“We’re moving past just simple concepts of sensors and shooters. How do we get multiple sensors and shooters integrated do we get more out of them than an individual item could provide?”
“It’s not a specific sensor to a specific shooter. On a future battlefield… just about everything is going to be a sensor. So how you do you store that data and how do you enable a smart distribution of data to the right shooter? Because we can’t build architectures that are relying upon huge pipes and just massive bandwidth to make it work.”
AMBS needs to be a cutting-edge, constantly improving network of radars, observers, and battle management to allow position of limited resources for maximum effect, aimed at exploiting the power of networked information to enable a limited force to prevail.
“If we can bring them together, you can use a sensor the Army already developed, bought and fielded to spot targets for one weapon – say, the Q-53 artillery radar – to feed targeting data into a totally different type of weapon – say, a Patriot battery.
The Army wants to plug in its new anti-aircraft and missile defense systems to the Network, but those technologies are at a critical juncture in their own individual test programs.
Army is also running tests with systems including aerial scouts, long-range missile launchers and armored vehicles.
So far, Air Force “experiments” have focused on connectivity across platforms, domains, and services. But these highly scripted and rigid kill chains simply move data; they are not exploring the stickier problems of actual battle management. Instead, what must be demonstrated is how these ABMS technologies support future operational concepts.
ABMS will be successful if completely aligned with the air defense concept of operation. It can’t just be a collection of sensors and networks randomly closing kill chains. Leaders need to understand the larger battlespace to prioritize the threats, manage available assets, and link capabilities as the battle unfolds. It is this broader functionality that will enable the services to maximize its limited assets to prevail.
Air Force should focus its experimentation on the fusion and decision functions of a battle management system. How does the system function with multiple targets and multiple assets with varying potential effects? What about the many support assets and actions? Experiments must also be tested with current platforms and tactics to be both backward- and forward-compatible.
The principal commander first determines the mission and the specific tasks required to accomplish the mission. An example of a typical set of mission tasks might be planning, establishing a command post, securing routes, providing perimeter defense, and establishing locations for providing assistance.
New Pentagon network projects seek to capture more data about real-world battlespace — then train computers to out-think human captains.
Even today’s best sonar technology doesn’t give a sub captain a very good sense of the battlespace. “What the submariners get is a low-dimensional picture. So if you are towing an array, you get information like bearing and sometimes frequency information.
There’s a lot of potentially valuable data that towed sonar doesn’t capture because it’s only collecting one type of data and only at one point. If you could collect and properly analyze sound and wave data from other points in the ocean, you could develop a much better sense of what an adversary is doing.
The strike group commander knows the strike group best. We know what we did here during deployment, and this was a lot of air-to-ground, but we didn’t do a lot of air-to-air, and we didn’t do a lot of war at sea, and we didn’t defend myself against missiles.
So we develop a scenario that will get the training required. … They did a live missile ex, shooting at supersonic targets with jamming and all high-end types of things here, to do that, the missile shot.
And there was a lot of air-to-air fighting, both live, but we also inserted virtual. So now the sailor on the scope sees five aircraft coming in, but there’s only one real one coming in for our guys to fight against.
And commander will see missiles coming in, constructive missiles. So we are pushing our live, virtual, constructive – that’s how we are accelerating along here the capability curve. “We put in that investment and that got their training up, and their readiness ratings were all green.
Network security technologies of yesterday are too large and expensive to deploy, leaving tactical networks unequipped with the mobility and scalability needed in a networked warfighting environment. Without the right technologies in place, Soldiers' views into the threat landscape can be restricted and even at times inaccurate, as real-time situational awareness of network threats is impaired.
Mission command is in part command empowering subordinates to act based on local initiative. Yet, there remains conflicting conceptions of what command and control means and what mission command even is. The military needs to reestablish a shared understanding of command and control.
The military decision making process is accomplished by members battle staff and participants from the different processes and occurs as needed. The output from this process is a division order. It is followed by a separate military decision making process that results in the commanders order for its subordinate units.
Command is what commanders do. Command and control is how they do it. Communications are the means by which they do it.