collaboratively improve products and processes.
 
To develop Digital Twin Simulation with a smart connected product, one that hooks up with a network platform, just build it. Just piece it together. Throw some sensors on a product. Wire that to some kind of embedded system. Wire that to your antenna. Start sending data to network platforms. You and your organisation can actually learn a lot from going through that exercise.
 
While that needs to be done, you will quickly run into limitations on the experiments you can conduct with physical prototypes. Swapping out a sensor isn’t easy when it’s soldered in place. There might not be room, physically, for the sensor you really need for accurate measurement. You might run into too much electromagnetic interference for the antenna you planned to use or the pump’s performance, condition and environment e.g., temperature, voltage, inlet pressure, etc.
 
Key goal is to demonstrate the real-world value of the hard-to-describe effort in tangible, understandable ways. JADC2, previously named multi-domain operations command and control, relies on ABMS to develop software and algorithms so that artificial intelligence and machine learning can compute and connect vast amounts of data from sensors and other sources at a speed and accuracy far beyond what is currently attainable.

“It is the core of adversaries warfighting strategy to gain an advantage in terms of their ability to affect decision-making at strategic, operational and tactical level. “The way we can counter that is through our own capabilities — call them ABMS, JADC2 allow us to maintain an advantage in terms of information.”

While modernizing command and control architecture certainly affects all aspects of the defense enterprise, which operates at the forward-most stages of conflict, needs this capability as much as any component.
 
Services need to vector away from current paradigm of warfighting and re-align itself for great powers competition, which requires a command and control capability that enables both the initial introduction of special operations, as well as supports the facilitation of mass conventional forces into denied operational environments and the broader strategic defense architecture.

Air Force has spearheaded critical efforts to upgrade the dated Department of Defense’s command and control systems. These efforts are better known as the Advanced Battle Management System [ABMS) under Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). In short, the Advanced Battle Management System aims to fuse information sharing across the full spectrum of warfighting, from the fighter pilot's cockpit to the echelons of  maneuver commanders down to the tactical-level operators.
 
The critical factor going forward is to create a failsafe system that gets – and shares - real time information across multiple spaces and platforms simultaneously. Achieving this will remove barriers that can keep information from personnel and units that need it. For example, once in place, the new command and control ability will allow F-16 and F-35 pilots to see the same information at the same time in the same way along with a submarine commander, a space officer controlling satellites and  Special Forces unit on the ground.
 
The reality is that this endeavor to create a centralized, data-sharing command and control system that supports a joint, decentralized fighting force may fall victim to the same flaws of predecessor command and control systems. This is inevitable if the systems requirements' determination remains at the strategic level, without end-user input in the system capability development process
.
Despite the recent on-ramp successes, highlighted by sensor-linking and simulated hypersonic missile intercepts developing a command and control system driven by top-down strategic requirements will not serve the end-users who will rely on its capabilities most in the next conflict.
 
Comprehensive information sharing, communication channels, and real-time mission data sharing up and down the chain of command is the warfighter’s ideal. However, operating beyond the bubble of battlespace supremacy will undoubtedly be the construct of a great power conflict. The department of defense has grown accustomed to battlespace dominance in all domains, and the next conflict is all but guaranteed to feature denied battlefields. The United States will not determine the time, place or speed of the next conflict, and it certainly will not have battlefield supremacy as in recent years.

Expecting a command and control infrastructure to meet uncontested is all but certain to drag the outcome of any Joint All-Domain Command and Control into the depths of services-driven proprietary requirements.

Past battlefield realities have inevitably fostered an increased dependence on technology. “Officers grasping for more certainty instead of comfort operating in uncertainty.” Command and control systems should not dictate or inhibit warfighting. Such systems should serve as a tool for decision making and enable decentralization.

By the induced artificiality of command and control dominance,  the enterprise became inherently technologically centralized. As such, any effort to create a command and control system that replicates this technological dependence will place the defense department well behind the curve in any future conflict.

The Advanced Battle Management System needs to function as a tactical resource that fuses tactical components in a denied battlespace while providing comprehensive situational awareness at operational and strategic levels of command. It must do this without curtailing the battlefield flexibility of the tactical actors. In short, the small-scale connection bubbles of data-sharing for command and control are far more critical than the top-down, reach back data sharing, and the ABMS architecture should develop in this manner.

End-user requirements development: Even if they have not yet begun, the special operations enterprise is already linked to potential conflict with power competitors. Whether the command and control systems are prepared now is irrelevant, which is why determining requirements for the Advanced Battle Management System belongs in the hands of those who will need it soonest.

When escalatory incidents, liminal confrontations or potential for open conflict emerge from the theoretical and draw the United States into the fray, special operations will be the first to close with whoever the enemy might be. The battlespace will be a denied environment, and the piecemeal, individual-service driven mess of command and control systems will fail in the attempt to curb the potential for fire storms.

In a similar way, a command and control system built around strategic networks that fails to support the lowest-level, end user components of warfighting in a denied environment will be equally unsuited to the task of conflict in power competition.

In order for the Advanced Battle Management System to realize its potential as the all-domain control system for the future, special operations should drive the requirements for its minimum capacity. Additional capabilities and tailored, modular requirements to suit the greater defense architecture can expand the family of systems following special operations-driven proof of concept.

But to truly effect a modernized, capable command and control network that supports the defense endeavor, it needs to be driven by the end-users who will need it soonest, and certainly the most
.
The Special Operations Command has a long, established history of innovating against rapidly changing battlefield requirements. The Joint Special Operations Command  has not ridden luck to the top of the global crucible of warfare. Rather it has adapted to enemies, environments, available/constrained resources to meet threats abroad in service to the national security of the United States.

The appeal of the Advanced Battle Management System as a truly user-fused yet decentralized, secure system of systems, which enables comprehensive situational awareness, is too important of an opportunity to be squandered by the malingering of services in dictating another piecemeal solution during budgetary squabbles.

Unique capabilities for complex problem-solvingAt this phase of development, the Air Force’s sibling services are either undermining roles and responsibilities in long-range, multi-domain capabilities or the program itself remains too broadly arrayed against the nebulous of what “multi-domain” is, or the ways and means of achieving it.

 In short, other than recognizing  a joint all-domain concept, the Advanced Battle Management System is no closer to bringing the fused capability to the defense enterprise, and all of the agile approaches to funding empty concept exercises won’t prevent congressional budgetary reviews from strangling limited progress to date. In order to ensure this endeavor is capable of reaching validity as a command and control system, the requirements generation belongs in the hands of the members who will need it to function effectively and immediately.

Special operations have exclusively lived the joint paradigm learning lessons from missions about effective command and control via an established joint paradigm were crucial for the enterprise capabilities to prepare for a global arena of rapidly changing threats. Adaptation, integration, and innovation have been the special operations special mark for decades. The special operations enterprise is less about doing spectacular things commonly, but they do common things spectacularly well.

Developing a functional, user-capabilities driven, secured battlefield management system requires a common-sense approach, done spectacularly well. Through these adaptive, exhaustively rehearsed principles, no component of the department of defense is as well suited for determining how the Advanced Battle Management System can support the national security architecture, and what this system needs to be able to do.

To make the Advanced Battle Management System work for Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Air Force needs to utilize the Joint-force expertise of end-user special operators to define baseline system requirements. While plenty of interested customers are intrigued by and committed to the program's success, scope creep within the life cycle of program development is already threatening the system that could make or break the department of defense’s success in a great powers confrontation.

The challenge of restructuring these modernization efforts lies in the overall responsibility of the program's success, calling for end-user representatives from the Joint Special Operations community to become key test and evaluation participants, and given the preponderance of requirements determination to meet battlefield realities.

Simple, logical solutions most often resolve the answer to a complicated and modular problem. The nature of special operations as joint experts provides the defense department with a collection of experts who are uniquely capable of dictating what is needed now, and down the line, from a joint command and control system

Once that system is demonstrated to work at the tactical level and incorporated into secure domain architecture, it can expand to the remainder of the defense enterprise as needed on the strategic, global services scale. Development from the bottom-up prevents the failures of previous attempts at joint command and control and sets the Advanced Battle Management System up for future success across the various user levels of the department of defense.

1. What is the relative priority for JADC2 compared with other major DoD programs?
2. Have all of the military services embraced the JADC2 concept?
3. Is there some resistance within DoD?
4. The Army and Air Force have announced programs to implement JADC2; what are the Navy’s plans to implement this new command and control concept?
5. What personnel, equipment, facilities, and training resources would be required to achieve JADC2?
6. What is the estimated cost for force-wide implementation?
7. What are the costs of lifecycle upkeep of JADC2?
8. When could the network become operational?
9. What role would AI have in JADC2 development?
10. How much human-in-the-loop is necessary if sensors are linked to shooters in real-time?

 

The Joint All-Domain Operations concept, provides commanders access to information to allow for simultaneous and sequential operations using surprise and the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities across all domains—to try to gain advantages and influence and control over the operational environment.
 
JADC2 architecture would enable commanders to 1) rapidly understand the battlespace, 2) direct forces faster than the enemy, and 3) deliver synchronized combat effects across all domains.
 
Communications, including digital processing systems, are only the means through which command and control can be accomplished. They are not command and control itself. That is a behavioural activity. Being clear about the precise meanings of command terms is more than just an excessive concern with minor details and rules.

Department of Defense needs a better understanding of the types and limits of command, as well as an appreciation for what kind of command the military is actually practicing, before it can expect to further modernize the force.

However, runaway acronyms highlight how the concept of command has been hijacked to justify other concepts. Consider how C2 (command and control) becomes C2I (command, control, and intelligence) becomes C4I2 (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and interoperability) becomes C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), and then multiple types of C5ISR where the fifth “c” stands for, perhaps, cyber, or combat systems, Into this ever-expanding conceptual sea, might we suggest future additions like critical infrastructure, circuits, clouds, computational resources, and cooling systems?
 
Battle Partners benefit from a network of digital twins with enhanced visibility. If an asset malfunctions during an operation, your digital provider knows it needs to mobilise a team to fix the equipment. If your troops hit a target ahead of schedule, your logistics team knows it can pick up/deliver combat effects early.
 
Digital twin networks help you glean invaluable insight from your customers. By monitoring how customers interact with your product directives, you can remove underused features from future iterations or direct new products that highlight popular features.
 
Enabling an open, collaborative environment through a network of digital twins offers you the chance to transform engineering, operations, and everything else in between.
 
Key drivers are “big data” analysed using artificial intelligence; high capacity connectivity; new human-machine interaction modes such as touch interfaces and virtual reality systems; and improvements in transferring digital instructions to the physical world.
 
The model is powered with network data fetched from sensors attached to the pump. With respect to developing products linked to networks, we’re in the early stages.

But soon, some companies are going to want to sidestep development problems they’re experiencing. They’re going to realise months of delay completely undermines their competitive position in the marketplace.
As a result, those companies are going to want to adopt more proven and standardised practices. Virtual firing ranges with Digital Twins are not there yet. But given the rush of companies toward network solutions, you should expect the demand for this practice to only increase.
 
The Air Force is ramping up its efforts to test and field command and control backbone to seamlessly connect equipment and pool together its data to form a complete picture of the battlespace.
 
The ABMS vision involves networking every shooter and sensor to a cloud computing environment and using artificial intelligence to ensure that relevant information is immediately sent to whichever platform needs it. In practice, that could look like compiling data from a drone and a naval destroyer to help cue a fighter jet to lock its missile on a nearby target.
 
“There’s so many people in between information, moving between different nodes in the decision chain. “The idea with ABMS is that the people are no longer the glue. The information flows everywhere all at once. The people are the assessors, the analyzers, the feedback providers that help the analytics that are doing the pushing to get better and better.”
 
ABMS also includes hardware updates including radios, antenna, and more robust networks that enable unimpeded data flow to operators. Aside from tools and tech, JADC2 also demands a cultural change among troops must embrace and respond to multi-faceted battlespaces driven by information shared across the joint force.
 
ABMS will require software and algorithms so that artificial intelligence and machine learning can compute and connect vast amounts of data from sensors and other sources at a speed and accuracy far beyond what is currently attainable” as well as hardware updates that include “radios, antenna, and more robust networks.”
 
Battlegroup stock of radios and other tactical communications systems is slated for an upgrade. Through a series of experiments, soldier feedback is being used to determine what its future communications systems will look like on tomorrow’s battlefields.
 
The teams are pursuing different types of servers down to the battalion level to increase the mobility of the unit. Typically, battalions need to rely on a brigade headquarters, but integrating new servers would eliminate that need.
 
“The brigade would have to be out in the field for all the battalions to be able to talk to each other. This breaks that paradigm by moving some of that compute capability down to the battalions … so they can operate
 
ABMS will lay the groundwork of systems and connectivity through the cloud so the military services can use things like artificial intelligence to process information and deliver important information to troops on the edge.
 
We have very little artificial intelligence that would go to war today. We haven’t laid in the digital infrastructure to enable it. That means cloud, that means transport, that means software-defined systems that are adaptable.
 
The Air Force passed data back and forth with the Navy between two fifth-generation fighter jets using a translating link, it pulled in data from a low-earth-orbit satellite for the operation, it used a cloud-based command and control application instead of a local app and, finally, made command and control mobile by working from a tent.
 
While the Air Force has some big picture ideas of the products that will comprise ABMS — such as cloud computing tools, machine learning technologies and apps — it hasn’t set firm requirements or laid out exactly what products it needs to build out the system.
 
Digital architecture, standards and concepts: The Air Force is looking for digital modeling and simulation technologies, trade studies and other standards development tools and processes that it can use to map out the entire ABMS architecture virtually and test how it would work in practice.
 
Sensor integration: In essence, the service wants any hardware or software that will allow different equipment to share data. “A key interest of ABMS is the compatibility and interoperability capabilities through the use of open interfaces to enable improved control of systems and the processing of their data.
 
Data: The Air Force is also interested in “cloud-based data repositories” that could pass information across domains to the different services. These libraries of data points will be “meta tagged,” analyzed and then fused using AI algorithms to help inform military decision makers.
 
Secure processing: The service needs technologies that will be able to move the appropriate data across technologies with different security levels, ensuring that classified information stays protected while sharing what is feasible. It also includes deployment, training and support services for all devices and processing environments.
 
Connectivity: These tools include line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight communications networks, as well as technologies that can turn a platform into a data node, reduce latency, provide improved anti-jamming capabilities or other functions that improve the speed and breadth of communications gear.
 
Applications: iPhone analogies have become Defense Department clichés at this point, but the Air Force is hoping to commission the design and development of apps to process, fuse and help present data to different audiences across domains.
 
Effects integration: These involve networked weapons that can be integrated with existing platforms for a greater combined effect. “This includes, but is not limited to smart munitions and low-cost autonomous platforms” that can carry out functions such as data relay.
 
Build it and they will come. That, in essence, is how the Air Force plans to get the Army, Navy, and Marines on board with its plan for a comprehensive Advanced Battle Management System to move data at machine speed across the globe — from subs to satellites, from aircraft to ground troops, and from ships to shore.
 
The catch? This vision is not only extremely ambitious, it’s also still quite vague – and critics in Congress are worried that ABMS, which is running behind schedule, was already too ambitious and too vague even when it was just trying to connect different systems within the Air Force.
 
ABMS originally stood for Airborne Battle Management System and referred to the mission long performed by the E8-C JSTARS fleet to carry powerful radars for ground and air surveillance, plus the technicians and communications to relay reports of enemy positions across the force. The data JSTARS provides is highly prized, but the aircraft themselves are old, lumbering and highly vulnerable. So the Air Force wanted to exploit modern electronic communications and miniaturization to replace JSTARS with a whole network of different sensors on satellites, manned aircraft, and drones.
 
That task is hard enough. Trying to pull in data from even more kinds of sensors and transmitting it to an even wider range of customers is going to be much harder.
 
But if the Air Force can get this ambitious architecture to actually work, it could become the indispensable digital nervous system of the future fight. By connecting all four services’ forces in all five domains of war – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace – such a Multi-Domain or All-Domain Command & Control (MDC2) system could make possible new kinds of high-speed, seamlessly coordinated combat operations that would give the US a much-needed edge
 
The Navy talks about Distributed Maritime Operations, the Army about Multi-Domain Operations and the Joint Staff about Joint All-Domain C2. “The nice thing is everybody’s rolling in the same direction.”
 
 “If you’re not established on this environment, if you don’t expose your data in an open manner, that you don’t follow the standards of an open systems architecture, you’re going to find yourself off on the sidelines and not being relevant to the fight.”
 
Today, troops from different branches can usually talk to one another over the radio, but that’s a slow and error-prone way of relaying detailed data like the locations of friendly forces and hostile targets.
 
The military has multiple systems for transmitting data directly from one computer to another – machine to machine – over radio and landline, but each focuses on a specific function, like navigation, logistics, or artillery planning, and they don’t connect with other systems in the same service, let alone with those of other services. All too often data has to be laboriously retyped by hand, or simply scrawled on sticky notes and passed from one staff officer to the next.
 
“We don’t have that machine to machine connection. “So that’s one of the other areas that we will specifically target as we build out this Advanced Battle Management System, which is really   the technical engine behind our particular Multi-Domain Command & Control [approach], ensuring that Army systems, Navy systems, Air Force systems speak to each other.”
 
“The capabilities that we’re building and using, we’re actually designing into it the capability to snap together like Lego blocks, both our Air Force capabilities as well as our sister services and international partners to reinforce the requirement that we all operate on and work from a certain set of standards, and we’re continuing to grow those standards.”
 
Now, agreeing on a common set of technical standards is just one step towards building something that complies with those standards and actually works. Smartphones working everywhere they go, switching automatically from network to network, and providing everything from the latest music to real-time navigation around traffic jams. But that ease of use is built on top of decades of hard work and heavy investment in an infrastructure of towers, routers, servers, and so on.
 
“What we have generally not done in the defense tech community is a really focused effort to invest in all the steps that have to happen. “We want connectivity, we want artificial intelligence, but you can’t jump to an end state” without doing all the other steps first.
 
“The fiscal year 2019 budget request for the Air Force cancelled the long-planned Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS] recapitalization and included a small amount of funding in existing programs as a bridge to a new concept for comprehensive battle management command and control…the Advanced Battle Management System,” the House Armed Services Committee wrote in its report.
 
But the budget request provided limited programmatic details on ABMS. The committee is concerned with the lack of discernible benchmarks to assess and measure progress.”  wouldn’t be ready before the aging JSTARS fleet had to retire.
 
At the moment, the Air Force has no program to build a new JSTARS aircraft and very little funding to develop ABMS. Now, there is a lot that can and should be done before dumping piles of money into building anything: the highly technical, work to define data architecture and standards.
 
Unless all five services adopt ABMS it will do little good for the Joint force, no matter how technologically advanced the system is. In building the system, the Air Force faces a basic choice between placing the weight of effort on the top, beginning at the strategic level and working down, or the inverse, beginning at the tactical level and building up. ABMS is more likely to be adopted if our service builds the system from the bottom-up.
 
When we say “build bottom-up,” we mean that this process of iterative experimentation should occur at the tactical level. The end users of ABMS—Joint sensors and shooters—should be the ones cycling through the new techniques and technologies that will come to form ABMS.
 
Building bottom-up also does not mean that the DoD should ignore the importance of sound strategy or the skillful pairing of strategic ends with operational means. The justification for building bottom-up is based on the virtues of building from the tactical level, not on any importance inhering in that level during the planning or execution of military operations.
 
The advantages of building bottom-up come from the checks and balances that such an approach would place on the scope and systematic complexity of future ABMS development. As with any good system of checks and balances, a bottom-up build anticipates counterproductive yet alluring impulses, and then relies on systemic solutions rather than any one person’s good judgment.
 
A bottom-up build requiring tactical end-users to perform experiments in the first place, would provide a check on this type of requirements change. This brings us to the converse—but still positive—outcome. Some early testing can reveal those things which must be addressed in the system lest they be dismissed by hand-waving over the drawing board during discussion of more lofty outcomes. The baseline features that do not work are equally likely to run the cost train off its track.

Another counterproductive impulse is the tendency towards secrecy. ABMS is so locked up behind classification is part of the problem. The more inaccessible the system, the less attractive it will seem in comparison to legacy technology that is easier to access. An old push-to-talk radio at an operator’s fingertips will seem more appealing than a new C2 system locked behind multiple vault doors.
 
Experimentation at the tactical level, where operators are less likely than senior Pentagon officials to have access to special programs, would make plain the trade-off between security and usability, forcing hard looks at what absolutely must be classified.
 
A final counter-productive impulse is the tendency towards service-centrism.  Many times, programs are broken apart so that services can have more control and in turn more budgetary influence. One way of checking this impulse is to move development away from the Pentagon and out to the tactical level, where the only imperative is to survive and defeat the enemy.
 
The importance of widespread adoption is baked into ABMS’s founding concept. The Air Force intends ABMS to be the technical backbone of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), a new command and control philosophy emphasizing decision speed across all the domains—the Air Force in fact defines JADC2 as “the art and science of decision making… [in order to act] faster than an opponent.”
 
Widespread adoption is fundamental because, as long as people rather than machines are responsible for critical choices, and deciding fast will require the widespread diffusion of decision authority. The only way to make a lot of critical choices fast is to have a lot of people making those choices. If only a few central decision makers can access ABMS, decisions will bottleneck and ABMS will fail JADC2.
 
Often, new military technologies do not by themselves change the balance of military power. It is instead the widespread adoption and integration of new military technologies that shifts the balance of power. It is only when “a round technological peg” fits into a round doctrinal and operational hole that militaries become more powerful.
 
No matter the technological promise of ABMS, if the average tactical operator does not think it serves his goals, or he never sees it in the first place because the system has been placed behind a firewall of classification, the impact of ABMS on the military’s ability to coerce or defeat peer adversaries will be lost.
 
DoD is updating surface force for the information age by inserting the latest weapons, sensors, and command and control systems into weapons to field new information-management systems and networks based on commercially developed processing, routing, switching, and systems-management technologies to enable future sensors, communication systems, and weapons to support long-advertised "network-centric warfare" concept.

These program components address offensive, defensive, and offshore support operations.. Linking operations an integrated architecture of information networks for combat, command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) missions. The network will provide connectivity to joint-service and national sensor and battle-management systems.

A prospective provider can’t begin to map out where your network should be headed until they completely comprehend the details surrounding your current situation. Make sure the exercise reiterates an awareness of the following issues:
 
1. Do you have an existing network or are implementing one from scratch

2. How many users are expected to utilize the network and in what capacities

3. What is entire scope for your network, including locations and number of buildings

4. What your user profiles/ Priority Levels look like

5. What types of systems and applications will rely on network usage

6. Types of data expected to be transmitted

7. Level of security necessary for your specific operations

8. Storage, scalability and speed requirements

9. Impact on operations if network has an outage
​
10. Level of ongoing maintenance and support

​The ABMS systems provide commanders an unprecedented view of the battlefield, which will enable them to support the battle as it is being fought and anticipate future requirements. The systems allow commanders to see where the enemy can disrupt operations and, most important, where the commander can intervene to sway the fight in favor of victory.
 
Exercising command and control of battlegroups supporting fast-moving combat units on a far-flung, asymmetric battlefield is one of the greatest challenges facing the services. Units operating in a digital environment must have the proper Battle Command  systems to provide the commander with a view of the battlefield.
 
The system supports the warfighting command and control and battle management process by rapidly processing large volumes of logistics, personnel, and battlefield information. It facilitates quicker, more accurate decision making by providing an effective means for force-level commanders and combat service support commanders to determine the sustainability and supportability of current and planned operations.
 
Success of the ABMS experiment ultimately rides on a makeshift control center displaying a digital picture of the battlefield that seems  mired in the past, with operators manually watching data feeds, making phone calls to correlate information with other troops watching different data feeds, and producing endless PowerPoint slides to convey information from stovepiped systems to higher ups.
 
“It takes this huge staff to be able to come up with a solution. And if you’ve ever worked in a large organization or huge staff, decisions don’t happen quickly because it takes a long time to get that information together.”
 
The whole point of the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System is to speed up that cycle, allowing potentially life-saving decisions to be made more quickly.
 
Digital Twin Simulations are mostly applied to the case where more insight is obtained from a physical operating product and a network platform.  To improve the model’s functionality, the digital twin network is integrated with enterprise and shop floor management systems. Fetching contextual operational data the digital twin could predict how a pump will function under varied external conditions.
 
The digital twin-based predictive network takes in real-time sensor records about the working conditions of a pump and analyzes it against historical data about the pump’s failure modes and their criticality, and contextual data fetched from enterprise and shop floor management systems e.g., pump’s maintenance data.
 
A neural network detects abnormal patterns in the incoming sensor data and reflects the patterns in predictive models, which are then used to predict failures. This way, if a pump’s current configuration is likely to lead to a failure, the digital twin network localizes the issue, assesses its criticality, notifies technicians, and recommends a mitigating action.
 
Advances in the business of battlefield network connect potential means combat effects can now occur anywhere with widely distributed production lines near the warfighter, transportation hubs or for protection in case of attack.
 
The service conducted its first ABMS experiment, testing a total of 28 different capabilities, including connecting the SpaceX Starlink constellation to an AC-130 gunship, and testing a mechanism that allows F-35 and F-22 fighter jets to stealthily exchange data.
 
The cruise missile attack was represented by six BQM-167 target drones which simulated the flight characteristics of a cruise missile.
 
If all went well, a collection of networked sensors — some legacy systems that have been in place for years, some developmental and some never before seen — would be able to see the missile coming, and artificial intelligence embedded into the military’s command-and-control system would precisely identify the missile, track it and almost instantaneously present a menu of options to a commander who will chose how to defeat it.
 
“It’s really important on on-ramps that we have a healthy combination of successes and failures, and today really struck a balance. One major success was the first-ever kill of a surrogate cruise missile threat by a high-velocity projectile fired by an Army M109 Paladin, a 155mm howitzer.
 
“The fact that a very inexpensive, high-density round was able to do that forebodes wonderful things for point defense for the nation’s future base defense and national defense as well.”
 
“But that wasn’t the star of the show. The star of the show was that the data that enabled its kill chain to take effect was enabled by data going into a cloud, being transported over 4G and 5G communications at machine speeds, to culminate in a kill chain that took seconds, not minutes or hours to complete.
 
Among the suite of technologies that facilitated the rapid sharing of data were five contenders for what the Air Force calls OmniaONE, which provides a single picture of the battlefield using multiple feeds that are merged through a system called FuseONE. Another technology, SmartONE, is layered over the top of that picture and uses artificial intelligence to cue the user to potentially helpful information, like a major reduction in the number of bombers that can be observed at an adversary’s installation.
 
But one of the most critical leaps was the introduction of CommandONE, developed to send commands over the Link 16 network to tactical users in the field, but not all systems performed perfectly.
 
“We did have things go down on the range — different links — as we were connecting all of the different centers that were participating. “There’s a silver lining to that because that forces us to show we can reestablish those points.”

 The system experienced challenges with bandwidth in the days leading up to the exercise. “What you’re doing is you’re trying to take things that were designed for an unclassified, optimal, cutting-edge technology, and then you’re cutting it in through SIPR [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network] feeds, designed to be optimized for security. Those two things don’t match up very well. “We were having five minutes of latency in some cases with the feeds that were coming into here.”
 
The artificial intelligence software, though very promising, needs more work before it is mature enough for fielding, but it helped provide commanders formulate potential responses to the incoming cruise missile threat.
 
“With the artificial intelligence and machine-to-machine capabilities, it’s important to point out you can be skeptical of those capabilities, but we are less skeptical after this exercise.
 
“What we saw as it took a look at the threat over and over, it digested more of what that threat capability looked like and gave us a higher percentage of competence.  “And so as a combatant commander, that is very appealing to get a system like that — that will learn and provide an additional capability.”
 
“When we did our dry run, some things weren’t working. They would literally run over, they break open the code. They then repackage it, they push a patch out and then the thing would work. And that would happen over the course of about a minute to be able to do that.”
 
“You’re taking cognitive burden off of the operator when it comes to understanding the environment, ruling out false positives and finding objects that the user has said that they care about. So in the case of this exercise, it’s cruise missiles.  “It’s the ability to fuse those[indicators into objects, classify them as such, and then provide that alert to a human being so that they can make a decision about it.”
 
“Ultimately where we’re going is really automating that decision support to the user to say: ‘Considering what’s available, here’s what is recommended you use, based on an optimal target/weapons pairing.’ And that’s capability that we’re building right now.”
 
The Air Force could be getting close to more broadly fielding some of the capabilities featured in the ABMS experiments, such as the cloud-computing environment. But it will be up to combatant commanders to make the call on what is ready and of most use to operators.
 
Air Force leaders are very confident that multiple ... things that we demonstrated today will be transitioned to combatant commands in future.  “We had five combatant commands sharing the same cloud environments, seeing the same picture, collaborating with the same tools, which is so much better than what we have today.”
 
ABMS systems will connect sensors and weapons from ships, submarines, ground troops, aircraft and commercial satellites to take down simulated enemy bombers, cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles. Systems will be used to enable location- and platform-agnostic command and control and information sharing.
 
The main focus of the events will be to prove that ABMS can enable the service to move at internet speeds as well as share machine-to-machine data through the cloud.
 
Commercially, that type of connectivity is ubiquitous and already available. Data on your phone is shared machine-to-machine going through the cloud but that is not how our military works. Most of the data that we share is via radios — people talking with each other and classified chat capabilities.”
 
During the first ABMS “on-ramp” event, the Air Force was able to demonstrate it could use a combat cloud to share information, including classified and unclassified data, without chat functions or human-to-human radio calls.
 
“We now need to show that we can do that on a broader scale and start putting data analytics and artificial intelligence in the cloud. The service hopes to bring AI capabilities that have developed machine learning systems to analyze reams of drone footage — to bear so data can be fed into algorithms during the exercises.”
 
Air Force also wants to prove that the technology can be successful across domains. While every service has unique needs, they all share a requirement to have information at machine speeds. That means not just raw data from a sensor, but actionable information that has been synthesized and processed.
 
The fact that the services “have specialized needs should not drive us to higher costs or higher development times. A successful ABMS program does not depend on every piece of technology working as hoped.
 
“If we succeed in everything we try to do, we’re not taking enough risk. Leaders want for ABMS is that we have about a 50/50 pass rate.”
 
While the service has taken steps to create an ABMS management structure, the authorities of Air Force offices to plan and execute the program’s efforts are not fully defined,
.
Critics maintain, that unless addressed, the unclear decision-making authorities will hinder the Air Force’s ability to effectively, but did not have access to the program’s classified work.
 
“That makes it challenging because if the technology that you’re moving forward, if a lot of it is in the classified realm … and investigators don’t  have access or clearance to be able to look at it, then the report is going to be on just a very small portion of what Advanced Battle Management System really is.
 
There is a great need for a robust and agile ‘sensor-to-shooter’ network to meet the challenges of future operating environment with support for broad principles of ABMS, but there are several weaknesses within the current ABMS program that must be addressed before they can agree to the budget growth for the program envisioned in the future years defense plan.
 
Air Force needs to articulate a strategy for transitioning technologies that are developed by the program into existing weapon systems.
 
“It is unclear how the costs of fully integrating elements of the ABMS family of systems will be accounted for through their lifecycles across multiple programs without simply being handed down as unfunded mandates to individual program managers.
 
While Air Force has been making progress on ABMS, it needs to firm up the program’s requirements. “You don’t want to start pulling money into something to then just keep changing the requirements, changing the acquisition strategy, changing the expectations for what kind of capabilities it’s going to provide.
 
The service needs to solidify what the Advanced Battle Management System will be in terms of platforms, sensors, payload and communication links sooner rather than later.
 
One challenge the program faces is getting the other services to buy into the Air Force’s vision of joint all-domain command and control. “The question is, where are the other services? Because this is not something that only the Air Force is going to benefit from. There needs to be top-down emphasis on buying into the overarching concept of seamless sharing of information.”
 
If the other services don’t get onboard with JADC2 and the Advanced Battle Management System, there is a risk they won’t be able to connect together in the future.
 
ABMS is a high enough priority for the Air Force that it should be able to move forward. However, “it will probably suffer from a downturn in defense spending, flat defense budgets … similar to just about every other program.
 
FY 2021 will bring the “first test of radar testbed, expansion of multi-level secure tablet to additional security levels, first operational test of edge processing hardware for disconnected/disadvantaged operations, laboratory test of wideband radios and apertures, initial design of sensor payloads for attritable aircraft, and additional technology development and integration based on emerging technology and warfighter needs.”
 
1. Accelerate Adoption and Integration of AI-Enabled Capabilities to Achieve Mission Impact at Speed/Scale Objective

2. Initiate Operations Strategy Element to ensure State-of-the-Art AI Capabilities

3. Develop and Sustain the Enterprise Infrastructure Technology Stack to enable AI Capability

4. Deliver AI-Enabled Capabilities to Address Key Component/Automation mission Initiatives

5. Assure /Certify the AI Algorithms, Data, and Models Developed for JAIC Implementations

6. Deliver a General-Purpose Enterprise Cloud for Compute and Store Capabilities i.e., Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI)

7. Identify Common Niche Capabilities to Inform modernisation of Fit for Purpose (F2P) Cloud Application Development

8. Develop and Deploy a DevSecOps Environment that Enables Application Development and Accreditation at Speed and Scale Integrated with network resilient Operations Strategy

9. Modernize Warfighter tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Infrastructure Systems product Strategies, Roadmaps, Plans, and Architectures

10. Implement DoD Global Enterprise Mass Warning & Notification (EMWN) Capabilities

11. Execute the Satellite Communications (SATCOM) control Modernization Activities Driven by Protected Satellite Communications Services (PSCS) , Wideband Communications Services (WCS) and Narrowband Satellite Communications

12. Define a Minimum Essential Set of Enterprise Data Tags Infrastructure Required to Make Data Visible, Accessible, Understandable, Trusted, and Interoperable

13. Improve Tactical Communications Waveform Export Processes and Develop a Standardized Method to Address CCMD Connection Requests

14. Ensure End-to-End Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) Interoperability at Appropriate Assurance Levels for the Information Being Shared

15. Rationalize Coalition C2 and Intelligence Information Sharing Capabilities deliver MPE Capability and Services

16. Ensure Command Capabilities (NLCC) Assured Connectivity Capability Improves Secure, Survivable Conferencing

17. Enhance the Security of the Supply Chain for Continuity of Operations and Command, Control, and Communications System (SLC3S) Communications Programs

18. Enhance the Delivery and Protection of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capability Implement Modular Open Systems Approaches and Collaborative Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Approach

19. Track and Assist in Modifying Plans for Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) Development and Production

20. Modernize Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) optical Transport Infrastructure

21. Enhance Mid-Point Security by Implementing JRSS and Joint Management System (JMS)

22. Build Out Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Router Network with Quality of Service and Performance Monitoring

23. Eliminate Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Low Speed Time Division Multiplexed (TDM) Circuits

24. Modernize and Optimize DoD Component Networks Consolidate Service Desks into a Single Service Support Environment

25. Provide End-to-End Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) Data Transport (DT) from Multiple Platforms/Sources

26. Build Tactical Relays for Sensor Platform Connectivity to Local Users and the DISN

27. Provide Global Satellite Gateways for Direct Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Connectivity Between AISR Platforms and the DISN

28. Establish Network Operations to Support End-to-End Situational Awareness and Proactive Network Management

29. Improve 5G Mobile Device Security architecture risk management Policies, Processes, and Procedures to Ensure Applications of Tactical Mobility

30. Establish Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Multi-Tiered Architecture Capable of Sharing EMS Data Between All Services and Agencies at All Classification Levels

31. Shift from Component-Centric to Enterprise-Wide Operations and Defense Model Enable Global and Regional Operations Centers

32. Migrate DoD Applications and Systems that Cannot be Hosted in Commercial Cloud Environments to Enterprise Data Centers Optimize for Performance First, Then Cost

33. Re-designate Installation Processing Nodes in Accordance with Current Data Center Optimization Approach

34. Define and Deploy an Optimized Enterprise Voice and Video Solution across the Department (e.g., ECAPS Capability Sets 2 and 3)

35. Define and Deploy an Optimized DoD C2 Voice Solution Eliminate Legacy Analog Phone Switch Infrastructure

36. Improve IT Category Management Objective Description: Category management

37. Continue to Establish ELAs for IT Software, Hardware, Services, Telecommunications and security

38. Transform the DoD Cybersecurity Situational Awareness Architecture through Big Data Analytics to Increase Agility and Strengthen Resilience

39. Improve Endpoint Security and Continuous Monitoring Enhance Enterprise Perimeter Protection Capabilities

40. Establish Enterprise Comply-to-Connect Capability Deploy Insider Threat Detection Capabilities

41. Deploy an End-to-End Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) Infrastructure Implement Automated Account Provisioning

42. Implement Support for Approved Multi-Factor Authentication Capabilities Enhance Enterprise Identity Attribute Service (EIAS)

43. Implement a Data Centric Approach to Collect, Verify, Maintain, and Share Identity and Other Attributes

44. Improve and Enable Authentication to DoD Networks and Resources through Common Standards, Shared Services, and Federation

45. Enable Consistent Monitoring and Logging to Support Identity Analytics for Detecting Insider Threats and External Attacks

46. Protect Sensitive DoD Information and Critical Programs and Technologies on Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Unclassified Networks and Information Systems

47. Support Development of Consistent Procedures to Assess Contractor Compliance with Cybersecurity Pathfinder Requirements for Threat Information Sharing to Non-Cleared Defense Contractors

48. Strengthen the DoD Cybersecurity Portfolio Management Process Expand the Use of Proven Software and Hardware Assurance Methods

49. Implement the Functional Community Maturity Model for the IT and Cybersecurity Categories of the Cyber Workforce Identify/Target Work Role Gaps of Critical Need for Cyber Workforce

50. Enhance Cyber Workforce Recruiting, Retention, Education, Training, Professional Development Update Curriculum Requirements and Maintain Continuous Learning Capabilities

Pentagon planners have been developing a new joint war-fighting concept, a plan meant to guide how the Defense Department fights in the coming decades.

The concept is centering around a key idea — one that requires tossing decades of traditional thinking out the window. “As opposed to what many leaders have been doing their entire career, the biggest difference is that in the future there will be no lines on the battlefield.”
 
The current structure is all about dividing areas of operations. “Wherever we go, if we have to fight, we established the forward edge of the battle area, we’ve established the fire support coordination line, the forward line of troops, and we say: ‘OK, Army can operate here. Air Force can operate here.”

“Everything is about lines” now.  But to function in modern contested environments, “those lines are eliminated.”
 
What does that mean in practice? Pentagon has put forth a vision in which every force can both defend itself and have a deep-strike capability to hold an enemy at bay, built around a unified command-and-control system.
 
“A naval force can defend itself or strike deep. An Air Force that can defend itself or strike deep. The Marines can defend itself or strike deep. “Everybody.”
 
That “everybody” includes coalition framework so this plan only works if it can integrate others. And for the entire structure to succeed, the Pentagon needs to create the Joint All-Domain Command and Control capability currently under development.

 “We had disparate services with their concepts of fighting. We never really had a manner to pull all the services together to fight as a coherent unit.”

The war-fighting concept will directly “drive some of our investments” in the future and tie together a number of ongoing efforts within the department — including the individual combatant command reviews and the Navy’s shipbuilding plan.

There’s some critical components from those reviews — how you command and control the forces, how you do logistics; there are some common themes in there in a joint war-fighting concept.
 
If we had that concept right now, we could use that concept right now to influence the ships that we are building, the amount of ships that we need, what we want the combatant commands to do.

“So this war-fighting concept is filling a gap. Leadership wishes we had it now.  “It would inform all of the decisions that we make today because now is about positioning ourselves in the future for success.”
 
There is an aspect that we need to share of this joint war-fighting concept. We have to preserve the classified nature of It and be careful what is reported, to a degree.
 
It’s Time to Fix the Command Post.
 
Headquarters need to optimize mobility, survivability and interoperability for the future fight.

Under the conditions of the modern battlefield, brigade combat teams (BCTs) need to find ways to mitigate adversary threats through improvements in mobility and survivability as well as a reduction in the signatures of BCT command posts and tactical assembly areas.
 
It’s time to ask whether enough has been done to prepare Army units for the challenge.
 
What Has Been Done?
 
In the past, the acquisitions process often yielded technology and systems in compartmentalized warfighting-function packages rather than holistically. Establishing the Army Futures Command signalled a unified development and acquisition efforts and represented a substantive first step in identifying and solving interoperability problems across the force.
 
Leaders recognized the shortcomings of legacy systems and openly committed themselves to breaking “stovepipes” of data and technology as the Army shifted away from counterinsurgency and stability operations and prepares increasingly for large-scale combat operations.
 
Emphasizing the use of analog Military Decision Making Process products enables command posts’ continuity of operations through displacements and minimizes the need for PowerPoint slide decks.
 
Army Futures Command and unit-level initiatives to optimize tactical operations center processes continue to permeate unit headquarters across the Army, along with the occasional incorporation of commercial off-the-shelf technology and significant upgrades to communications like Tactical Network Transport On-the-Move.
 
Digital systems certainly have a place in the way forward, but without a solution to the multi-hour system boots and shutdowns needed to establish connectivity, many units opt to fight with a minimalist architecture.
 
Army is trying to improve capabilities offered by the intelligence system of record, the Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A). These are all steps in the right direction to resolve gaps in how tactical data is pushed to commanders in austere, resource-constrained environments.
 
The Army’s efforts to modernize also come with the acknowledgement that at times, commanders are being saturated with “too much data,” which can be alleviated with software improvements that allow for targeted data pulls.
 
What More Can Be Done?
 
Miniaturize Army Footprints
 
As the Army shifts back toward preparing for large-scale combat operations, it needs to look hard at the size of maneuver units’ footprints. Some units have experimented by, for example, downsizing sprawling, counterinsurgency-era mission command centers through the optimization and decentralization of legacy systems.
                                          
The current force is vulnerable to precision fires cued by visual and electromagnetic signatures, which threat forces use to target formations from the top down. The Army should move the small tent cities onto highly mobile platforms that come equipped with built-in electronics and communications suites.
 
The command centers of the future must be capable of rapid displacement with the ability to maintain scalable mission command. In order to reduce signatures, it is also in the interest of developers to hone communications suites with dedicated bandwidth that can reach back to processing, exploitation, and dissemination cells in the consolidation area.
 
No tent can replicate the mobility of mission command on wheels. Even the smallest, most mobile tents still take upwards of twenty to thirty minutes to break down and set up, even with practiced crews. Achieving this kind of mounted mobility may compel the Army to sacrifice vehicle armor for expandable capability.
 
Ultimately, this risk must be weighed against the anticipated character of future kinetic fights. The current inability to achieve rapid system displacement is so pervasive that it will require a refashioning of BCT and battalion command posts across the force.
 
The use of expandable vehicles at several BCTs, repurposed from legacy workshop vehicles, has shown that formations can adjust to the new reality. While effective, the Army should look to field these types of systems from the ground up for the next generation.
 
As legacy intelligence and signals systems are phased out, it is imperative they are not replaced with vehicles at a one-to-one ratio. Acquisitions should look to fashion systems that bring functions under fewer roofs and can displace at a moment’s notice.
 
A smaller physical presence, complete with built-in retractable antennas and dishes, will be key to dispersion and the elimination of antenna farms and other time-consuming displacement items. This will require the elimination of multi-hour system boots and shutdowns or the permanent tasking of these systems to the consolidation area.
 
Footprint reduction must also come with the institutional concession that displacement crew drills cannot fully mitigate the threat of BM-21 multiple launch rocket system salvos. While drills are important and should be trained, commanders should not let proficiency in crew displacement create a false sense of security. Systems modifications to promote mobility will be a huge challenge for the acquisitions community.
 
We need viable frameworks to get intelligence to “move at the speed of decisive action” while performing key tasks to inform commanders’ decision-making processes. The transition to reduce vulnerable forward footprints with condensed, modular systems will take time and vision.
 
At the core of this shift should be a sustained commitment to maneuver supported by precision fires. The Army will not perpetuate these successful institutional norms without more maneuverable BCT and battalion headquarters and complementary fires development to protect units from long-range artillery.
 
The unmitigated effects of adversaries’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and artillery against the American constellation of ground command posts could lead to overmatch and potential defeat on a future battlefield.
 
Mitigate Bandwidth Issues and Improve Interoperability
 
Establishing and maintaining sustained communications in remote operational environments is a struggle for even the best-trained organizations.
 
While some units master the tenets of “shoot” and “move,” the last building block, “communicate,” often remains elusive. Many units fail due to overly complicated architectures, lack of support, lack of priority, and user error.
 
Tactical bandwidth requirements continue to outpace system capabilities, with different warfighting functions demanding alternate networks to meet classification needs. The “soda straw” analogy is a popular visualization of this issue, describing how voluminous data can only flow at the rate of available “piping” or bandwidth.
 
The typical BCT pipes several levels of data networks, tactical radio, and satellite-based tracking systems simultaneously, saturating the signal environment. The lapses when moving forward headquarters leaves ample room for shutdown and startup errors.
 
The Army should seek to condense as many of these tactical data streams and functions as possible. One reliable network that is accessible across the operational environment is a reasonable aim, even if it makes networks slightly more vulnerable to electronic attack.
 
Some say the Army has already taken this step with the tactical SIPR network, but there are numerous systems that do not fall under this umbrella. This goes back to the Army’s culture of security, which is rigid by regulation but often loose in practice to reduce friction.
 
The Department of Defense consistently labels systems and documents “SECRET” when it’s not necessary, slowing down the dissemination and collection of battlefield data.
 
In essence, this creates operational barriers at lower echelons. A thorough review of future systems and documents should emphasize lowering classification when possible, reducing the security burden on commanders and freeing up bandwidth across the BCT for priority communications.
 
Achieving this kind of network would come with a tradeoff between communications and operational security in exchange for reliability and access. In this area, innovators have already started to step in, providing alternative solutions like soldier-level ATAK (Android Tactical Assault Kit) modules and encrypted communications that use cellular network backbones.
 
Though these might not work well in an austere environment and are more vulnerable to targeting by electronic warfare, the need to simplify user-level systems and encourage interoperability is paramount.
 
Simplification is an area where the Army has made some strides. There have been efforts to overhaul of the legacy DCGS-A software suite to eliminate extraneous functions, condensing essential tools into fewer, and more user-friendly, applications.
 
With regard to mission command, BCTs regularly fail to achieve doctrinal expectations using currently fielded systems. The Army can learn from “self jamming” failures and build on successful simplification efforts to balance the risks between security and reliable mass communications.
 
Pairing on-the-move mission command with at-the-halt capabilities hampers commanders’ ability to maintain tempo. Mobility enhancement and dispersion enable commanders to reduce the threat to command posts and keep vulnerable elements out of the range rings of the enemy.
 
The Army doesn’t get to choose its next conflict or adversary, but it can prepare for the fight through investments in command nodes, communications, and trust in commanders’ equipment requests.
 
A blind brigade will never be able to mass and link/coordinate effects. On the other hand, a brigade enabled by highly mobile and redundant mission command, bound together by flexibility in tactics and communication, will stand ready to meet and defeat adversaries on a future battlefield.

Each aligned Network project includes supporting Plans of Actions and Milestones that encompassing issues, risks, and mitigation plans to meet the overall strategic vision. Each project contains measurable parameters verified in advance of commencement.

Project progress measures against the originally set parameters quantifiably tracking each project’s advancement. Planning, prioritization, and coordination of these project efforts are necessary to establish and maintain tempo and momentum in system development.

Here we provide objectives addressing technical methodology and details to provide engineering details and parameters of interrelated projects across the strategy. In other words, they provide the “how” in regards to the technical parts, processes, and policies required in achieving assured C2.

1. Transform Air Ground Task Force Command and Control

Establish warfighting network providing interoperable, always present and rapid access to information in any location/condition

2. Unification

Standardize network by eliminating legacy systems, consolidating resources, and optimizing network operations

3. Applications

Establish and maintain application development standards, processes, and infrastructure allow system capabilities to be delivered rapidly and efficiently

4. Installation/Tactical Processing Nodes

Standardize capabilities of regionally aligned Installation Processing Nodes, increasing effective access to secure information

5. Command and Control Network Survivability

Ensure survivability of the Command and Control network through the most austere, challenged, and contested conditions

6. Network Security

Establish appropriate measures to protect and defend data, users, systems, connections, and missions

7. Equipment

Maintain proven Command and Control capabilities, while fielding capable, relevant, and interoperable systems employed in innovative ways

8. Workforce Training and Resources

Establish and enforce disciplined workforce skill sets and processes for delivering effective/efficient enterprise capabilities across all warfighting functions requirements

9. Enterprise Command/Control Policy

Establish enterprise policies, processes, and standards that govern the implementation, operation, and sustainment of the Command and Control network

10. Information Technology Value

Influence and shape investment opportunities to demonstrate fiscal responsibility while guiding innovation throughout Capabilities Based Assessment